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Abstract
This thesis investigates the employment and welfare effects of social insurance programs
and minimum wage policy.
The first chapter provides new estimates of the income effect of welfare transfers on in-
dividual labor supply. Using administrative data on survivor insurance in Italy, and
quasi-experimental variation in the benefit amount received by surviving spouses, the
analysis shows that benefit losses trigger equivalent increases in earned income, imply-
ing an income effect of approximately minus one. Extensive-margin responses – in the
form of increased labor-market entry at younger ages and delayed retirement at older
ages – emerge as the main driver of the earned income response. A revealed-preference
model demonstrates that large participation responses to realized benefit drops are re-
vealing of large implicit valuations of welfare transfers in the widowhood state.
The second chapter analyzes the employment and welfare effects of short-time work pro-
grams (STW), which subsidize hour reductions in firms affected by temporary shocks.
The analysis uses administrative data from Italy and quasi-experimental variation in
STW policy rules to identify the effects of STW on firms and workers, and on reallo-
cation in the labor market. STW has a large and significant negative effect on hours, but
large and positive effects on headcount employment. However, these effects disappear
once the subsidy ends. Similarly, STW does not provide long-term insurance to workers.
Finally, STW has significant negative reallocation effects on employment growth at the
local labor market level. A conceptual framework assesses the welfare implications of
STW and provides a general formula for the optimal subsidy.
The third chapter investigates the impact of minimum wages on firm behavior and
the within-firm wage structure. The analysis exploits the natural experiment of the Na-
tional Living Wage (NLW) introduction and matched employer-employee data on En-
glish care homes. No evidence of adverse employment effects, nor firm closure is found.
Rather homes bound more tightly by the NLW exhibit smaller short-run improvements
in the quality of care services. There is strong evidence of positive wage spillovers onto
younger workers, but with there being no negative employment spillovers. Employers’
preferences for fairness emerge as the most plausible explanation for the observed wage
spillovers.
iv
The fourth chapter investigates the nature of alternative work arrangements in the UK
labor market, placing a particular focus on zero hours contracts (ZHC). Combining ex-
isting secondary data and newly collected survey data, the analysis documents the im-
portance and characteristics of ZHC work. The chapter also explores the extent to which
higher minimum wages have potential to induce a larger utilization of alternative work
arrangements by firms and, consequently, a shift in the composition of their workforce
towards more flexible, but also insecure jobs. Minimum wage increases are shown to
have resulted in a greater utilization of ZHCs in the UK social care sector, and in low
wage sectors more generally.
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1Chapter 1
When Income Effects are Large:
Labor Supply Responses and the
Value of Welfare Transfers
1.1 Introduction
The effect of income on labor supply is a parameter of great importance for both the-
ory and policy analysis. Theoretically, the income effect provides the link between the
uncompensated and the compensated elasticity through the Slutsky equation. Estimates
of the income effect, combined with estimates of the uncompensated wage elasticity, are
thus useful to back out the compensated elasticity, which is itself a key parameter for
optimal tax policy design and for the calibration of business cycle models. From a policy
perspective, income effects are central to the evaluation of a broad set of policies involv-
ing income transfers, such as social insurance programs, public pension schemes and tax
policies. Income effects are also important for welfare analysis, since they are directly
related to the marginal utility of consumption (Chetty, 2004; Chetty, 2008). Recent work
has shown that income effects are also key inputs of standard balanced-growth theory,
because they help rationalize the secular decrease in hours worked observed in many
developed and developing countries (Boppart and Krusell, 2016).
In spite of their importance for economic analysis, we still know surprisingly little
about income effects, especially in the context of welfare transfers. This is mostly due to
the fact that the effect of income on labor supply is hard to identify. Identification is of-
ten complicated by the fact that social insurance, and tax and benefit programs generally
involve simultaneous transfers of income and changes in work incentives, which make
it hard to separately identify income and substitution elasticities. The ideal experimental
setting for identification would require to randomly allocate substantial lump sums to
individuals for a long period of time. In practice, such ideal experiment is hard to come
by. For this reason, income effects have been typically either assumed away, or calibrated
to recover compensated elasticities. Most quasi-experimental estimates of income effects
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are based on transfers that are either too modest to trigger a response, or relatively short-
lived implying that observed responses may be substantially attenuated by optimization
frictions (Pencavel, 1986; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Kimball and Shapiro, 2008; Mari-
nescu, 2018). It is therefore still unresolved whether existing estimates of income effects
are indeed capturing the true effects of income on labor supply, especially in relation to
welfare transfers.
In this paper, I provide novel estimates of the income effect of welfare transfers on
individual labor supply, earnings and total income. To do so, I exploit a unique research
setting in the context of the Italian survivor insurance scheme. Survivor insurance is a
public scheme providing a pension benefit to surviving spouses of deceased retirees and
workers. The benefit is computed as a fraction of the deceased’s pension and starts from
the beginning of the month following the death.1 I take advantage of a policy change
that introduced an exogenous, large and permanent discontinuity in the fraction of the
deceased’s pension received by survivors on the basis of their spouse’s death date. Specif-
ically, the reform decreased the fraction of the deceased’s pension received by survivors
whose benefit started on or after September 1, 1995, generating a discontinuity in the ex-
pected lifetime benefit of e100,000 (or 31 percent of the mean in the pre-reform regime)
and de facto introducing two parallel benefit regimes of exogenously different generosity
that would then coexist for a long time.2
Using newly released, rich administrative data on the universe of survivor insurance
payments and survivors’ contributory histories from the Italian Social Security (INPS), I
implement a regression discontinuity design in the spousal death date – which is equiva-
lent to the benefit start date – and compare the long-term outcomes of otherwise identical
individuals receiving benefits of different generosity for a long time, in order to identify
the income effect of transfers on individual labor supply and other economic behavior.
The long-run identifying variation generated by the benefit reform offers a unique win-
dow on the long-run behavioral responses to a permanent reduction in benefits. Specif-
ically, the research setting allows to estimate long-run effects that are plausibly not at-
tenuated by short-run optimization frictions. Also, by comparing treated and control
individuals similarly affected by the loss of a spouse, the identification strategy implic-
itly controls for the confounding role of state-dependent preferences. Finally, while most
existing estimates of income effects are based on benefit expansions, this setting allows
me to explore the effects of a benefit loss.3 In this respect, it is often implied that the effect
of a positive and a negative income shock would be symmetric, but this need not be the
case if, for instance, agents are loss averse or have sticky consumption habits.
I find that survivors fully offset the benefit loss by increasing their earnings and, as a
1Entitlement to the benefit is lost upon remarriage. It otherwise continues until death.
2In the empirical analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals aged 55 and under at the time of their
spouse’s death. The expected lifetime benefit drop is computed on this sample.
3It is likely that individuals in the new regime expected higher survivor benefits, especially given that the
reform was little anticipated.
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result, do not experience any drop in disposable income. Specifically, in the fifteen years
after their spouse’s death, survivors affected by the reform lose on average e2,000 per
year, which is equivalent to a 21 percent drop relative to old-regime surviving spouses.
In response, they increase their average annual earned income by a quantity equal to
the benefit loss. This translates into an estimated marginal propensity to earn out of
unearned income (MPE) of approximately -1.0, indicating that earned income increases
one-for-one with decreases in unearned income.4 I document substantial heterogeneity
in the income effect by the relative severity of the benefit loss.
I probe the large income response by examining its underlying mechanisms. Firstly,
I decompose the earned income response along three margins: labor force participation,
hours worked and the wage rate. Labor force participation is the main driver of the
income response: a loss of e1,000 in benefits increases labor supply by 4 percentage
points on average in the fifteen years after the spouse’s death – an effect equivalent to
7 percent of the mean in the control group. The participation response is driven by both
increased labor-market entry by younger survivors and delayed retirement by older sur-
vivors. Hours worked and the wage rate are found to have a muted response to changes
in the benefit. Secondly, I uncover interesting dynamic patterns in the labor supply re-
sponse: participation responses are silent in the two years after the spouse’s death and
then grow steadily larger over time, reaching a differential of 18 percent after 15 years.
The observed pattern in the years immediately after the death is likely due to grief. The
overall dynamic is also consistent with the notion that optimization frictions, such as
adjustment costs, attenuate responses in the short run and fade away over time. The dy-
namics of hours worked and the wage rate are flat throughout the 15 years following the
spouse’s death, indicating no intensive-margin adjustments and suggesting that work
experience, human capital accumulation and effort have limited returns in the context
under study.
I investigate program substitution responses as an additional margin of adjustment
in response to the income drop.5 I find that survivor benefit reductions trigger a statis-
tically significant increase in the take-up of paid family leave and unemployment insur-
ance benefits. The magnitude of both effects is large as a percentage of the mean in the
control group. I interpret the increase in paid-family-leave take-up as an indication that
surviving spouses who increase their labor supply may be doing so under substantial
work-time constraints due to care duties. The increase in unemployment insurance take
up may instead suggest that individuals are willing to pay the cost of unemployment
stigma to increase disposable income.
Finally, I discuss the normative implications of my findings. A central result of this
4The income effect – or marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income – is measured as the change
in earned income for a unit change in unearned income.
5Program substitution refers to a change in take-up of other social assistance and social insurance pro-
grams (conditional on eligibility) in response to a change in a given program’s generosity (Inderbitzin,
Staubli, and Zweimüller, 2016).
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paper is the large labor supply and taxable income response to a negative income shock.
Why is the income effect that I estimate so large? On the one hand, if an individual in-
creases labor supply sharply in response to a benefit drop, that lost income must be of
high utility value. On the other hand, a substantial labor supply response may arise if
the cost of adjusting labor supply is small. Understanding which of these two alterna-
tive mechanisms prevails is important for welfare analysis. I first provide evidence of
there being adjustment costs associated to the observed labor supply response. I show
that the participation response to a given benefit drop is a negative function of the con-
temporaneous unemployment rate in the region in which the survivor resides. Since the
unemployment rate is arguably positively correlated with the utility cost of labor – either
because finding a job requires more search effort or because keeping an existing job re-
quires more on-the-job effort –, this evidence is consistent with the notion that adjustment
costs are non-zero in the context analyzed.
I then propose a new methodology to estimate the value of transfers, based on partic-
ipation responses to benefit losses. I demonstrate that survivors’ labor supply responses
to a realized drop in benefits reveal their implicit valuation of the benefit in the wid-
owhood state, as measured by the gap in the marginal utility of consumption between
the low-benefit and high-benefit regime. Intuitively, the extent to which individuals in-
crease work effort in response to a drop in unearned income reveals, ceteris paribus, the
consumption value that such lost income would have provided. Hence, larger responses
must mean that the lost income is highly valued and that there are large welfare gains
from recouping it. I provide conditions under which the semi-elasticity of labor force
participation to an unconditional transfer scaled by the semi-elasticity of labor supply
to the wage rate can be used to evaluate the marginal welfare gains from increased sur-
vivor insurance generosity. I estimate a marginal welfare gain of 0.5, which implies that
the marginal utility of consumption is 50 percent higher among widow(er)s in the low-
benefit regime as compared to widow(er)s in the high-benefit regime. This is in the higher
end of the range of existing estimates of the value of social insurance, unemployment in-
surance in particular. It follows that widowhood is a state with a high marginal utility
of consumption and that increasing the generosity of survivor insurance would generate
substantial welfare gains.
Whilst there is a selection issue of studying survivor insurance benefits, nonetheless
I believe there is scope for generalizability of the findings obtained in this context. In-
dividuals in my sample are spouses – prevalently women – who become widow(er)s in
their mid forties. Single-parenthood, and single-motherhood in particular, are among the
states most at risk of income insecurity and single parents make up a large proportion of
welfare recipients of programs such as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).
Hence, to the extent that widow(er)s in my sample can be representative of single parents
in general, my findings can be relevant to a larger set of public policies in the US and in
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Europe. Losing a spouse at a young age is a low-probability and relatively unpredictable
event against which households are likely to be limitedly insured. In this respect, my
estimates of the labor supply and income response are likely to provide an upper bound
of what would be expected for “shocks” that are easier to anticipate and insure ex ante,
such as own or spousal job loss and skills obsolescence. Finally, the elasticity of labor
supply may differ between marriage and widowhood, due to leisure complementarities
between spouses (Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo, 2014), a potentially increased desire to
engage in working activities due to loneliness during widowhood, or the (in)ability to
share family-related duties with a partner. To the extent that labor supply elasticities are
higher (lower) in the widowhood state, the effects estimated in this paper are likely to
provide an upper (lower) bound for what would be expected for married individuals.
Related literature and main contribution. The findings in this paper inform a long-
standing line of research on the income effect of welfare transfers on labor supply. Early
studies of the US negative income tax (NIT) and the Canada Mincome experiments that
took place simultaneously in the 1970s tend to find negative, but small and statistically
insignificant effects of income guarantees on employment and hours worked (Robins,
1985; Burtless, 1986; Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990; Hum and Simpson, 1993). Whilst the
combination of wealth transfers and marginal tax rate changes that characterizes NIT-like
experiments makes it complex to disentangle income and substitution effects, consensus
estimates set the income effect between -0.10 and 0.00. The ability to draw conclusions
from NIT experiments is however limited by data collection issues such as selective attri-
tion and earnings misreporting, and by the short duration of the programs, which raises
concerns that observed responses may be attenuated by frictions.6
To compellingly isolate income effects, subsequent studies have examined the few ex-
isting examples of unconditional cash transfers and lottery wins, as both settings do not
entail alterations of the tax structure faced by individual recipients. Studying the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians Casino Dividend, Akee et al. (2010) find results consistent with
a zero income effect four years after the start of the payments. Similar results are found
in the context of the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend (Jones and Marinescu, 2018).
However, in both studies, dividend payments may be correlated with increased job op-
portunities, implying that micro-level income effects may be compensated by opposite-
signed macro labor demand effects. Studies of lottery winners in Massachusetts (Imbens,
Rubin, and Sacerdote, 2001) and Sweden (Cesarini et al., 2017) both estimate marginal
propensities to earn out of lottery wins of -0.10. Being closest to the ideal experiment for
the identification of a causal effect, lottery studies provide internally valid and credibly
identified estimates of wealth effects on labor supply. There are, however, concerns about
the generalizability of their findings to other contexts, due to the selected nature of both
6Price and Song (2018) study the long-term effects of NIT experiments taking place in Denver and Seattle
in the 1970s on individual outcomes up to four decades after the programs ended. Treated individuals have
lower post-experimental annual earnings and a higher propensity to apply for disability insurance compared
to individuals in the control group, suggesting that income support may have important dynamic effects.
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the population of lottery players and the type of wealth shock that lottery wins consti-
tute.7,8 I contribute to this literature by providing well-identified estimates of the income
effect from a large and permanent drop in unearned income, in the long term and in the
context of publicly provided benefits.
This paper is also related more broadly to the literature on the labor supply and
program substitution effects of social insurance programs, such as disability insurance
(Bound, 1989; French and Song, 2014; Kostol and Mogstad, 2014; Autor et al., 2016; Desh-
pande, 2016a; Deshpande, 2016b; Autor et al., 2017), health insurance (Garthwaite, Gross,
and Notowidigdo, 2014), earned income tax credits (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Saez, 2010)
and retirement wealth (Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Gelber, Isen, and Song, 2016). Two of
these studies provide estimates of the income effect that are much larger than consensus
estimates in the literature and more in line with the findings in this paper. Specifically,
Deshpande (2016b) estimates a parental earnings response to the loss of Supplemental Se-
curity Income payments of approximately -1.4, while Gelber, Isen, and Song (2016) and
Gelber, Isen, and Song (2017) estimate an upper bound of the elderly earnings response
to the Social Security “Notch” of -0.6 for men and -0.89 for women.9
This paper is also partly related to a large literature on the divergence between steady-
state macro and micro elasticities of labor supply.10 Macroeconomic models of cross-
country variations in hours worked imply elasticities that are much larger than those esti-
mated using micro-level sources of identifying variation. Optimization frictions (Chetty,
2012) and the indivisibility of labor (Rogerson, 1988; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2007; Roger-
son and Wallenius, 2009) have been identified as the two main factors that can reconcile
such divergence. As previously argued, the long-run variation offered by the 1995 reform
is useful in identifying a parameter estimate likely not attenuated by short-run optimiza-
tion frictions. I show that the – arguably frictionless – micro elasticity that I estimate
is indeed statistically compatible with macro elasticities of labor supply and with the
steady-state frictionless hour elasticity identified in Chetty (2012). I also discuss the rela-
tionship between my findings and macroeconomic models of indivisible labor.
Finally, this paper contributes to a growing body of work that attempts to evaluate
the welfare gains of social insurance using empirically estimable “sufficient statistics”.
Applied predominantly in the context of unemployment insurance, consumption-based
7The cited studies find that lottery players tend to differ in their observables from the general population:
specifically, they are more likely to be male, older, less educated and with lower earnings. Lottery players
may as well differ in their unobservable characteristics, such as the degree of risk aversion. Moreover, to the
extent that lottery wins and welfare transfers are not fungible (Thaler, 1990), lottery-based estimates need
not be representative of responses to welfare transfers or other public policy schemes. Finally, the magnitude
of lottery wins is in most cases small.
8Unconditional cash transfers have been widely studied in developing countries. Recent surveys of the
existing literature are unanimous in concluding that cash transfers had no detrimental effects on employ-
ment (Bastagli et al., 2016; Banerjee et al., 2017).
9Interestingly, both those and this study exploit exogenous reductions in benefits relative to the status quo
ante (contrary to the majority of studies in the literature), hinting at potentially asymmetric responses to
benefit gains and losses (Deshpande, 2016b).
10See Chetty et al. (2011) for a review of this literature.
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approaches use consumption responses to unemployment or job loss (combined with
measures of the coefficient of relative risk aversion) to infer the value of unemployment
insurance (Baily, 1978; Gruber, 1997; Chetty, 2006a). The main limitation of consumption-
implementation approaches is their reliance on consumption data, for which availability
is limited and often partial, and where there are issues of mis-measurement and difficul-
ties with assignment to individuals within a household. From a theoretical standpoint,
the approach also relies on the potentially strong assumptions of state-independent pref-
erences and no anticipation effects. Partly in response to these limitations, recent work
has developed revealed-preference, optimization-based approaches that exploit behav-
ioral responses to estimate the welfare gains from social insurance. While most work has
been done in the context of unemployment insurance (Shimer and Werning, 2008; Chetty,
2008; Landais, 2015; Hendren, 2017), similar approaches have been developed for social
insurance against fatal and non-fatal health shocks (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2018; Dobkin
et al., 2018).11 I contribute to this literature by providing a simple revealed-preference
method based on within-state participation responses to benefit losses that allows for
state dependence and is applicable to a broad class of public policies involving income
transfers. Moreover, because it requires labor supply rather than consumption data, the
revealed-preference approach that I propose has the advantage of being widely applica-
ble given the increasingly large availability of detailed data on individual labor supply
from administrative and other sources.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the institutional details of the Ital-
ian survivor insurance scheme and of its 1995 reform, and discusses the expected effects
of the reform on individual labor supply. Section 1.3 describes the INPS administrative
data and illustrates the empirical strategy. Estimates of the effect of survivor insurance
benefits on total income, labor supply and program substitution are presented in Section
1.4. Section 1.5 examines the external validity of the findings and their relation to theo-
ries of labor supply. Section 1.6 discusses the normative implications of the findings and
provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare gains from increased survivor
insurance generosity. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Setting and Conceptual Framework
1.2.1 Background on the Italian Survivor Insurance Scheme and its 1995 Re-
form
The largest across OECD countries, the Italian survivor insurance scheme amounts to
2.4 percent of GDP and involves up to 4.4 million recipients in 2017 (INPS, 2018). The
11In recent work, Landais and Spinnewijn (2018) propose a revealed-preference approach based on
marginal propensities to consume that allows for state-dependent preferences and accounts for unobserved
margins of adjustment.
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scheme provides benefits to the relatives of deceased retirees and disability-insurance re-
cipients entitled to a state pension (in which case the survivor pension is called pensione
di reversibilità), and of deceased workers who have a minimum number of accrued weeks
of compulsory contributions towards their state pension (in which case the survivor pen-
sion is called pensione indiretta).12
The benefit is universally provided to the following surviving relatives: the surviving
spouse, even if separated or divorced provided that alimony rights have been granted
and that the spouse has not remarried; dependent children, who are minors, incapaci-
tated or students (including university students); fully-dependent minor grandchildren;
absent the above, dependent parents aged 65 and over, and siblings, who are not simul-
taneously entitled to other social security benefits. The benefit starts at the beginning of
the calendar month following the death date, irrespective of when the application is filed.
For surviving spouses, entitlement to the benefit ends once they remarry; for dependent
children and grandchildren, once they turn 18 or lose their incapacitation status; for par-
ents and siblings, once they lose their dependency or incapacitation status, or once they
become entitled to other social security benefits.13 Dependent children and grandchil-
dren aged 18-21 who are high-school students and not working are entitled to the benefit
up to age 21. University students up to age 26 are also entitled to the benefit, provided
that they are not working.
The amount of the benefit is computed as a percentage of the pension that the de-
ceased was or would have been entitled to at the time of death.14 Table 1.1 summarizes
the replacement rates – i.e. the percentage of the deceased’s pension received by surviv-
ing relatives – for different types of survivors. As reported in the first column, a spouse
without dependent children or grandchildren receives 60 percent of the pension of the
deceased, a spouse with one dependent child 80 percent and a spouse with two or more
dependent children 100 percent. Absent the spouse, the replacement rate for a sole de-
pendent child is 60 percent, for two dependent children 80 percent and for three or more
dependent children 100 percent. Absent the spouse, children or grandchildren, depen-
dent parents and siblings are entitled to 15 percent of the deceased’s pension each, up to
a total of 100 percent.
12In order to qualify for survivor insurance (pensione indiretta), deceased workers who have not yet retired
at the time of their death, must have accrued a minimum of 780 weeks of contributions or a minimum of
260 weeks of contributions, of which 156 in the five years prior to death. In case these requirements are not
met, survivors are entitled to a one-off lump-sum payment. Survivors of deceased workers with at least
one year of contribution in the five years prior to their death and whose contributory history started on or
before December 31, 1995 are entitled to a benefit equal to 45 times the amount of their contributions, up
to a cap of e2,979.90. Conditional on having an income below the social assistance threshold, survivors
of deceased workers whose contributory history started after December 31, 1995 are entitled to a one-off
payment equivalent to the number of years of contributions of the deceased times e448.00.
13Once the surviving spouse remarries, he/she receives a one-time lump-sum payment equivalent to two
years of benefits.
14In those cases in which the deceased had not yet retired at the time of death, the survivor benefit is based
on the pension that he or she would have been entitled to at the time of death, as determined by pension
contributions paid up to that date. In case the deceased was on disability insurance at the time of death, the
survivor benefit is computed on the basis of the disability benefit.
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As part of the 1995 reform of the Italian social security system (Law 335/95), the sur-
vivor insurance scheme moved from universal to means tested. The reform, which was
passed on August 8, 1995, affected all benefit payments starting on or after September
1, 1995 whose beneficiary is a spouse with no dependent children. As illustrated in the
second column of Table 1.1, the new-regime replacement rate for surviving spouses with
no dependent children nor grandchildren decreases sharply when the survivor’s annual
taxable income exceeds certain thresholds. Specifically, the replacement rate drops to 45
percent if the survivor’s income is above three times the annual minimum pension, 36
percent if above four times the annual minimum pension and 30 percent if above five
times the annual minimum pension.15 The income measure used to determine the re-
placement rate is individual taxable income, inclusive of all forms of labor income from
employment and self-employment, retirement income, pensions and retirement annu-
ities, capital income and rental income, with the exclusion of the survivor pension. Dur-
ing the application stage and in each subsequent year, survivors are required to report
their taxable income to the Social Security Administration.16 If they fail to do so, they
receive a pension equivalent to the minimum pension. The minimum pension is a min-
imum amount provided by the social security to pensioners whose pension benefit is
below a subsistence threshold. The minimum pension level is set by law each year. Table
1.B1 reports the nominal value of the minimum pension and of its multiples for the years
from 1990 to 2017.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the replacement rate schedule for individual spouses in the old
and new regime. The x-axis represents the surviving spouse’s taxable income net of the
survivor benefit, denoted by z, and the y-axis represents the survivor replacement rate
b =
B
P
, where B is the survivor benefit amount and P the pension of the deceased spouse.
The dashed line refers to the old regime, in which a flat replacement rate of 60 percent
applies uniformly irrespective of the level of z. The solid line refers instead to the new
regime, whereby survivors with taxable income in the second, third and fourth income
brackets are subject to reduced replacement rates. Denoting by j the income bracket,
where j = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Ij indicates the taxable income threshold between bracket j and j+
1.17 Importantly, the replacement rate schedule is kinked and not notched. This feature
stems from a provision of the law preventing that the sum of individual income and
survivor benefit in a higher income bracket be lower than what would be obtained in a
lower income bracket. Formally, the benefit formula in the old regime is BOj = b
O
j · P ∀ j,
where bOj = 0.6. In the new regime, the benefit formula reads B
N
j = max{bNj · P , bNj−1 ·
P + Ij−1 − z} ∀ z in bracket j, where bN1 = 0.6, bN2 = 0.45, bN3 = 0.36 and bN4 = 0.3.
Interaction with personal income taxation. The tax base for personal income taxation
15The 1995 reform left unchanged the replacement rates for all other categories of recipients, with the
exception of single dependent children whose replacement rate increased from 70 to 80 percent.
16Reported income refers to the previous fiscal year.
17More precisely, I1 is equivalent to three times the minimum pension, I2 four times the minimum pension
and I3 five times the minimum pension.
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includes all forms of labor income from employment and self-employment, retirement
income, pensions and retirement annuities, capital income and rental income, and the
survivor benefit. Importantly, since survivors under both the old and new regimes are
subject to the same personal income tax schedule, income taxes do not affect the income
wedge between old- and new-regime survivors and can therefore be assumed away in
the analytical framework.18
The 1995 pension reform. The 1995 reform of survivor benefits was part of a broader
set of measures, known as the “Dini Reform”, whose main objective was to improve
the financial sustainability of the Italian social security system. While remaining pay-as-
you-go, the new pension system moved from a defined-benefit to a notionally defined-
contribution scheme, and introduced greater flexibility in the retirement age. The reform
initiated a progressive transition to the new system: workers with at least 18 years of
contributions as of December 31, 1995 remained under the old defined-benefit system;
workers with less than 18 years of contributions would be subject to a pro-rata system,
with pension benefits computed using the defined-benefit formula up to the end of 1995
and the notionally defined-contribution formula starting from January 1, 1996; workers
entering the labor market on or after January 1, 1996 would be fully subject to the new
notionally-defined contribution system. In spite of the close timing of the pension and
survivor insurance reforms, the former is unlikely to have any confounding effect on
the identification of the causal impact of the latter, since the threshold dates of the two
reforms are different. In Section 1.3.2, I will provide evidence that the effect of the pension
reform is smooth at the September 1, 1995 cutoff.
1.2.2 Expected Effects of the 1995 Reform of Survivor Insurance
As illustrated in Section 1.2.1, the 1995 reform of survivor insurance generated a sub-
stantial change in the benefit schedule of surviving spouses without dependent children
nor grandchildren. In this section, I describe the impact of the reform on the budget
constraint of those spouses and its expected effects on their labor supply decisions.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the effect of the reform on the survivor’s budget set in the (z, c)
plane, where z indicates taxable income net of the survivor benefit and c denotes dis-
posable income. Specifically, c = z + B(P, b(z)) − T(z + B(P, b(z))), where B(·) is the
survivor benefit, which is a function of the pension of the deceased P and of the re-
placement rate b(z); T(·) is a tax function representing personal income taxes payable
on taxable income including the survivor benefit (z + B(·)). The dashed line represents
the individual budget constraint under the old regime, while the solid line the individual
budget constraint under the new regime. The vertical bars indicate the income brackets
relevant to the determination of the benefit replacement rate in the new regime. Without
any loss of generality, the plotted budget is constructed using the mean value of P, the
18Personal income tax brackets do not coincide with the income thresholds relevant to the computation of
the survivor benefit in any of the years in the analysis.
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income thresholds and the personal income tax parameters in effect at the time of the
1995 reform.19 Individual utility increases with disposable income c, since disposable
income provides consumption, and decreases with taxable income z, since it is costly to
gain income.
In a static framework, survivors with taxable income above z > I′3 experience a pure
negative income effect with no change in the net-of-tax rate. Under the standard assump-
tion that leisure is a normal good, individuals should respond to the negative income
shock by increasing labor supply and hence taxable income. The same is true for indi-
viduals with taxable income in the ranges [I′1, I2] and [I
′
2, I3]. Individuals with income
z ∈ [Ij, I′j ] for j = 1, 2, 3 experience both a negative income effect and an increase in the
marginal tax rate on taxable income.20 By reducing the net reward from additional work,
the reform creates substitution incentives to reduce labor supply and taxable income for
these individuals. In particular, given that the marginal tax rate is effectively equal to
100 percent for z ∈ [Ij, I′j ], it is suboptimal for individuals to locate in this range. As-
suming that the income-generating ability distribution is smooth, we should expect all
treated individuals who would counterfactually locate in [Ij, I′j ] to bunch at the convex
kink Ij. However, since the range of taxable incomes over which the reform creates sub-
stitution incentives is narrow, one might expect negative labor supply responses to be
limited. Conversely, positive labor-supply responses to the pure income effect are ex-
pected to arise over most of the taxable income distribution. The reform does not affect
individuals with income z < I. Thus, we do not expect to observe any changes for these
individuals.
From a dynamic perspective, individuals under new-regime rules face lower net re-
turns from each additional year of work. This is illustrated in Figure 1.A1, which shows
the relationship between lifetime consumption and the number of years of work (out of
the total number of available years). The dashed line represents the individual lifetime
budget constraint under the old regime, while the solid line under the new regime. It
is clear from the graph that the reform creates dynamic income effects and substitution
incentives with opposite expected effects on labor supply: income effects play in the di-
rection of increasing labor supply at the extensive margin, for instance through a delay of
labor-market exit and retirement; substitution incentives have the opposite effect.21 The
fact that income and substitution incentives work in opposite directions implies ambigu-
ous expected effects on labor force participation along both the entry and the exit margin.
Hence, it is an empirical question whether dynamic income or substitution effects prevail
in the context of analysis.
19It is apparent from the graph that, by affecting individuals under both regimes in the same way, personal
income taxation does not add to the wedge between the old and new regime benefit schedules.
20Formally, I′ = (bNj−1 − bNj )P + Ij−1.
21The discussion rests implicitly on the assumption that leisure is a normal good.
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1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Data
I use novel, confidential administrative data from the Italian Social Security (INPS) on the
universe of survivor benefits in Italy. The survivor insurance archive comprises all sur-
vivor insurance benefits paid out to survivors of deceased retirees, disability insurance
recipients and workers in the private sector, with starting date between January 1, 1990
and December 1, 2000. The archive includes detailed annual benefit information for each
individual beneficiary within the household. Available information includes the start and
end dates of the benefit, the pension of the deceased, the amount of the benefit before and
after means testing, the number of beneficiaries in the household and their relationship
to the deceased, the survivor’s taxable income used to determine the replacement rate
and the reason for benefit entitlement loss in case of benefit exhaustion.22
The survivor benefit archive can be linked to individual survivors’ contributory his-
tories that span from as early as 1900 up to 2017. The contributory archives provide
detailed information on the entire working history of individuals, including both em-
ployment spells and spells related to in-work and out-of work social insurance, such as
parental and family leave, sick leave and unemployment insurance. Information is also
available on the duration of each spell and on earnings in each employment spell. The
sample covers all employees of the private and public sector, as well as self-employed
workers, independent contractors and professionals. For the subgroup of private-sector
employees, I link the contributory records to the UNIEMENS file, which gives informa-
tion on the type of contract held by the worker (i.e. whether full-time or part-time), a
unique identifier of the firm, the 5-digit industry code and the province in which he or
she works in each year from 1983 to 2017. Finally, the data can be linked to the demo-
graphic archive, which provides information on gender, municipality of birth, birth date,
retirement date and death date.
Combining the survivor benefit, contributory history and demographic archives, I
build up a panel of individual working and benefit histories of survivor benefit recipi-
ents at annual frequency. The final dataset is a balanced panel of approximately 95,000
survivors spanning from six years before to 15 years after the spouse’s death.23 The sam-
ple comprises all surviving spouses aged 55 and under and not yet retired at the time of
their spouse’s death, and whose benefit started between September 1, 1993 and August
22The data do not report the cause of death.
23The balanced panel is conditional on the surviving spouse being alive in the 15 years after the spouse’s
death, and unconditional on employment and remarriage. When considering a balanced sample of sur-
vivors unconditional on survival, the survival rate 15 years after the spouse’s death is not discontinuous at
the cutoff. Similarly, there is no discontinuity in the survival rate 19 years after the spouse’s death in the
balanced sample used in the analysis. The remarriage rate – measured 15 years after the spouse’s death – is
approximately 5.6 percent. Remarriage occurs on average 10 years after the former spouse’s death. There
is no statistically significant discontinuity in the remarriage rate 15 years after the spouse’s death nor in the
time to remarriage.
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1, 1997.24 Information on the number of formally dependent children and grandchildren
is included in the data.
The first two columns in Table 1.B2 report the mean and standard deviation of a set
of individual characteristics for the main sample. The sample is predominantly female
(90 percent) and the average age in t = 0 is 46.9 years. At the time of their spouse’s
death, 45 percent have dependent children, aged 13 years on average, and 40 percent are
employed. Average annual labor earnings (unconditional on employment) are e6,200.25
The average monthly survivor benefit in t = 0 amounts to e690, which translates into an
average annual benefit of e9,700.26 The table also reports separate summary statistics for
surviving spouses whose benefit started before (“control” group) and after (“treatment”
group) September 1, 1995.
1.3.2 Empirical Strategy and Identification Checks
The 1995 reform naturally defines a treatment and a control group as a function of the
spouse’s death date: benefits starting before September 1, 1995 fall under the universal
scheme (henceforth, “control” group), while benefits starting on or after that date un-
der the means-tested scheme (“treatment” group). In this way, the reform introduces a
new, less generous benefit schedule that will coexist parallel to the old one until all old-
regime benefits will have been exhausted. Such quasi-experimental variation allows to
estimate the causal effect of unearned income on individual labor supply, earnings and
total income, by comparing otherwise identical individuals subject to exogenously dif-
ferent benefit schedules for the rest of their lives. The ability to estimate labor supply
and total income responses from long-run variation in unearned income is an important
feature of this research setting, because it allows to obtain estimates likely not attenuated
by short-run optimization frictions and therefore closer to the structural parameter of in-
terest. A second important feature of this research setting is that, by comparing treated
and control individuals similarly affected by a spouse’s death, it implicitly controls for
state dependent preferences and potential anticipation effects.
The structural model that describes the causal relationship of interest is:
Yit = α+ β · Bit + X′it · γ+ ε it (1.1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest Y for individual i; t indicates event-time years after
the death event; Bit is the amount of the survivor benefit received by i in t; and Xit rep-
resents a vector of controls. In this model, the parameter of interest is β, which captures
the causal effect of unearned income Bit on the outcome Yit. For Y = z, where z is taxable
24The choice of restricting the sample to spouses experiencing the shock at or before age 55 is motivated
by the fact that I analyze long-run labor supply responses up to 15 years after the spouse’s death. The modal
age of retirement in the data is 60 and retirement can be considered an absorbing state in the Italian context.
25All monetary quantities are expressed in 2010 prices.
26The annual benefit is equivalent to 14 monthly instalments. Survivors receive twice the monthly benefit
amount in July and December each year.
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income, β identifies the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income MPE =
dz
dB
.
Given the potential endogeneity of B, I exploit exogenous variation in the benefit replace-
ment rate due to the 1995 reform and use the September 1995 cutoff as an instrument for
B.
The policy change lends itself to the implementation of a regression discontinuity
(RD) design in the benefit start date around the September 1, 1995 cutoff.27 The em-
pirical strategy for this RD design is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The x-axis represents the
month-year of benefit start, with the vertical line indicating the September 1995 thresh-
old. The graph shows the average replacement rate by month-of-benefit-start bin for
surviving spouses with taxable income in the second, third and fourth income brackets
in the first year of benefit receipt. The graph provides compelling evidence of the reform
implementation: all benefit payments with start date prior to the cutoff had a replace-
ment rate of 0.6; benefit payments with start date immediately after the cutoff have a
substantially lower replacement rate. At the threshold, the replacement rate drops by 14
percentage points to 0.44. Because of this sharp and exogenous discontinuity in the ben-
efit replacement rate, I can estimate the structural form in model 1.1 using the September
1995 threshold as an instrument for B.
The first stage equation is estimated using a parametric RD specification of the fol-
lowing form:
Bit = α0 + β0 · I[τi ≥ 0] +
K
∑
k=1
αk · τki +
K
∑
k=1
βk · τki · I[τi ≥ 0] + X′it · δ+ µit (1.2)
where τi is the benefit start date for survivor i normalized so that τ = 0 at the cutoff
date of September 1, 1995, and all other variables are defined as before. The coefficient
of interest capturing the effect of the discontinuity at τ = 0 is β0. Polynomials in τ of
order K are included to control in a flexible way for the effect of benefit start date τ on
the outcome variable. The reduced-form equation is equivalent to equation 1.2 with Yit
as outcome variable:
Yit = θ0 + η0 · I[τi ≥ 0] +
K
∑
k=1
θk · τki +
K
∑
k=1
ηk · τki · I[τi ≥ 0] + X′it · λ+ νit (1.3)
The key assumption for identification in an RD design is that treatment is as good
as randomly assigned in a neighborhood of the cutoff and that counterfactual outcomes
are smooth at the cutoff. This identification requirement would be invalidated if there
were some strategic manipulation around the threshold in anticipation or in response to
the policy change. Figure 1.A2 plots the probability density function of benefit recipients
by month-year of benefit start for the entire sample (Panel A) and for the subgroup of
individuals with taxable income in the second or higher income bracket at time t = 0
27Note that using the benefit start date as running variable is essentially equivalent to using the deceased’s
death date, since benefits start on the first day of the month immediately after the death.
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(Panel B). There is no visible discontinuity in the density around the threshold in none
of the two plots. The McCrary test statistics reported on each panel do not reject the null
hypothesis of no discontinuity at the threshold. On top of providing supporting evidence
for the identifying assumption, these results also show that the reform had no effect on
survivor benefit take-up.
The RD identifying assumption implies that individuals around the cutoff are com-
parable in their observable and unobservable characteristics. I perform a covariate bal-
ancing test using parametric and non-parametric RD specifications. As reported in Table
1.B3, covariates are balanced under both the linear and quadratic parametric specifica-
tions, and the local linear regression specification. It is worth emphasizing that the pro-
portion of individuals subject to a defined-benefit pension regime is smooth at the cutoff,
indicating that the 1995 reform is not a confounder in the estimation of the causal ef-
fect of the 1995 survivor benefit reform. Based on the balancing test results, I select the
parametric RD with a second-order polynomial fit and with covariates as my preferred
specification. Output tables also report estimates for the parametric linear specification.
Estimates are based on month-of-benefit-start bins and a symmetric bandwidth of 24
months. Figures 1.A3, 1.A4 and 1.A5 report parametric quadratic RD estimates of the
main outcomes of interest for a set of different bandwidths.
As illustrated in Section 1.2.2, the reform only affects individuals with incomes in the
second or higher brackets. In order to focus on the subgroup of individuals that are more
likely to be affected by the reform, ideally I would need a measure of the counterfactual
income bracket in which treated individuals would locate absent the reform. On the one
hand, the observed income bracket in t = 0 (i.e. in the first year in which it is recorded
in the data) may be sufficiently exogenous to labor supply choices in response to the re-
form in a neighborhood of the 1995 cutoff. However, it is unlikely to be a good proxy
for the long-run income bracket in both the treatment and control group, due to idiosyn-
cratic income shocks correlated with the spouse’s death. On the other hand, the observed
longer-run income bracket is endogenous to the policy change for individuals in the treat-
ment group. To overcome these limitations, I employ statistical-learning techniques and
develop an empirical model to predict the long-run counterfactual income bracket in
the treatment group using observations in the control group. Having randomly selected
ten percent of individuals in the control group (training sample), I predict their income
bracket at time t = 10 using a rich set of pre-determined demographic characteristics
and variables related to their working history prior to widowhood. Among this rich set
of covariates, I select a parsimonious subset of most relevant predictors using a Lasso
estimator. Finally, I apply the coefficients of the prediction model – an OLS regression
of income bracket in t = 10 on the selected covariates – to observations in the treatment
group and predict their long-run counterfactual income bracket. This procedure allows
to define a group of individuals, in both treatment and control groups, with predicted
income in the second or higher income brackets. I conduct the empirical analysis on this
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sample, since it is the one likely most affected by the reform.
Summary statistics for the sample with predicted income in the second or higher in-
come bracket are reported in Table 1.B4, both for the full sample and for the treatment
and control groups separately. As one would expect, the sample of “affected” survivors
has larger average labor income (e24,200) and a much higher labor force participation
rate (0.96 in t = −1) as compared to the full sample. The sample is still predominantly –
albeit less prominently – female (64 percent) and slightly younger than the main sample
(43.5 years old on average). The average monthly benefit is also higher, consistent with
the notion of assortative mating.
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the policy change creates a large income effect for all
individuals with taxable income in the second or higher income brackets. At the same
time, substitution incentives may arise as a result of marginal tax rate changes over small
portions of the taxable income distribution. In order to identify the marginal propensity
to earn out of unearned income – the income effect –, I first estimate the effect of the bene-
fit on taxable income using the IV-RD strategy described above. Formally, if substitution
incentives matter and the compensated elasticity is greater than zero, then the IV-RD
estimate of β provides a lower bound of the true income effect.28 Secondly, I provide
evidence consistent with substitution incentives having a limited role and conclude that
the estimated βˆ coefficient from model 1.1 indeed provides a measure of the structural
marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 First Stage
Based on the empirical strategy outlined in the previous section, I use having benefit start
date on or after September 1, 1995 as an instrument for the amount of survivor benefit
received. Figure 1.4 shows the first-stage effect of benefit start date on expected lifetime
benefit in t = 0. The lifetime benefit is computed by multiplying the annual benefit in
t = 0 by life expectancy at time t = 0. Life expectancy tables are obtained from the Italian
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and are split by gender, age, calendar year and region of res-
idence. The discontinuity in lifetime benefits is estimated to be approximately e100,000
and is equivalent to a 31 percent drop when compared the mean in the control group.29
The RD estimate is large and highly statistically significant, indicating that having ben-
efit start date on or after the cutoff date indeed translates into a substantial reduction in
benefits.
Table 1.2 reports estimates of the coefficient β0 from equation 1.2 using either the
annual benefit in t = 0 or the expected lifetime benefit in t = 0 as outcome variable.
28From the Slutsky equation, the total (uncompensated) labor supply response to a benefit change is the
sum of a positive compensated effect and a negative income effect (= dz/dB).
29The mean in the control group is measured as the average of the outcome variable for surviving spouses
with benefit start date between May and August 1995.
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Estimates in the top panel are based on the sample of individuals with predicted second
or higher income bracket, while those in the bottom panel on the full sample of surviving
spouses. According to the estimates reported in column (4) of the top panel, individuals
with benefit start date after the cutoff receive annual benefits in t = 0 that are on average
e2140 or 25.2 percent lower than those received by otherwise identical individuals in the
control group. The second row of the top panel of Table 1.2 reports the RD estimate of the
effect of the reform on survivor’s lifetime benefit, which was discussed in the previous
paragraph.
The bottom panel of Table 1.2 shows similar estimates for the full sample of surviving
spouses. Consistent with part of this sample having taxable income z < I1 and hence
not being affected by the reform, the estimated effect is smaller than the one reported in
the top panel. Specifically, the annual benefit drop in t = 0 is of e600 (7.1 percent of the
mean in the control group) and the expected lifetime benefit drop as of t = 0 is ofe23,600
(3.9 percent of the mean in the control group). These results confirm that the prediction
model described in Section 1.3.2 well identifies a subgroup of individuals most heavily
affected by the reform.
1.4.2 Effect of the Benefit on Taxable and Disposable Income
In this section, I estimate the long-run effect of the benefit on taxable income and dispos-
able income. I first provide reduced-form evidence of the effect of the 1995 reform on the
outcomes of interest. I then complement the reduced-form evidence with structural-form
estimates of the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income from IV estimation
of model 1.1. In the analysis, I follow an extensive literature that uses taxable income
as an all-encompassing measure of labor and other behavioral margins of response to
changes in the tax and benefit system (Feldstein, 1995; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012).
Of course, there could be additional sources of income that are unobserved in the data,
for instance undeclared income and income support from relatives. If anything, the effect
that I estimate should be a lower bound of the true effect if unobserved income plays a
similar role in response to the benefit reduction.
Panel A of Figure 1.5 reports the reduced-form RD effect of the reform on the average
annual benefit over the fifteen years after the spouse’s death. The graph is constructed
pooling event time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Individuals in the treatment group re-
ceive approximately e2,000 less in survivor benefits on average each year – an amount
equivalent to 20.7 percent of the mean in the control group. At the same time, their re-
ported taxable income (excluding the survivor benefit) is on average e2,300 or 15.8 per-
cent larger than that in the control group over the same time period (Panel B). The sum of
these two roughly equally sized but opposite signed effects implies that the net reduced-
form effect on disposable income is quantitatively small and precisely equivalent to e300
or 1.5 percent over the mean in the control group (Panel C). Regression estimates of the
reduced-form model for average annual benefit, taxable income and disposable income
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are reported in Table 1.3. The reduced-form results indicate that individuals fully offset
the benefit loss with a tantamount increase in taxable income in the fifteen years follow-
ing their spouse’s death. This is also confirmed by the IV-RD estimates of the β coefficient
of model 1.1 reported in Table 1.4. According to the estimates in column (3), the marginal
propensity to earn out of unearned income is equal to -1, i.e. a e1 decrease in average
annual survivor benefits is associated with a e1 increase in taxable income.30 Such esti-
mated effect is large and provides a lower bound of the true income effect for a positive
compensated elasticity. The 95 percent confidence interval around the estimate allows to
reject parameter estimates lower than 0.4 in absolute value, which is itself at least twice
as large as most existing estimates in the literature. Consistent with the reduced-form
evidence, the net effect on disposable income is essentially zero (column (4) of Table 1.4).
Rescaling the estimated income effect by the ratio of the benefit to taxable income
provides a measure of the income elasticity, i.e. the percent change in taxable income
for a one percent change in the benefit. Since the ratio B/z is approximately 0.6 in a
left neighborhood of the threshold, it follows that the income elasticity is approximately
-0.6. Based on a 95 percent confidence interval, I can reject elasticities lower than 0.25 in
absolute value.
Mean income effects mask substantial heterogeneity across subgroups. As shown
in Table 1.B5, the income effect is one order of magnitude larger, in absolute value, for
women than for men. Such heterogeneity in income effects likely reflects heterogeneity
in the severity of the income shock across gender. Since women are predominantly sec-
ondary earners in the household, the benefit drop that female survivors face as a conse-
quence of the reform is, on average, larger than that of male survivors. This is confirmed
by the results in Table 1.B5, which show that female survivors lose approximately e2000
per year, while male survivors only e700. Moreover – as secondary earners – female sur-
vivors tend to have lower taxable incomes than male survivors, as illustrated in Panel A
of Figure 1.A6. The graph plots the empirical distribution of the predicted taxable income
bracket by gender and shows that, indeed, female survivors tend to have lower predicted
taxable incomes then male survivors. The greater severity of the income shock faced by
female survivors is a factor that can help explaining the substantially larger income re-
sponse among this group. Turning to heterogeneity by age at the time of the spouse’s
death, the income effect is monotonically decreasing over the life cycle. This pattern may
be explained by the fact that the ability to increase earned income declines at older ages,
due to both higher disutility from work and slimmer labor market opportunities. The
availability of sources of self-insurance other than labor supply, such as savings and chil-
dren’s labor supply, may also be greater at older ages, thus limiting the need to adjust
30The estimate of the income effect is robust to different parametric specifications. The linear and quadratic
specifications are statistically similar (Table 1.4). The parametric quadratic estimates are stable across band-
widths, with the exception of the 18-month bandwidth (Figure 1.A3).
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taxable income.31
Validating the identification of the income effect. I now turn to investigating how
important substitution incentives are in the context of analysis. Firstly, I show that the
estimated income effect is robust to the exclusion of individuals with taxable income
in a neighborhood of the convex kinks created by the reform. Table 1.B6 reports the
IV estimate of the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income, based on the
sample of individuals with predicted income in the second or higher income bracket,
with the exclusion of individuals whose observed taxable income falls in the second or
third income bracket. The IV-RD estimate of the income effect is in line with the one
obtained in the main sample, though less precisely estimated due to smaller sample size.
Secondly, I take advantage of the discontinuities in the marginal tax rate introduced
by the 1995 reform to infer the value of the compensated elasticity using a bunching esti-
mator (Saez, 2010; Kleven, 2016). Let individual preferences be defined over disposable
income (consumption) and taxable income (work effort). A utility function representing
such preferences is U = u(z− T(z), z/θ), where T(·) is a tax function and θ is income-
generating ability, distributed with probability density function f (θ). If T(·) is linear and
f (θ) smooth, then the probability density function of z is also smooth. Figure 1.A7 il-
lustrates a theoretical density function of taxable income z. The dashed line illustrates
the case of a smooth density function. By introducing discrete changes in the marginal
tax rate, the reform creates three convex kinks in the budget constraint of treated indi-
viduals at z = Ij for j = 1, 2, 3. Absent the kink (as under old-regime rules), individuals
would locate smoothly along the old-regime budget set. Once introduced, the convex
kink creates a disincentive for individuals to locate in the range [Ij, I′j ] (since the marginal
unit of income is taxed away at a 100 percent tax rate over that range) and induces in-
dividuals who would counterfactually locate in that range to bunch at Ij. This behavior
will give rise to excess bunching in the taxable income density function at the kink point
and to a left-shift in the density above the kink, as illustrated by the solid line in Figure
1.A7. Hence, the presence of bunching provides compelling evidence of taxable income
responses to the marginal tax rate change. As shown in Saez (2010), the amount of excess
bunching is proportional to the compensated elasticity of taxable income and can be used
to identify such elasticity.
The 1995 reform introduced three convex kinks in the budget set of individuals in
the treatment group (Figure 1.2). If substitution incentives are at play, we should observe
bunching around kinks in the treatment group and a smooth density in the control group.
Figure 1.6 plots the empirical distribution of taxable income pooling observations around
the three convex kinks created by the reform and pooling all years from t = 0 to t = 15.32
31As Panel B of Figure 1.A6 shows, differences in the empirical distribution of predicted taxable income
bracket across age groups are limited. For individuals in the 50-55 age group at the time of their spouse’s
death, the distribution has slightly more mass at the lower end of the distribution.
32Results do not change when replicating the analysis around each of the three kinks separately and for
each of the event-time years separately.
Chapter 1. When Income Effects are Large:
Labor Supply Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
20
The vertical bar represents the location of the convex kink. Each dot refers to ae200 bin in
the range [−2, 700; 2, 700] centered around the kink. Black circles represent observations
in the treatment group (kinked budget), while hollow circles observations in the control
group (smooth budget). The empirical distributions of both groups appear rather similar
throughout the range and equally smooth around the kink, in spite of the rather different
incentives faced by the two groups at that point of the income distribution.
In principle, the absence of excess bunching is consistent with different theoretical
interpretations: on the one hand, it is consistent with the compensated structural elastic-
ity being small; on the other hand, it is also consistent with the compensated structural
elasticity not being small, but the observed elasticity being attenuated by optimization
frictions. Optimization frictions may come in the form of costs of adjusting labor supply,
such as hour constraints, or in the form of imperfect information, inattention and inertia.
Adjustment costs are believed to be of less importance for self-employed workers and to
become more attenuated over time. Yet, even when splitting the sample between self-
employed and wage earners – as illustrated in Panels A and B of Figure 1.A8, for individ-
uals in the treatment and the control group respectively –, there appears to be no visible
difference in the empirical densities nor excess bunching at the kink for self-employed
in the treatment group. This evidence is thus consistent with the fact that adjustment
costs may not be responsible for the lack of excess bunching. Adjustment costs, imper-
fect information and inertia should all fade away in the long term. The graphs in Figures
1.6 and 1.A8 are both constructed using observations for event-time years from t = 0 to
t = 15 – a time span that should be sufficiently long for adjustment costs, information
frictions and inertia to dissipate. Thus, the lack of bunching over such a long period of
time seems unlikely to be due to these types of frictions.
Cognitive biases may make individuals misperceive the way in which the new-regime
benefit schedule affects the budget constraint.33 One such possibility is that the benefit
schedule (and in turn the budget constraint) is understood as notched and not kinked. If
this were the case, however, one should still expect to see excess bunching at the kinks,
making this type of misperception unsuitable to explaining the lack of bunching. A type
of cognitive bias consistent with the absence of bunching is “ironing”, whereby individ-
uals make decisions based on average rather than marginal tax rates and, therefore, do
not react to the latter. Cognitive bias, inattention and low salience of the benefit schedule
are all factors that could explain the absence of bunching. Whilst I cannot completely
rule out their playing a role, nonetheless I can exclude that individuals are responding to
static substitution incentives in the context that I study. Individuals may still be respond-
ing to dynamic substitution incentives, in which case the estimated βˆ is a lower bound
(in absolute value) of the structural income effect.
Comparison with existing quasi-experimental estimates. The taxable income re-
sponse estimated in this paper is substantially larger than the existing empirical estimates
33This is what Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) call “schmeduling”.
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of the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income. As outlined in the intro-
ductory section, the literature on NIT experiments and lottery wins places a consensus
estimate of the income effect at approximately -0.10 (Robins, 1985; Hum and Simpson,
1993; Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990; Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote, 2001; Cesarini et al.,
2017). Yet, recent studies have found larger income effects on earnings in the context of
disability insurance and social security wealth in the US. Deshpande (2016b) estimates a
parental earnings response to the loss of Supplemental Security Income of approximately
-1.4, while Gelber, Isen, and Song (2016) and Gelber, Isen, and Song (2017) estimate an
upper bound of the elderly earnings response to the Social Security “Notch” of -0.6 for
men and -0.89 for women.
The results in this paper are not necessarily inconsistent with the smaller estimates
found in the literature. I here consider potential explanations for finding large income
effects. Firstly, differences in the observable and unobservable characteristics – such as
the degree of risk aversion – of the populations of analysis may explain differences in
their marginal propensities to earn out of unearned income.34 Secondly, responses may
differ with respect to the type of income shock. In this regard, individuals may respond
asymmetrically to gains and losses of unearned income (Deshpande, 2016b): responses
to unearned income losses are likely to be larger than responses to unearned income
gains whenever individuals are loss averse, have minimum income targets or sticky con-
sumption habits (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006; Chetty and Szeidl, 2007; Chetty and Szeidl,
2016).35 The degree to which individuals are ex-ante insured against the income shock
is also a factor that can influence the magnitude of the income effect. Finally, individu-
als may behave differently with respect to different types of income and, consequently,
have different marginal propensities to consume or earn out of different sources of un-
earned income (e.g. lottery wins as opposed to welfare transfers). This is what Thaler,
1990 refers to as (absence of) fungibility. Given the available data, I have limited ability
to probe these explanations.
Compatibility with macro elasticities of labor supply. I also examine whether the
micro elasticity that I estimate is consistent with macro elasticities of labor supply. It has
long been recognized that estimates of steady-state macro elasticities diverge from micro
ones. Specifically, macroeconomic models of cross-country variations in hours worked
imply elasticities that are much larger than those estimated using sources of identifying
variation at the micro level (Chetty et al., 2013). The literature has identified two main
factors that can reconcile the macro and micro evidence on the elasticity of labor sup-
ply: optimization frictions (Chetty, 2012) and the indivisibility of labor (Rogerson, 1988;
34As shown in Chetty (2004), the coefficient of risk aversion is directly related to the size of the income
effect on labor supply. Ceteris paribus, large income effects are evidence that utility over consumption is
highly curved. Intuitively, if an individual increases labor supply sharply in response to a given drop in
unearned income, it must mean that the marginal utility of consumption increases quickly when income
falls, meaning that the individual is highly risk averse.
35Whilst individuals in the new regime never got the higher, old-regime benefit level, it is still the case
that they may have expected higher benefits, especially given that the reform was little anticipated.
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Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2007; Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009). Specifically, optimization
frictions are likely responsible for the substantial attenuation of micro elasticities. The
small and short-run policy variation that is typically exploited to identify micro elastici-
ties is unlikely to generate large labor supply responses precisely due to optimization fric-
tions such as adjustment costs. On the other hand, labor supply indivisibility – whereby
agents face fixed labor-market entry costs or intensive-margin rigidities – is a feature of
several macroeconomic models that reproduce large labor supply elasticities, and show
that both intensive and extensive margins of labor supply are important to describe hour
fluctuations.
Using data for OECD countries from 1985 to 2015, I run a simple regression of the
logarithm of hours of work per person on the logarithm of GDP per hour, controlling
for country and calendar year fixed effects.36 Figure 1.A9 reports a binned scatter plot
of the regression of interest. The estimated elasticity of hours worked to GDP per hour
is -0.56.37,38 The latter is statistically compatible with my micro estimate, and with the
steady-state frictionless hour elasticity identified in Chetty (2012). Overall, this result
suggests that the long-run identifying variation exploited in this paper can indeed prove
useful in delivering a parameter estimate not attenuated by short-run optimization fric-
tions.
1.4.3 Labor Supply Responses
The large taxable income response to the benefit cut prompts several questions. In this
and the following section, I probe the mechanisms behind the income response. I first
investigate the anatomy and dynamic of the labor supply response, and then examine
effects on program substitution.
Anatomy of labor supply responses. The effect on earned income can be decom-
posed along three margins: labor force participation, hours of work and the wage rate.
Figure 1.7 shows the reduced-form effect of the reform on labor force participation, pool-
ing event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Labor force participation is 7.6 percentage
points higher to the right of the cutoff. This effect is equivalent to a 12.7 percent increase
over the mean in the control group. The IV-RD estimate reported in Table 1.6 indicates
that an average annual e1,000 decrease in the survivor benefit leads to a 4 percentage
point increase in labor force participation (6.6 percent over the mean in the control group).
Another measure of the extensive margin of labor supply is the number of years of cu-
mulated experience in the 15 years after the spouse’s death. As reported in Table 1.5,
36The countries included in the sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland,
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States.
37The robust standard error of the coefficient estimate is 0.065. The estimated macro elasticity is likely
to conflate both substitution and income effects, and thus likely to provide a lower bound of the income
elasticity itself.
38I also run an alternative specification in which I regress the logarithm of hours of work per person on the
logarithm of total factor productivity, controlling for country and calendar year fixed effects. The estimated
elasticity is -0.30 (robust standard error 0.077). Results are available upon request.
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cumulated experience in t = 15 is approximately 1.1 year higher for individuals in the
treatment group.
The observed participation response could be due to either increased entry in the
labor market or delayed exit from the labor market. Figure 1.8 shows a decomposition of
the increase in cumulated experience over the 15 years after the death along the entry and
exit margin. Specifically, the first bar to the left reports the average increase in cumulated
work experience over those 15 years (equivalent to 1.1 years). The remaining three bars
decompose such effect into increased entry (second bar from the left) and delayed exit,
distinguishing between delayed exit in the form of delayed non-employment (third bar
from the left) and delayed retirement (fourth bar from the left). I measure the entry
margin by looking at the participation response of individuals who were not working
in t = −1 and weight the estimate by the share of such individuals in the full sample.
I measure delayed non-employment and delayed retirement as the reduced-form effect
on the number of years not in employment (excluding retirement) and the number of
years in retirement over the 15 years after the spouse’s death (weighted by the share of
individuals who were working in the year before their spouse’s death). The observed
participation response is driven both by increased entry and postponed retirement. In
particular, delayed retirement appears to be the main driver of the labor supply response.
The delay-effect on retirement is also confirmed by the reduced-form estimates in Table
1.5 and the IV estimates in Table 1.6: according to the latter, an average annual e1,000
decrease in the survivor benefit leads to a 10 percentage point decrease in the retirement
rate in t = 15, representing a 19 percent decrease relative to the mean in the control
group.39
Being an average effect, the result in Figure 1.8 is largely driven by the age composi-
tion of the sample and masks important responses along the entry margin by individuals
at younger ages. To shed light on this point, Figure 1.9 outlines the profile of the par-
ticipation response by age in t = 0. The shaded area shows the 95 percent confidence
interval of the reduced-form RD estimate for labor force participation for individuals in
different age groups, irrespective of their employment status in t = −1. Black circles
report the same coefficient for individuals who were not working in t = −1, and hollow
circles for individuals who were working in t = −1. The mean effect on participation
(represented by the shaded area) is therefore a weighted average of an entry effect (rep-
resented by the black circles) and a delayed exit effect (represented by the hollow circles).
Comparing the magnitude of the labor supply response in the full sample with that in
the subgroup that was not working in t = −1, one can infer that the entirety of the labor
force participation response of individuals in younger age groups (20-40 and 41-50 years
39I probe the heterogeneity of the retirement rate response between individuals employed in the private
and the public sector. To this end, I focus on individuals who were working in the years prior to their
spouse’s death and construct an indicator variable for being employed in the public or private sector based
on their employment history in t < 0. I find that the retirement rate response is entirely driven by individuals
employed in the private sector. This is consistent with the notion that public-sector employees have limited
ability of adjusting the retirement margin. Results are available upon request.
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old) is in the form of labor market entry. Conversely, the participation response comes
predominantly from delayed labor market exit for individuals in older age groups (51-55
years old).
Having established substantial extensive-margin responses, I now move to investi-
gating intensive-margin and wage rate responses. Since the data provide information
on days worked but not hours worked, I use days worked as a measure of the intensive
margin of employment. The wage rate is defined as earnings per day worked conditional
on employment. When analyzing outcomes conditional on employment, I control for po-
tential endogenous selection into employment by including the number of years of work
experience in t = 0 among the individual-level covariates (Schmieder, Wachter, and Ben-
der, 2016). Albeit imperfectly, this allows to isolate the effect of the reform on hours
worked and the wage rate from that of compositional changes of the workforce due to
extensive-margin responses to the reform itself. The IV estimates in Table 1.6 show a sta-
tistically significant, yet mild effect of the benefit on days worked and on the wage rate: a
e1,000 benefit drop is associated with a decrease in days worked of 2.6 days per annum
and a decrease in the daily wage of e2.2 on average. The results suggest that surviving
spouses may be moving to part-time, slightly lower paid jobs. However, both effects are
especially small, both in absolute terms and in percent of the mean in the control group
(0.7 and 2.3 percent respectively).
I further investigate the anatomy of the labor supply response by looking at the condi-
tional probability of holding a full-time job, and of changing firm, industry and province
of work.40 I observe these outcomes only for the subsample of individuals with a job
in the private sector. According to both the reduced-form and IV estimates reported in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 respectively, no statistically significant effect can be detected on the
probability of holding a full-time job nor of changing firm, industry or province.
Dynamic of labor supply responses. The participation response estimated pooling
all event-time years masks interesting dynamics. Figure 1.10 uncovers the evolution of
the participation response over event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15.41 Black circles re-
port the reduced-form RD estimate at each event-time year in percent of the mean in the
control group. Vertical capped bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Consistent
with the absence of anticipation of the reform and/or manipulation around the threshold,
there is no discontinuity in the participation rate in the years before the spouse’s death.
The participation response unfolds progressively over time, being small and statistically
insignificant in the first two years after the shock and then growing quite steadily over
time, from 7 percent in t ∈ [2; 3] to 18 percent in t ∈ [14; 15]. Analogous to Figure 1.10,
Figure 1.A10 reports the evolution of the labor force participation response in levels. The
effect is muted up to event time t = 1, grows to a statistically significant 6.4 percent-
age point difference at event time t ∈ [2; 3] and then stabilizes at an approximately 7
40I look at transitions across 3-digit industries.
41To improve the precision of the estimates, I estimate dynamic effects pooling event-time years into bien-
nia.
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percentage point difference in subsequent event-time years. The evolution of the labor
supply response is consistent with the notion that optimization frictions, such as adjust-
ment costs or attention costs, attenuate responses in the short-run and fade away over
time, allowing to uncover frictionless structural responses only in the medium-long run.
I also examine the dynamic of hours worked and the wage rate. Figures 1.11 and 1.12
report the reduced-form effect on the number of days worked and the daily wage condi-
tional on employment at each event-time year. The dynamic of both variables is essen-
tially flat throughout the 15 years following the spouse’s death, indicating no intensive-
margin adjustments and suggesting that work experience, human capital accumulation
and effort have a limited role in the context under study.
Heterogeneity of labor supply responses. There is substantial heterogeneity in par-
ticipation responses by gender. As reported in Table 1.B5, the female participation rate in-
creases on average by 10 percentage points (15.8 percent of the mean in the control group)
in the 15 years after the spouses death, while the male participation rate by 4.5 percentage
points (8.1 percent of the mean in the control group). This difference is consistent with
what found for the income effect in Section 1.4.2. A stark gender differential also emerges
when examining the dynamic pattern of labor force participation over event-time years,
as shown in Panel A of Figure 1.A11: the dynamic of the female subgroup displays a spec-
tacular growth over event-time years, while that of the male subgroup is rather steady.
There is no statistically significant difference by gender in the intensive margin response,
as measured by the number of days worked (Table 1.B5). As for the wage rate, male
survivors experience a statistically significant decrease in the daily wage, conditional on
employment, of approximately e5.85, equivalent to 7 percent of the mean in the control
group. No significant effect is detected for female survivors.
The dynamic of the participation response by age at the time of the spouse’s death
confirms the role of retirement as a margin of adjustment: the labor force participation
response of individuals in the 51-55 age group increases sharply over event-time years 2
to 7, and then drops to zero in subsequent years. This is consistent with a delay in retire-
ment occurring in the late fifties and early sixties. Interestingly, an analogous increase in
labor force participation emerges around event-time years 12 to 15 for individuals in the
41-50 age group. As reported in Table 1.B5, the age profiles of the intensive margin re-
sponse and the wage rate response, conditional on employment, are essentially flat and
statistically insignificant, except for a small, positive and statistically significant effect
on the wage rate for individuals in the 20-40 age group, which are found to increase by
approximately 1.8 percent.
1.4.4 Program Substitution
The reduction in survivor insurance generosity may induce survivors to take up more of
other social insurance and social assistance programs in order to increase their disposable
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income. This is what previous studies have defined program substitution (Inderbitzin,
Staubli, and Zweimüller, 2016).42
Social insurance take-up. The data provide information on the take-up of work-
related social insurance benefits, such as paid family leave, paid sick leave and un-
employment benefits. Paid family leave includes both maternity/paternity leave and
parental leave provided to individuals who need to take time off work to care for an
ill child or relative. Paid sick leave is a benefit paid to workers who need to take time
off work while sick. Unemployment benefits are publicly-provided benefits granted to
laid-off private-sector employees. Since the take-up of these social insurance benefits is
conditional on being employed at the time of take-up or on having been employed in the
previous months, I restrict the sample to surviving spouses in employment in t or t− 1.
Moreover, in order to control for potential endogenous selection into program eligibil-
ity due to the conditioning on employment status, I control for the number of years of
working experience in t = 0. According to the IV estimates in Table 1.6, every e1,000
decrease in benefits increases the probability of taking up paid family leave by 0.3 per-
centage points, which represents 37.5 percent of the mean in the control group.43 The
increase in paid family leave suggests that surviving spouses who increase their labor
supply may be doing so under substantial work-time constraints due to family and care
duties. While no significant effect can be detected on the probability of taking up paid
sick leave, unemployment insurance take-up increases by 1.7 percentage points for every
e1,000 decrease in benefits (a 100 percent increase over the mean in the control group).
These results indicate that individuals in the new regime compensate for the less gener-
ous survivor benefits by increasing their take-up of alternative welfare programs. In this
respect, the increase in unemployment insurance take up suggests that individuals may
be willing to pay the cost of unemployment stigma to increase disposable income.
Children’s dependency period. The 1995 reform reduced the benefit replacement
rate for surviving spouses with no dependent children, while leaving unchanged the
replacement rate for surviving spouses with one or more dependent children, who face
a replacement rate of 80 percent and 100 percent respectively. Hence, the benefit drop
experienced when children lose their dependency status is larger for surviving spouses
with benefit start date on or after the September 1, 1995 threshold. This is confirmed
by the results in Figure 1.A12 and in the first row of Table 1.8. The latter reports the
estimated effect of the reform on the benefit received by surviving spouses upon loss of
children’s dependency. Individuals in the treatment group suffer a e1,305 larger benefit
loss than individuals in the control group. The level effect corresponds to 16.6 percent
of the mean in the control group. It follows that, at the margin, one extra year with
children as dependent is much more valuable for individuals in the treatment than the
control group. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1.13, the number of years with dependent
42In principle, less generous benefits may also affect the take-up of survivor insurance itself. However, the
results presented in Figure 1.A2 allow to exclude any differential take-up around the threshold.
43Reduced-form estimates are reported in Table 1.7.
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children is 1.2 years greater in households with benefit start date to the right of the cutoff.
The IV-RD effect reported in Table 1.6 indicates that a e1,000 benefit drop increases the
dependency period by 0.7 years – a 10.7 percent increase above the control mean.44 To be
classified as dependent, a child must be either aged under 18, or enrolled in high school
and not working up to age 21, or enrolled at university and not working up to age 26.
Thus, extending children’s dependency period can be viewed as a costly action – namely
paying enrolment fees – that surviving spouses undertake in order to increase disposable
income.
1.5 Interpretation
1.5.1 External Validity and Policy Relevance
Whilst there is a selection issue of studying survivor benefit recipients, nonetheless there
may be scope for generalizing the findings obtained in this context. Individuals in my
sample are spouses – prevalently women – who become widow(er)s in their mid forties.
Single-parenthood, and single-motherhood in particular, are among the states most at
risk of income insecurity and single parents make up a large proportion of welfare re-
cipients of programs such as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Hence,
to the extent that widow(er)s in my sample can be representative of single parents in
general, my findings can be relevant to a larger set of public policies in the US and in
Europe.
To assess the validity of this hypothesis, I compare the characteristics of survivor
benefit recipients in my sample with EITC recipients in the US, using data from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) in the years 1993 to 1997. Summary statistics for the
sample of household heads receiving EITC are reported in Table 1.B8, where column (1)
refers to both married and single household heads and column (2) to single parents or
single individuals. EITC recipients tend to be younger than individuals in my sample.
Consequently, a higher fraction has dependent children and dependent children tend
also to be younger. Apart from the age composition, labor force participation and taxable
income are in line with those of benefit recipients in my sample.
Losing a spouse at a young age is a low-probability and relatively unpredictable event
against which households are likely to be limitedly insured. In this respect, my estimates
44A potential concern is that the estimated increase in the dependency period is spuriously driven by the
fact that the cutoff date is in September – the month in which school years start and university enrolment
takes place – and children who lost one of their parents in August may end up delaying their school or
university enrolment by approximately one year. I test the validity of this alternative hypothesis by running
placebo RD regressions around the September cutoff in the three years before and after 1995. Results are re-
ported in Table 1.B7. The estimates reveal a statistically significant positive effect only around the September
1995 cutoff. The estimated effect for September 1994 is statistically significant, but of negative sign. Over-
all, these results lend support to the idea that the observed increase in the dependency period is indeed a
behavioral response to the incentives created by the 1995 reform.
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of the labor supply and income response are likely to provide an upper bound of what
would be expected for “shocks” that are easier to anticipate and insure ex ante, such as
own or spousal job loss.
Finally, the elasticity of labor supply may differ between marriage and widowhood.
For instance, the lack of leisure complementarities between spouses and the desire to
engage in working activities due to loneliness may make widow(er)s’ labor supply more
elastic. Conversely, the inability to share family-related duties with their partners may
make widow(er)s’ labor supply less elastic. To the extent that labor supply elasticities
may differ across marital statuses, the effects estimated in this paper are likely to provide
an upper or a lower bound for what would be expected for married individuals.
1.5.2 Implications for Theoretical Models of Labor Supply
In this section I examine how the findings in this paper connect with theories of labor
supply. One simple way to theoretically rationalize the magnitude of the estimated in-
come effect is to assume that individual preferences are quasi-linear in labor. Similar
to the framework introduced in Section 1.4, suppose individual preferences are defined
over consumption c (disposable income) and work effort
z
θ
, where z is income from work
and θ income generating ability. Individuals maximize a utility function U(c, z) that is
concave in consumption and linear in work effort
U(c, z) = u(c)− z
θ
(1.4)
subject to the budget constraint c = z + B. The optimal levels of consumption and work
(c∗, z∗) are such that ∂c∗/∂B = 0 and ∂z∗/∂B = −1.45 In response to a drop in unearned
income, income from work increases one-for-one and the level of consumption remains
unchanged.
The “time-averaging” or “career-length” model proposed by Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2007) is one example of a dynamic model that – in the reduced form – delivers predic-
tions that are observationally equivalent to those of the above static model with quasi-
linear preferences. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) construct a non-stochastic, continuous-
time life-cycle model with time-separable preferences and labor supply indivisibility, in
which a representative agent decides what fraction of her lifetime to devote to work.46
A model of this type delivers a high labor supply elasticity at the extensive margin (i.e.
in the number of years of work), which is observationally consistent with the finding in
this paper that individuals lengthen their careers by delaying retirement in response to a
negative income shock.
45The optimal levels of consumption and work are (implicitly) defined by u′(c∗) = 1
θ
and z∗ = 1
θ
− B.
46The model also assumes a constant wage rate and no credit-market constraints.
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1.6 Normative Implications
A central result of this paper is that benefit losses trigger large labor supply and earned
income responses. Why is the income effect that I estimate so large? On the one hand,
if an individual increases labor supply sharply in response to a benefit drop, that lost
income must be of high utility value. On the other hand, a substantial labor supply
response may arise if labor-supply adjustment costs are low. Understanding which of
these two alternative mechanisms – high utility value vs. low adjustment costs – prevails
is important for welfare analysis.
To gain more formal intuition of the interplay between utility value and adjustment
costs, assume individuals choose their consumption and labor force participation status
to maximize a utility function that satisfies
u(c)− I {l = 1} · φ (1.5)
where u(·) is a concave function, c is consumption, l ∈ {0, 1} a binary labor force partic-
ipation decision and φ an additively separable utility cost of work that individuals incur
when participating to the labor market. Assume that φ is distributed according to a type
III extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function F(·) and probability
density function f (·), with f ′ < 0.47 Utility is maximized subject to a budget constraint
c = {l = 1} · z + B, where z is labor income and B the survivor benefit. Denoting the
utility-maximizing labor force participation rate with Φ, the labor force participation re-
sponse to a benefit change can be written as
dΦ
dB
= −γ · dΦ
dz
· z
B
(1.6)
where γ is a coefficient of relative risk aversion and dΦ/dz is the labor force participation
response to a wage-rate change. The latter is a negative function of the utility cost of
work (φ). The formula shows that labor supply responses to unearned income losses are
larger whenever: (i) utility over consumption is highly curved and the marginal utility
of consumption rises sharply as consumption falls (as captured by higher values of γ);
or (ii) the responsiveness of labor force participation to the wage rate is high, or equiva-
lently the utility cost of adjusting labor supply is low.48 In the following sections I first
provide evidence of there being adjustment costs associated to the observed labor supply
response. I then develop a revealed-preference method to infer the value of the benefit
from observed participation responses to benefit losses.
47A distribution with these characteristics is a Weibull distribution with shape parameter σ < 1.
48This result is based on Chetty (2004), Chetty (2006b), and Chetty (2008).
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1.6.1 Evidence on Adjustment Costs
I investigate how the participation response to a given benefit drop correlates with a
measure of the cost of adjusting labor supply. Evidence of a negative correlation between
the labor supply response and such measure is consistent with the notion that adjust-
ment costs are non-zero in the context analyzed. Figure 1.14 shows heterogeneity in the
semi-elasticity of labor force participation to the benefit by different levels of the regional
unemployment rate in the region where the individual resides.49 Individual observations
are binned into the quartiles of the distribution of the regional unemployment rate in each
calendar year.50 The graph shows that the participation response is larger – in absolute
value – for lower levels of the unemployment rate.51 The cost of increasing labor sup-
ply is likely to be larger when the unemployment rate is higher, either because finding a
job requires more search effort or because keeping the current job requires more on-the-
job effort. All in all, these results are suggestive of there being important labor supply
adjustment costs, which may be especially pronounced for some groups of individuals.
1.6.2 A Revealed-Preference Approach for Estimating the Value of Transfers
The extent to which individuals increase work effort in response to a drop in unearned
income reveals, ceteris paribus, the consumption value that such lost income would have
provided. Larger responses must mean that the lost income is highly valued and that
there are large welfare gains from recouping it. In this section, I demonstrate that the ex-
tent to which surviving spouses increase their labor supply in response to a realized drop
in the survivor benefit reveals their implicit valuation of the benefit itself and can there-
fore be used to measure the value of transfers within the widowhood state. The value of
the marginal unit of transfers (denoted by MB) is captured by the percent change in the
marginal utility of consumption between the low-benefit and the high-benefit states
MB =
u′(c(0))− u′(c(B))
u′(c(B))
(1.7)
This ratio provides a measure of the welfare gain from transferring a unit of benefit from
the high- to low-benefit state. The higher the marginal utility of consumption in the
low- relative to the high-benefit state, the larger the gains from such transfer and, more
generally, from increasing the generosity of survivor insurance benefits.
49Data on the regional unemployment rate at annual frequency are taken from ISTAT. I match each
individual-year observation with the regional unemployment rate in that same year in his/her region of
residence.
50I combine the second and third quartiles to improve the precision of the estimates.
51In the Italian economy, higher rates of unemployment are typically correlated with higher rates of unde-
clared work, which may also explain the pattern obtained in Figure 1.14. In order to control for the potential
confounding role of the level of the black economy, I include the regional rate of undeclared work at the
annual level among the regression covariates. The rate of undeclared work is measured as the ratio of es-
timated irregular full-time-equivalent employment over estimated total full-time-equivalent employment.
Data on the rate of undeclared work are taken from ISTAT.
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Proposition 1. Let individual utility be given by u(c)− I {l = 1} · φ, where c is consumption,
l ∈ {0, 1} a binary labor force participation decision and φ an additively separable utility cost
of work, distributed with cumulative distribution function F(φ). Consumption c cannot exceed
the sum of labor income z and the survivor benefit B. Denote the optimal level of labor force
participation with Φ. Then,
MB =
u′(c(0))− u′(c(B))
u′(c(B))
≈ −
[
dΦ
d log B
]
ε
(1.8)
where ε is the semi-elasticity of labor supply to labor earnings.
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.1.
Proposition 1 shows that the value of the benefit can be identified by scaling the
semi-elasticity of labor force participation to the benefit by the semi-elasticity of labor
supply to labor earnings. If labor supply is relatively inelastic to changes in the wage
rate, then larger participation responses indicate that surviving spouses have a high val-
uation of extra resources in the widowhood state.52 The intuition behind this result is
that the extent to which individuals undertake costly actions to increase their consump-
tion in the low-benefit state provides a measure of the utility gain that they would get
from more generous transfers. From a theoretical standpoint, by exploiting labor sup-
ply responses within the widowhood state, Proposition 1 allows for both state-dependent
preferences and anticipation responses. By relying on optimizing behavior, revealed-
preference methods work under the assumption that individuals are not subject to op-
timization frictions that prevent them from optimally responding along the relevant ad-
justment margin. They also assume the absence or separability of other margins of ad-
justment.
Empirical implementation. For the empirical implementation of the result in Propo-
sition 1, I use the IV-RD estimate of the semi-elasticity of labor force participation to the
benefit reported in column (2) of Table 1.6 and the simulated value of ε = 0.6 as in Blun-
dell et al. (2016).53 The value of −dΦ/d log B that I estimate in the data is approximately
0.3. Rescaling it by 0.6, I obtain a measure of the value of the marginal unit of transfer
equivalent to 0.5.54 This suggests that the marginal value of consumption is 50 percent
higher among widow(er)s in the low-benefit regime as compared to widow(er)s in the
high-benefit regime.
It is useful to consider how this result compares to other existing estimates in the
literature. Several papers have both developed estimation methods and provided ac-
tual estimates of the welfare gain from increased welfare generosity. This has been more
52The model builds on previous work by Chetty (2008) and Landais (2015).
53Based on simulated data, Blundell et al. (2016) calculate a semi-elasticity of participation of 0.38 for single
women with no children and 0.78 for lone mothers. Weighting these two elasticities by the share of survivors
with and without dependent children in my sample, I obtain a weighted average of approximately 0.6.
54The 95 percent confidence interval of this effect ranges from 0.33 to 0.62.
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marked in the context of unemployment insurance (Gruber, 1997; Chetty, 2008; Landais,
2015; Hendren, 2017; Landais and Spinnewijn, 2018), but recent work has also focused on
survivor insurance (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2018). In the context
of unemployment insurance, consumption-implementation approaches that exploit the
causal effect of job loss on consumption provide estimates in the ballpark of 0.2 (Gru-
ber, 1997). More recent evidence using ex-ante consumption and spousal labor supply
responses finds a value of unemployment insurance of approximately 0.5-0.6 (Hendren,
2017). To the best of my knowledge, the only existing estimate of the value of survivor
insurance is provided by Fadlon and Nielsen (2015). Rescaling changes in survivors’ la-
bor supply around spousal death by a measure of the utility cost of work, they estimate
a value of survivor insurance that ranges from 0.03 for surviving spouses aged less than
60, to 0.94 for spouses of older ages. In comparison with existing estimates, the value of
MB = 0.5 that I estimate appears therefore relatively high, suggesting that widowhood
is a state with a high marginal utility of consumption and in which increased survivor
benefit generosity would deliver substantial welfare gains.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide novel estimates of the income effect of welfare transfers on in-
dividual labor supply, earnings and total income, in the context of the Italian survivor
benefit program. I find that surviving spouses respond to benefit losses with one-for-one
increases in earned income, implying a marginal propensity to earn out of unearned in-
come of -1.0. This large earnings response stems from increased labor force participation,
in the form of increased entry into the labor market by younger survivors and delayed
retirement by older survivors. No intensive-margin nor wage rate response to the ben-
efit drop is detected. Individuals are found to significantly increase the take-up of paid
family leave and unemployment insurance benefits in response to the benefit drop. Be-
cause the presence of dependent children grants a more generous allowance, households
that will experience the largest benefit drops upon loss of dependency, extend tertiary
education enrolment by almost 20 percent in order to delay the benefit drop. Thus, la-
bor force participation and program substitution both emerge as margins through which
individuals increase their disposable income in response to a realized drop in unearned
income.
I develop a simple model of extensive labor supply choices and demonstrate that
participation responses to realized benefit losses are revealing of the implicit valuations
of welfare transfers in the widowhood state. The intuition behind this result is that the
extent to which individuals undertake costly actions to increase disposable income in re-
sponse to a benefit drop are informative of their valuation of the extra consumption that
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would be provided by the benefit. According to the model’s predictions, the large ob-
served participation responses imply that widowhood is a state with high marginal util-
ity of consumption and that substantial welfare gains could be obtained from increased
survivor insurance generosity. Because it requires labor supply rather than consumption
data, the revealed-preference approach that I propose is potentially widely applicable
given the increasingly large availability of detailed data on individual labor supply from
administrative and other sources. Moreover, being based on estimates of participation
responses to unearned income, the approach can be applied to a broad class of public
policies involving income transfers.
Whilst there is a selection issue of studying survivor benefit recipients, nonetheless I
believe there is scope for generalizing the findings in this paper to other contexts. To the
extent that widow(er)s in my sample can be representative of single parents, and single
mothers in particular, my findings can be relevant to a larger set of public policies in the
US and in Europe. On the other hand, the likely low probability and predictability of
spousal death at younger ages implies that households are probably limitedly insured
against the associated income shock. In this respect, my estimates of the income effect
and of the implicit valuation of the benefit are likely to provide an upper bound of what
would be estimated for “shocks” that can be anticipated and that are easier to insure ex
ante.
The normative assessment that I draw in this paper is based on a partial equilibrium
framework. A comprehensive evaluation of the welfare implications of reduced survivor
insurance generosity would require an appraisal of the long-term consequences on in-
tergenerational educational and labor market outcomes, and on individual well-being.
From a general-equilibrium standpoint, it would also be important to understand how
the provision of survivor insurance benefits affects decisions regarding human capital
accumulation, marriage and fertility (Borella, De Nardi, and Yang, 2017; Low et al., 2018;
Persson, forthcoming). I see these as interesting avenues for future research.
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1.8 Figures
FIGURE 1.1: BENEFIT REPLACEMENT RATE SCHEDULE
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Notes: The graph reports the benefit replacement rate schedule for surviving spouses without dependent
children or grandchildren in the old and new regime. The x-axis represents the surviving spouse’s taxable
income net of the survivor benefit (z) and the y-axis represents the survivor replacement rate (b). The dashed
line refers to the old regime, while the solid line refers to the new regime. Ij for j = 1, 2, 3 indicates the income
thresholds at which the replacement rate changes under new-regime rules: I1 is equivalent to three times
the annual minimum pension, I2 to four times the annual minimum pension and I3 to five times the annual
minimum pension. The nominal values of the minimum pension and of its multiples for the years from 1990
to 2017 are reported in Table 1.B1.
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FIGURE 1.2: BUDGET CONSTRAINT
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Notes: The graph illustrates the effect of the 1995 reform on the budget set of a surviving spouse without
dependent children nor grandchildren in the (z, c) plane, where z indicates taxable income net of the survivor
benefit and c denotes disposable income. Specifically, c = z + B(P, b(z))− T(z + B(P, b(z))), where B(·) is
the survivor benefit, which is a function of the pension of the deceased P and of the replacement rate b(z);
T(·) is a tax function representing personal income taxes payable on taxable income including the survivor
benefit (z + B(·)). The dashed line represents the individual budget constraint under the old regime, while
the solid line the individual budget constraint under the new regime. The vertical bars indicate the income
brackets relevant to the determination of the benefit replacement rate in the new regime: I1 is equivalent
to three times the annual minimum pension, I2 to four times the annual minimum pension and I3 to five
times the annual minimum pension. The thresholds I′ = (bNj−1− bNj )P+ Ij−1 ∀j = 1, 2, 3 indicate the convex
kinks in the budget constraint. The budget constraint is constructed using the mean value of P, the income
thresholds and the personal income tax parameters in effect at the time of the 1995 reform.
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FIGURE 1.3: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE BENEFIT REPLACEMENT
RATE
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Notes: The graph shows the average replacement rate by month-of-benefit-start bin for surviving spouses
with taxable income in the second or higher income brackets in the first year of benefit receipt. It also
reports the coefficient η0 and associated robust standard error from estimating equation 1.3, using the benefit
replacement rate b in t = 0 as outcome variable. The estimated η0 is also reported as a percent of the mean
outcome in the control group.
FIGURE 1.4: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE EXPECTED LIFETIME BENE-
FIT
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Notes: The graph shows the expected lifetime benefit by month-of-benefit-start bin for surviving spouses
with taxable income in the second or higher income brackets in the first year of benefit receipt. The life-
time benefit is computed by multiplying the annual benefit in t = 0 by life expectancy at time t = 0. Life
expectancy tables are obtained from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and are split by gender, age, cal-
endar year and region of residence. The graph also reports the coefficient β0 and associated robust standard
error from estimating equation 1.2, using the expected lifetime benefit as outcome variable. The estimated
β0 is also reported as a percent of the mean outcome in the control group.
Chapter 1. When Income Effects are Large:
Labor Supply Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
37
FIGURE 1.5: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON ANNUAL BENEFIT, TAXABLE IN-
COME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME
A. Benefit B. Taxable income
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Notes: The graphs show the mean value of different outcome variables by month-of-benefit-start bin, pool-
ing event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. The solid dark lines display predicted values from the quadratic
parametric regression in equation 1.3. Each graph also reports the coefficient η0 and associated robust stan-
dard error from estimating equation 1.3, and the estimated η0 as a percent of the mean outcome in the control
group. Panel A refers to the annual survivor benefit B, Panel B to taxable income z and Panel C to disposable
income z + B.
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FIGURE 1.6: EMPIRICAL DENSITY OF TAXABLE INCOME AROUND CONVEX
KINKS BY TREATMENT STATUS
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Notes: The graph plots the empirical distribution of taxable income pooling observations around the three
convex kinks created by the reform and pooling all years from t = 0 to t = 15. The vertical bar represents
the location of the convex kinks. Each dot refers to a e200 bin in the range [−2, 700; 2, 700] centered around
the kink. Black circles represent observations in the treatment group and hollow circles to observations in
the control group.
FIGURE 1.7: PARTICIPATION RESPONSE
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Notes: The graph shows the mean values of the participation rate in each month-of-benefit-start bin, pooling
event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. The solid dark lines display predicted values from the quadratic para-
metric regression in equation 1.3. The graph also reports the coefficient η0 and associated robust standard
error from estimating equation 1.3, and the estimated η0 as a percent of the mean outcome in the control
group.
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FIGURE 1.8: DECOMPOSITION OF PARTICIPATION RESPONSE ALONG EN-
TRY AND EXIT MARGINS
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Notes: The graph shows a decomposition of the reduced-form effect on cumulated years experience between
t = 0 and t = 15 along the entry and exit margin. Specifically, the first bar to the left reports reports the
coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using cumulated work experience in t = 15 as outcome variable.
The remaining three bars decompose such effect into increased entry (second bar from the left) and delayed
exit, distinguishing between delayed exit in the form of delayed non-employment (third bar from the left)
and delayed retirement (fourth bar from the left). The second bar from the left reports the coefficient η0 from
estimating equation 1.3 using cumulated work experience in t = 15 as outcome variable for individuals who
were not working in t = −1 and weighting the estimate by the share of such individuals in the sample.
The third bar from the left reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the (negative of the)
number of non-employment years (excluding retirement) between t = 0 and t = 15 for individuals who
were working in t = −1 and weighting the estimate by the share of such individuals in the sample. The
fourth bar from the left is analogous to the third, but uses the number of years of retirement between t = 0
and t = 15 as outcome variable.
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FIGURE 1.9: PROFILE OF THE PARTICIPATION RESPONSE BY AGE IN t = 0
AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN t = −1
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Notes: The graph outlines the profile of the labor force participation response by age in t = 0 and employ-
ment status in t = −1. The graph reports the estimated coefficient η0 and associated 95 percent confidence
interval from equation 1.3, using the participation rate as outcome variable and pooling event-time years
from t = 0 to t = 15. The shaded area shows the 95 percent confidence interval of the coefficient η0 for in-
dividuals in different age groups, irrespective of their employment status in t = −1. Black circles report the
same coefficient for individuals who were not working in t = −1, while hollow circles for individuals who
were working in t = −1. The capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust
standard errors. The mean effect on participation (represented by the shaded area) is therefore a weighted
average of an entry effect (represented by the black circles) and a delayed exit effect (represented by the
hollow circles).
FIGURE 1.10: DYNAMIC OF THE PARTICIPATION RESPONSE
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the participation rate as
outcome variable and pooling event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15 into biennia. Black circles indicate the
estimated η0 in percent of the mean in the control group for different event-time years. The capped vertical
bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 1.11: DYNAMIC OF THE INTENSIVE MARGIN RESPONSE
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the number of days worked as
outcome variable and pooling event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15 into biennia. Black circles indicate the
estimated η0 in percent of the mean in the control group for different event-time years. The capped vertical
bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The estimates are conditional
on employment and on work experience in t = 0.
FIGURE 1.12: DYNAMIC OF THE WAGE RATE RESPONSE
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the daily wage rate as outcome
variable and pooling event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15 into biennia. Black circles indicate the estimated
η0 in percent of the mean in the control group for different event-time years. The capped vertical bars
report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The estimates are conditional on
employment and on work experience in t = 0. The wage rate is computed as annual earnings divided by
the number of days worked.
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FIGURE 1.13: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE NUMBER OF YEARS WITH
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
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Notes: The graph shows the mean values of the number of years with dependent children in each month-of-
benefit-start bin. The solid dark lines display predicted values from the quadratic parametric regression in
equation 1.3. The graph also reports the coefficient η0 and associated robust standard error from estimating
equation 1.3, and the estimated η0 as a percent of the mean outcome in the control group.
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FIGURE 1.14: HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS BY REGIONAL UN-
EMPLOYMENT RATE IN t
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficient β from estimating equation 1.1 using an indicator for labor force
participation as outcome and logBit as main regressor. Black circles indicate the estimated β and the capped
vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The graph shows het-
erogeneity in the semi-elasticity of labor force participation to the benefit by different quartiles of the distri-
bution of the regional unemployment rate, in the region in which the surviving spouse resides. Data on the
regional unemployment rate are at annual frequency and are taken from ISTAT. Individual-year observa-
tions are matched with the regional unemployment rate in the same year in the region where the individual
resides. Individual observations are then binned into the quartiles of the distribution of the regional unem-
ployment rate in each year. To improve the precision of the estimates, the second and third quartiles are
combined. In order to control for the potential confounding role of the level of the black economy, I include
the regional rate of undeclared work – as measured by estimated irregular full-time-equivalent employment
over estimated total full-time-equivalent employment – at the annual level among the regression covariates.
Data on the rate of undeclared work are taken from ISTAT.
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1.9 Tables
TABLE 1.1: BENEFIT REPLACEMENT RATES
Benefit start date
Before After
Sept 1, 1995 Sept 1, 1995
(1) (2)
Spouse (with and without dependent children)
Spouse only
Survivor’s taxable income ≤ 3 ×minimum pension 60% 60%
Survivor’s taxable income ≤ 4 ×minimum pension 60% 45%
Survivor’s taxable income ≤ 5 ×minimum pension 60% 36%
Survivor’s taxable income > 5 ×minimum pension 60% 30%
Spouse with one dependent child or grandchild 80% 80%
Spouse with two or more dependent children or grandchildren 100% 100%
Dependent children (absent the spouse)
One dependent child or grandchild 60% 70%
Two dependent children or grandchildren 80% 80%
Three or more dependent children or grandchildren 100% 100%
Dependent parents or siblings (absent the spouse, children or grandchildren)
Each dependent relative 15% 15%
Notes: The table reports the benefit replacement rates for different types of survivors and separately for
benefits with start date before or after September 1995. Dependent children and grandchildren aged 18-21
who are high-school students and not working are entitled to the benefit up to age 21. University students
up to age 26 are also entitled to the benefit, provided that they are not working. Children, grandchildren,
parents or siblings that are disabled or incapacitated are also considered dependent. Each parent or sibling
receives 15% of the pension of the deceased, up to 100%.
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TABLE 1.2: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE BENEFIT AMOUNT IN t = 0
Regression discontinuity Control mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predicted second or higher income bracket
Benefit in t = 0 -1510.21*** -1684.83*** -2137.66*** -1963.66*** 8494.83
(260.413) (296.800) (376.689) (407.618)
Lifetime benefit (000) -67.032*** -85.273*** -99.641*** -104.547*** 337.387
(13.811) (16.691) (20.155) (22.831)
Obs. 13556 13556 13556 13556 -
Full sample
Benefit in t = 0 -465.171*** -558.993*** -593.922*** -602.776*** 8371.92
(73.548) (85.830) (109.989) (120.938)
Lifetime benefit (000) -18.917*** -24.567*** -23.623*** -25.120*** 298.57
(3.243) (3.916) (4.879) (5.511)
Observations 94578 94578 94578 94578 -
Benefit-start-month FE x x -
Calendar year FE x x -
Linear trend x x x x -
Quadratic trend x x -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient β0 from estimating equation 1.2 using the benefit amount in t = 0
as outcome variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) are based on a linear parametric specification, without and with controls re-
spectively. Columns (3) and (4) are based on a quadratic parametric specification, without and with controls
respectively. Column (5) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control group. All estimates are
based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth. The top panel reports estimates for the sample with predicted
second or higher income bracket. The bottom panel reports estimates for the full sample. The lifetime ben-
efit is computed by multiplying the annual benefit in t = 0 by life expectancy at time t = 0. Life expectancy
tables are obtained from the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and are split by gender, age, calendar year
and region of residence. The lifetime benefit is in thousands of euros.
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TABLE 1.3: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON BENEFIT, TAXABLE INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME
Regression discontinuity Control mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benefit -1155.25*** -1306.96*** -1771.21*** -1966.23*** 9462.31
(103.033) (110.320) (145.140) (152.225)
Taxable income 1674.92*** 1473.23*** 2508.59*** 2329.31*** 14470.64
(380.664) (407.731) (455.254) (471.733)
Disposable income 519.674 166.277 737.385 363.081 23932.95
(386.337) (414.151) (464.363) (481.298)
Observations 216896 216896 216896 216896 -
Benefit-start-month FE x x -
Calendar year FE x x -
Linear trend x x x x -
Quadratic trend x x -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using different outcome variables
and pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) are based on a linear parametric specification,
without and with controls respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are based on a quadratic parametric specifica-
tion, without and with controls respectively. Column (5) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the
control group. All estimates are based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth.
TABLE 1.4: IV ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF THE BENEFIT ON TAXABLE
INCOME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME
Taxable income Disposable income Taxable income Disposable income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit -1.205*** -0.205 -1.008*** -0.008
(0.337) (0.337) (0.303) (0.303)
Observations 216896 216896 216896 216896
Benefit-start-month FE x x x x
Calendar year FE x x x x
Linear trend x x x x
Quadratic trend x x
Notes: The table reports the IV-RD coefficient β from estimating equation 1.1 using different outcome variables and
pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The IV estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on a first stage with linear parametric
specification, while those in columns (3) and (4) on a first stage with quadratic parametric specification with individual
controls. All estimates are based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth.
Chapter 1. When Income Effects are Large:
Labor Supply Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
47
TABLE 1.5: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON LABOR SUPPLY, RETIREMENT AND
OTHER WORK-RELATED OUTCOMES
Regression discontinuity Control Obs.
mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participation rate 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.603 216896
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Cumulated experience in t = 15 0.307 0.570* 1.061** 1.113** 10.256 13556
(0.285) (0.325) (0.421) (0.466)
Retirement rate in t = 15 -0.012 -0.041 -0.072* -0.079* 0.516 13556
(0.025) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041)
Days worked 0.147 -0.248 -1.169 -1.561 351.482 123829
(0.995) (1.033) (1.491) (1.521)
Daily wage 0.382 -0.427 0.998 -0.047 76.755 123829
(0.818) (0.860) (1.217) (1.251)
Full-time job -0.020** -0.027*** -0.004 -0.013 0.891 68253
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Change firm -0.008 -0.012 0.005 0.003 0.082 68253
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Change industry 0.001 0.001 0.011* 0.012* 0.029 68253
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Change province -0.008* -0.011*** -0.005 -0.008 0.025 68253
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Benefit-start-month FE x x - -
Calendar year FE x x - -
Linear trend x x x x - -
Quadratic trend x x - -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using different outcome variables and
pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) are based on a linear parametric specification, without and with
controls respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are based on a quadratic parametric specification, without and with
controls respectively. Column (5) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control group and column (6)
the number of observations. All estimates are based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth. Cumulated experi-
ence and the retirement rate are measured at event-time t = 15. The wage rate is computed as annual earnings
divided by the number of days worked. The probability of holding a full-time job, changing firm, changing in-
dustry (at three-digit level) and changing province are estimated on the sample of individuals employed in the
private sector. The estimates for days worked, the wage rate, the probability of holding a full-time job, changing
firm, changing industry and changing province are all conditional on employment and include the number of
years of work experience in t = 0 among the individual controls.
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TABLE 1.6: IV ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE BENEFIT ON LABOR
SUPPLY, PROGRAM SUBSTITUTION AND DEPENDENCY PERIOD
Benefit (000) ln Benefit Control Observations
(1) (2) mean
Participation rate -0.040*** -0.286*** 0.603 216896
(0.006) (0.043)
Cumulated experience in t = 15 -0.842** 10.256 13556
(0.414)
Retirement rate in t = 15 0.100** 0.516 13556
(0.047)
Days worked 2.563*** 351.482 123829
(0.731)
Daily wage 2.210*** 76.755 123829
(0.618)
Full-time job 0.010* 0.891 68253
(0.005)
Change firm -0.004 0.082 68253
(0.005)
Change industry -0.002 0.029 68253
(0.003)
Change province -0.000 0.025 68253
(0.003)
Paid family leave -0.003** 0.008 117264
(0.002)
Paid sick leave -0.003 0.043 117264
(0.003)
Unemployment benefits -0.017*** 0.017 117264
(0.003)
Dependency period -0.653** 6.095 5595
(0.272)
Benefit-start-month FE x x - -
Calendar year FE x x - -
Linear trend x x - -
Quadratic trend x x - -
Notes: The table reports the IV-RD coefficient β from estimating equation 1.1 using different out-
come variables and pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates of the first stage are
based on a quadratic parametric specification with individual controls and a 24-month symmetric
bandwidth. Cumulated experience and the retirement rate are measured at event-time t = 15. The
wage rate is computed as annual earnings divided by the number of days worked. The probabil-
ity of holding a full-time job, changing firm, changing industry (at three-digit level) and changing
province are estimated on the sample of individuals employed in the private sector. The estimates
for days worked, the wage rate, the probability of holding a full-time job, changing firm, chang-
ing industry and changing province are all conditional on employment and include the number of
years of work experience in t = 0 among the individual controls. Estimates for paid family leave,
paid sick leave and unemployment benefits are conditional on employment in t or t − 1, and in-
clude the number of years of work experience in t = 0 among the individual controls. The benefit
amount is in thousands of euros.
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TABLE 1.7: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON SOCIAL INSURANCE TAKE-UP
Regression discontinuity Control mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Paid family leave 0.004* 0.005* 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Paid sick leave 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.016** 0.043
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Unemployment benefits -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.013*** 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 117264 117264 117264 117264 -
Benefit-start-month FE x x -
Calendar year FE x x -
Linear trend x x x x -
Quadratic trend x x -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using different outcome
variables and pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are re-
ported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) are based
on a linear parametric specification, without and with controls respectively. Columns (3) and
(4) are based on a quadratic parametric specification, without and with controls respectively.
Column (5) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control group. All estimates are
based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth. All estimates are conditional on employment in
t or t− 1, and include the number of years of work experience in t = 0 among the individual
controls.
TABLE 1.8: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE BENEFIT UPON LOSS OF DE-
PENDENCY AND ON THE DEPENDENCY PERIOD
Regression discontinuity Control mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benefit upon dep. loss -1242.33*** -1186.79*** -1508.89*** -1305.21*** 7875.19
(261.391) (287.243) (388.340) (408.394)
Dependency period 0.737*** 1.255*** 1.220*** 1.223*** 6.095
(0.222) (0.290) (0.335) (0.415)
Observations 5595 5595 5595 5595 -
Benefit-start-month FE x x -
Calendar year FE x x -
Linear trend x x x x -
Quadratic trend x x -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using different outcome variables.
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1)
and (2) are based on a linear parametric specification, without and with controls respectively. Columns (3)
and (4) are based on a quadratic parametric specification, without and with controls respectively. Column
(5) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control group. All estimates are based on a 24-month
symmetric bandwidth. The benefit is measured in the year after all children have lost their dependency
status. The dependency period is measured as the number of years with dependent children within the
household.
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1.A Appendix Figures
FIGURE 1.A1: DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK
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Notes: The graph illustrates the effect of the 1995 reform on the dynamic budget set of a surviving spouse
without dependent children nor grandchildren. The x-axis reports the number of years of work out of the
total number of available years. The y-axis reports the level of lifetime consumption associated to each
number of years of work. Without loss of generality, the graph is constructed under the assumption that,
when working, individuals earn a fixed annual wage and receive 30 percent of their spouses’s pension
as survivor benefit; when not working, individuals do not earn any wage and receive 60 percent of their
spouse’s pension as survivor benefit. The dashed line represents the individual lifetime budget constraint
under the old regime, while the solid line the individual lifetime budget constraint under the new regime.
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FIGURE 1.A2: DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS BY START DATE AND MC-
CRARY TESTS
A. Full sample
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B. Individuals with taxable income in second or higher income bracket
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Notes: The graphs plot the empirical probability density function of benefit recipients by month-year of
benefit start for the entire sample (Panel A) and for the subgroup of individuals with taxable income in the
second or higher income bracket in t = 0 (Panel B). Each graph reports the test statistics and associated
standard error in parenthesis of a McCrary test of the discontinuity in the probability density function of the
running variable at the September 1995 threshold.
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FIGURE 1.A3: RD COEFFICIENTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS BY BAND-
WIDTH
A. Benefit B. Taxable income
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C. Disposable income D. Income effect (MPE)
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Notes: Panels A, B and C report the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using a quadratic parametric
specification and different bandwidths. Panel D reports the coefficient β from an IV estimation of equation
1.1 using a quadratic parametric specification for the first stage and different bandwidths. Solid circles
indicate the estimated coefficients. The capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals based on
robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 1.A4: RD COEFFICIENTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS BY BAND-
WIDTH
A. Participation rate B. Cumulated experience
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C. Daily wage D. Days worked
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Notes: The graphs report the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using a quadratic parametric speci-
fication and different non-parametric local linear regression. Solid circles indicate the estimated η0 for spec-
ifications with different symmetric bandwidths. The capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence inter-
vals based on robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 1.A5: RD COEFFICIENTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS BY BAND-
WIDTH
A. Paid family leave B. Paid sick leave
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C. Unemployment benefits D. Years with dependent children
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Notes: The graphs report the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using a quadratic parametric speci-
fication and different non-parametric local linear regression. Solid circles indicate the estimated η0 for spec-
ifications with different symmetric bandwidths. The capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence inter-
vals based on robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 1.A6: EMPIRICAL DENSITY OF PREDICTED TAXABLE INCOME
BRACKET BY GENDER AND AGE IN t = 0
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Notes: The graphs report the empirical distribution of predicted taxable income bracket by gender (Panel
A) and age at event time t = 0 (Panel B). The graph reports the distribution for individuals with predicted
taxable income in the second or higher income bracket. Each dot refers to a 0.1 bin.
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FIGURE 1.A7: DENSITY OF TAXABLE INCOME
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Notes: The graph plots a theoretical density function of taxable income z. The dashed line illustrates the
case of a smooth density function. By introducing a discrete change in the marginal tax rate, the reform
creates a convex kink in the budget constraint of treated individuals at z = I. Absent the kink, individuals
would locate smoothly along the old-regime budget set generating a smooth taxable income density. Once
introduced, the convex kink creates a disincentive for individuals to locate in the range [I, I′] and induces
individuals who would counterfactually locate in that range to bunch at I. This behavior will give rise to
excess bunching in the taxable income density function at the kink point and a left-shift in the density above
the kink, as illustrated by the solid line and the shadowed region in the graph.
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FIGURE 1.A8: EMPIRICAL DENSITY OF TAXABLE INCOME AROUND CON-
VEX KINKS BY TREATMENT STATUS AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS
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Notes: The graphs plot the empirical distribution of taxable income pooling observations around the three
convex kinks created by the reform and pooling all years from t = 0 to t = 15. The vertical bar represents the
location of the convex kinks. Each dot refers to a e200 bin in the range [−2, 700; 2, 700] centered around the
kink. Black circles represent self-employed individuals, while hollow circles represent wage earners. Panel
A is based on observations in the treatment group and Panel B to observations in the control group.
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FIGURE 1.A9: MACRO-ELASTICITY OF HOURS WORKED PER PERSON TO
GDP PER HOUR
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Notes: The graph reports a binned scatter plot of the logarithm of hours of work per person on the loga-
rithm of GDP per hour, controlling for country and calendar year fixed effects. The plot is based OECD data
at the country-year level from 1985 to 2015 for the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ger-
many, Denmark, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States.
The graph also reports the estimated elasticity of hours worked to GDP per hour and its associated robust
standard error. Gray circles represent binned observations and the black line the regression fitted line.
FIGURE 1.A10: DYNAMIC OF THE PARTICIPATION RESPONSE (LEVEL EF-
FECT)
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the participation rate as
outcome variable and pooling event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15 into biennia. Black circles indicate the
estimated η0 for different event-time years. The capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 1.A11: HETEROGENEOUS DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION BY GENDER AND AGE IN t = 0
A. Gender
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Notes: The graphs report the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using the participation rate as
outcome variable and pooling event-time years from t = −6 to t = 15 into biennia. Markers indicate the
estimated η0 for each event-time year. Panel A shows heterogeneity in the dynamic of the participation
response by gender. Panel B shows heterogeneity in the dynamic of the participation response by age in
t = 0.
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FIGURE 1.A12: EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE BENEFIT UPON LOSS OF
DEPENDENCY STATUS
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Notes: The graph shows the mean value of the annual benefit by month-of-benefit-start bin. The benefit is
measured in the year after all children have lost their dependency status. The solid dark lines display pre-
dicted values from the quadratic parametric regression in equation 1.3. The graph also reports the coefficient
η0 and associated robust standard error from estimating equation 1.3, and the estimated η0 as a percent of the
mean outcome in the control group. The estimates are based on the sample of individuals with dependent
children in t = 0 and with predicted taxable income in the second or higher income brackets.
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1.B Appendix Tables
TABLE 1.B1: ANNUAL MINIMUM PENSION (IN EURO)
Year Amount × 3 × 4 × 5
1990 3,142.98 9,428.93 12,571.90 15,714.88
1991 3,354.98 10,064.94 13,419.93 16,774.91
1992 3,696.41 11,089.23 14,785.64 18,482.06
1993 3,825.68 11,477.04 15,302.72 19,128.40
1994 4,006.80 12,020.41 16,027.21 20,034.01
1995 4,205.95 12,617.84 16,823.79 21,029.74
1996 4,433.21 13,299.64 17,732.86 22,166.07
1997 4,606.10 13,818.29 18,424.39 23,030.49
1998 4,684.32 14,052.95 18,737.26 23,421.58
1999 4,768.58 14,305.73 19,074.30 23,842.88
2000 4,844.78 14,534.34 19,379.12 24,223.89
2001 4,970.67 14,912.00 19,882.66 24,853.33
2002 5,104.97 15,314.91 20,419.88 25,524.85
2003 5,227.56 15,682.68 20,910.24 26,137.80
2004 5,358.34 16,075.02 21,433.36 26,791.70
2005 5,465.59 16,396.77 21,862.36 27,327.95
2006 5,558.54 16,675.62 22,234.16 27,792.70
2007 5,669.82 17,009.46 22,679.28 28,349.10
2008 5,760.56 17,281.68 23,042.24 28,802.80
2009 5,950.88 17,852.64 23,803.52 29,754.40
2010 5,992.61 17,977.83 23,970.44 29,963.05
2011 6,076.59 18,229.77 24,306.36 30,382.95
2012 6,246.89 18,740.67 24,987.56 31,234.45
2013 6,440.59 19,321.77 25,762.36 32,202.95
2014 6,517.94 19,553.82 26,071.76 32,589.70
2015 6,524.57 19,573.71 26,098.28 32,622.85
2016 6,524.57 19,573.71 26,098.28 32,622.85
2017 6,524.57 19,573.71 26,098.28 32,622.85
Notes: The table reports the nominal value of the minimum
pension and of its multiples for the years from 1990 to 2017.
The minimum pension is a minimum amount provided by
the social security to pensioners whose pension benefit is be-
low a subsistence income threshold. The minimum pension
level is set by law each year.
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TABLE 1.B2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE OF SURVIVING
SPOUSES
Full sample Treatment group Control group
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.90 0.30 0.91 0.29 0.90 0.30
Age in t = 0 46.85 7.19 46.88 7.11 46.83 7.26
Prop. aged < 40 in t = 0 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Prop. aged 40-50 in t = 0 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Prop. aged 51-55 in t = 0 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49
Prop. with dependent children in t = 0 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50
Age of dependent children in t = 0 13.16 5.14 13.22 5.15 13.10 5.14
Prop. in first bracket in t = 0 0.86 0.34 0.85 0.36 0.88 0.33
Prop. in second bracket in t = 0 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23
Prop. in third bracket in t = 0 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
Prop. in fourth bracket in t = 0 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Prop. ever employed in t ≤ −1 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.40
Years of experience in t = −1 14.25 10.12 14.31 10.18 14.20 10.06
Prop. employed in t = −1 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49
Prop. employed in private sector in t = −1 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.60 0.49
Prop. employed in public sector in t = −1 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23
Prop. employed in para-public sector in t = −1 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Prop. self-employed in t = −1 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47
Prop. in professional occupation in t = −1 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06
Labor income in t = −1 6237.35 10761.88 6205.20 10745.04 6266.57 10777.19
Daily wage in t = −1 47.27 67.47 47.10 43.00 47.43 83.50
Days worked in t = −1 327.30 88.52 325.94 90.26 328.53 86.90
Benefit in t = 0 9691.92 7597.10 9712.08 7358.12 9673.44 7333.20
Income of deceased in t = 0 16256.70 14759.14 17322.87 14849.46 15043.89 14561.44
Pension of deceased in t = 0 12668.17 10407.14 13233.03 10223.97 12148.19 10546.34
Observations 94578 45022 49556
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the full balanced sample of surviving spouses. The statistics are com-
puted on the sample of survivors whose benefit start date is within a 24-month symmetric bandwidth around September
1, 1995. Monetary quantities are expressed in 2010 prices. Labor income is unconditional on employment. Days worked
and the wage rate are conditional on employment. The wage rate is computed as annual earnings divided by the number
of days worked.
Chapter 1. When Income Effects are Large:
Labor Supply Responses and the Value of Welfare Transfers
63
TABLE 1.B3: COVARIATE BALANCING TESTS
Regression discontinuity Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) mean
Female 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.899
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age in t = 0 0.070 -0.097 -0.160 -0.216 -0.075 46.860
(0.094) (0.124) (0.143) (0.179) (0.120)
Experience in t = −1 -0.001 -0.006 -0.418* -0.188 -0.289 14.445
(0.143) (0.189) (0.216) (0.269) (0.123)
Earnings in t = −1 -269.993* -170.699 -140.946 -105.928 -111.621 6373.42
(139.426) (185.312) (211.708) (265.219) (224.762)
Prop. employed in t = −1 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.397
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Days worked in t = −1 -0.999 -1.181 -3.594* -0.214 0.165 341.026
(1.358) (1.797) (2.007) (2.539) (3.165)
Daily wage in t = −1 -1.282 1.675 1.189 -0.953 -3.376 47.544
(1.020) (1.721) (1.353) (2.469) (2.204)
Prop. on defined benefit -0.005 -0.013 -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 0.312
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 94578 94578 94578 94578 94578 -
Month-of-benefit-start FE x x -
Calendar year FE x x -
Linear trend x x x x -
Quadratic trend x x -
LLR x -
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 for different outcome variables. Ro-
bust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2)
are based on a linear parametric specification, without and with controls respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are
based on a quadratic parametric specification, without and with controls respectively. Column (5) is based
on non-parametric local linear regression. Column (6) reports the mean of the outcome variable in the control
group. All estimates are based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth. Earnings are measured unconditional
on employment. The number of days worked and the wage rate are conditional on employment. The wage
rate is computed as annual earnings divided by the number of days worked.
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TABLE 1.B4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF SURVIVING
SPOUSES WITH PREDICTED TAXABLE INCOME IN THE SECOND OR HIGHER
INCOME BRACKET
Full sample Treatment group Control group
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.64 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.62 0.48
Age in t = 0 43.50 7.49 43.56 7.31 43.45 7.65
Prop. aged < 40 in t = 0 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46
Prop. aged 40-50 in t = 0 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50
Prop. aged 51-59 in t = 0 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41
Prop. with dependent children in t = 0 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49
Age of dependent children in t = 0 12.23 5.61 12.29 5.61 12.18 5.62
Prop. ever employed in t ≤ −1 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.06
Years of experience in t = −1 20.81 8.85 20.83 8.75 20.78 8.94
Prop. employed in t = −1 0.96 0.19 0.96 0.18 0.96 0.19
Prop. employed in private sector in t = −1 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.48
Prop. employed in public sector in t = −1 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
Prop. employed in para-public sector in t = −1 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Prop. self-employed in t = −1 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
Prop. in professional occupation in t = −1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Labor income in t = −1 24216.42 12681.93 24096.99 12625.93 24328.48 12734.13
Daily wage in t = −1 72.36 40.08 71.86 38.14 72.82 41.82
Days worked in t = −1 347.55 53.53 346.83 55.00 348.22 52.10
Benefit in t = 0 10670.52 9974.44 10437.28 9605.68 10892.00 10308.06
Income of deceased in t = 0 21361.10 21933.74 21886.54 20968.13 20589.71 23261.99
Pension of deceased in t = 0 14104.45 13660.71 14528.82 12980.38 13701.51 14265.97
Observations 13556 6562 6994
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the balanced sample of surviving spouses with predicted taxable income
in the second or higher income bracket. The statistics are computed on the sample of survivors whose benefit start date
is within a 24-month symmetric bandwidth around September 1, 1995. Monetary quantities are expressed in 2010 prices.
Labor income is unconditional on employment. Days worked and the wage rate are conditional on employment. The
wage rate is computed as annual earnings divided by the number of days worked.
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TABLE 1.B5: HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY GENDER AND AGE IN t = 0
Gender Age in t = 0
Female Male 20-40 41-50 51-55
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benefit -1984.11*** -734.445*** -2840.77*** -1194.09*** -2099.00***
(208.525) (89.437) (174.841) (245.582) (294.558)
[11318.84] [7129.74] [8842.95] [9612.85] [8944.35]
MPE -1.325*** -0.106 -1.097*** -0.999 -0.451
(0.376) (0.772) (0.459) (0.644) (0.299)
Participation rate 0.101*** 0.045*** 0.028** 0.036*** 0.051***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
[0.639] [0.553] [0.883] [0.585] [0.212]
Days worked 1.045 -0.092 6.307*** -3.999 3.418
(2.668) (3.855) (2.820) (3.534) (5.871)
[341.04] [338.62] [347.63] [336.31] [326.39]
Daily wage 1.673 -5.854** 1.359 0.526 -1.944
(1.412) (2.487) (1.848) (1.871) (3.396)
[74.238] [83.820] [73.630] [80.669] [80.453]
Benefit-start-month FE x x x x x
Calendar year FE x x x x x
Linear trend x x x x x
Quadratic trend x x x x x
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient η0 from equation 1.3, for various outcome variables
and groups of survivors, pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. The second row reports
instead the estimated coefficient β from equation 1.1 using taxable income as outcome variable. Robust
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mean value of
the outcome variable in the control group is reported in square brackets. The wage rate is computed as
annual earnings divided by the number of days worked. The estimates for days worked and the wage
rate are all conditional on employment and include the number of years of work experience in t = 0
among the individual controls.
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TABLE 1.B6: IV ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF THE BENEFIT ON TAXABLE
INCOME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME
Taxable income Disposable income Taxable income Disposable income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit -0.943** 0.057 -0.847** 0.153
(0.450) (0.450) (0.419) (0.419)
Observations 73783 73783 73783 73783
Benefit-start-month FE x x x x
Calendar year FE x x x x
Linear trend x x x x
Quadratic trend x x
Notes: The table reports the IV-RD coefficient β from estimating equation 1.1 using different outcome variables and
pooling event-time years from t = 0 to t = 15. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. P-value: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The IV estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on a first stage with linear parametric
specification, while those in columns (3) and (4) on a first stage with quadratic parametric specification with individual
controls. All estimates are based on a 24-month symmetric bandwidth. Individuals with observed taxable income in
the second and third income bracket are excluded from the estimation sample.
TABLE 1.B7: PLACEBO TEST FOR THE EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE
DEPENDENCY PERIOD
Number of years with dependent children
Placebo thresholds
September 1992 -0.404
(0.568)
September 1993 0.757
(0.423)
September 1994 -1.317***
(0.413)
September 1995 1.223***
(0.415)
September 1996 -0.345
(0.421)
September 1997 0.390
(0.416)
September 1998 -0.502
(0.540)
Benefit-start-month FE x
Calendar year FE x
Linear trend x
Quadratic trend x
Notes: The table reports the coefficient η0 from estimating equation 1.3 using
different cutoff dates τ. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimates are based on a quadratic
parametric specification with individual controls and a 24-month symmetric
bandwidth. The dependency period is measured as the number of years with
dependent children within the household.
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TABLE 1.B8: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE OF EITC RECIPI-
ENTS IN THE MARCH CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (1993-1997)
All household heads Single household heads
Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.53 0.50 0.85 0.36
Age 35.47 8.56 35.18 8.44
Prop. aged < 40 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46
Prop. aged 40-50 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
Prop. aged 51-59 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Prop. with dependent children 0.93 0.26 0.92 0.27
Age of dependent children 7.89 4.70 8.47 4.68
Prop. single 0.51 0.50
Prop. employed in t = −1 0.93 0.25 1.00 0.00
Prop. employed in private sector in t = −1 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.38
Prop. employed in public sector in t = −1 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33
Prop. self-employed in t = −1 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22
Total income (excl. unearned) 22066.68 14261.54 23397.75 13192.35
Estimated EITC amount 1557.91 1053.41 1645.41 1045.20
Observations 28036 13600
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the sample of EITC recipients in the March Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1992-1997. The sample is restricted to household heads
aged 18-55 at the time of the survey. The first two columns report the mean and standard devi-
ation of variables for all household heads, while the last two columns report the same statistics
for the sample of single household heads (i.e. those for whom no cohabiting spouse is recorded
in the data). Observations are weighted using the CPS individual weights. Monetary quantities
have been converted in 2010 euros using the US CPI and euro/dollar purchasing-power-parity
conversions.
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1.C Additional Results
1.C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
This section shows that the semi-elasticity of participation to the benefit, rescaled by the
semi-elasticity of labor supply to labor earnings, can be used to estimate the welfare gain
of increasing survivor benefits in the widowhood state.
I develop a model in which widow(er)s choose labor supply at the extensive margin.
Preferences are defined over consumption and labor. When participating in the labor
market, individuals incur an additively separable utility cost φ and earn labor income z.
Let utility be given by
u(c)− I {l = 1} · φ (1.C1)
where u(·) is a concave utility function, c is consumption, l ∈ {0, 1} a binary labor force
participation decision and φ labor disutility. φ is distributed with probability density
function f (φ) and cumulative distribution function F(φ). Assuming that labor force par-
ticipation generates income z, the budget constraint is
c = I {l = 1} · z + B (1.C2)
where B is the survivor benefit.
Let V(z, l, B) denote the indirect utility function. Individuals decide to work if and
only if
V(z, 1, B)−V(0, 0, B) ≥ φ (1.C3)
which is equivalent to a threshold rule whereby individuals work if and only if φ ≤
φ(z, B). The probability of working – i.e. the labor force participation rate – is Φ(z, B) =
F(φ(z, B)).
The semi-elasticity of labor supply with respect to the benefit is
dΦ
d log B
= f (φ) · ∂φ
∂B
· B = f (φ) ·
[
∂V(z, 1, B)
∂B
− ∂V(0, 0, B)
∂B
]
· B (1.C4)
Using a first order Taylor expansion around z = 0, we have
dΦ
d log B
≈ f (φ) · ∂
2V
∂z∂B
· z · B (1.C5)
Since
∂V
∂z
= u′(c(B)) is the marginal utility of income, we have
dΦ
d log B
≈ f (φ) · ∂u
′(c(B))
∂B
· z · B = f (φ) · u′′(c(B)) · z · B (1.C6)
Rescaling the above expression by the semi-elasticity of labor force participation to labor
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earnings ε =
dΦ
d log z
= f (φ) · u′(c(B)) · z and applying a first order Taylor expansion
around B = 0, we obtain[
dΦ
d log B
]
ε
≈ u
′′(c(B)) · B
u′(c(B))
≈ u
′(c(B))− u′(c(0))
u′(c(B))
(1.C7)
or equivalently, the negative of the labor supply response to log B divided by ε provides
a measure of the marginal benefit (MB) of survivor insurance:
MB =
u′(c(0))− u′(c(B))
u′(c(B))
≈ −
[
dΦ
d log B
]
ε
(1.C8)
70
Chapter 2
Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in
Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects
of Short Time Work
2.1 Introduction
The Great Recession has generated a significant revival of interest in policies destined at
encouraging labor hoarding by firms during downturns (e.g. Yagan, 2017; Giroud and
Mueller, 2017). Short time work programs (STW), which are subsidies for temporary re-
ductions in the number of hours worked, are the most emblematic of such policies, and
have been aggressively used during the Great Recession, especially in European coun-
tries. The fraction of employees on STW in 2009 reached 7% in Belgium, close to 5%
in Germany and 4% in France.1 In Italy, according to social security data, 4.6% of the
workforce was in STW in 2013, for a cost of 0.5% of GDP. This revival of interest is also
palpable in the U.S., where state STW programs have been actively promoted by the Job
Creation Act of 2012. In 2016, more than 28 U.S. states had implemented their own STW
program.2
But what is behind this STW craze? Do we know that it is effective in stabilizing em-
ployment? Is it helping firms hold onto their productive workers? Is it an effective way to
provide insurance to workers? More effective than unemployment insurance (UI) for in-
stance? More fundamentally, do we know anything about its welfare implications? What
sources of inefficiencies are we trying to correct with STW? If we believe that hours or
employment are not optimally set in the labor market, how can STW deal with these inef-
ficiencies? Are we not creating additional inefficiencies with these programs, by keeping
workers in unproductive firms, preventing efficient reallocation of labor?
1See Hijzen and Martin (2013), and Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018)
2U.S. Department of Labor Office, 2016.
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Despite STW being a key element to the countercyclical policy toolkit, and one of
the main active labor market policies during downturns, we are completely at a loss
to answer these fundamental questions: we know close to nothing about the effects of
STW, and its welfare consequences. This is all the more surprising given the large lit-
erature devoted to the use of other insurance programs such as UI over the business
cycle (Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2012; Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2018a;
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2018b; Kekre, 2016).
There are however three simple reasons that explain the very limited knowledge that
we have of the effects and desirability of STW. The first reason is a critical lack of firm or
individual level administrative data on STW.3 The literature on STW had to mainly resort
to cross country analysis (e.g. Van Audenrode, 1994; Boeri and Brücker, 2011; Cahuc and
Carcillo, 2011). But even in the presence of firm level data, the second issue lies in the
lack of credible sources of identification of STW treatment.4 Most papers therefore rely
on the structure of calibrated models to analyze the effects of STW on workers and firms
(Tilly and Niedermayer, 2016; Cooper, Meyer, and Schott, 2017). Alternatively, a few
studies have tried to find instruments for the take up of STW, but their results have not
enabled to reach any consensus.5 Even if we were to have some credible estimates of the
effects of STW on workers’ and firms’ outcomes, the third issue is the lack of a simple,
tractable yet general conceptual framework to rationalize the empirical evidence and feed
these estimates back into a welfare evaluation that would make transparent the trade-offs
implied by STW policies.6
This paper contributes to our understanding of STW by addressing these three lim-
itations. It relies on uniquely rich administrative data on STW from Italy. It uses the
presence of variation in eligibility rules across firms to provide compelling evidence of
the causal impact of STW on firms’ and workers’ outcomes. And it offers a simple and
general conceptual framework that maps to our empirical results to transparently assess
the welfare consequences of STW programs.
3As a matter of example, the German social security administration (IAB) does not collect data on STW.
Most STW applications and reports are sent in a paper format to the Federal Employment Agency, and are
not digitized. Only a sample of these reports has been digitized for the Nuremberg metropolitan area for
years 2008 to 2010 and matched to IAB data (Tilly and Niedermayer, 2016).
4In most countries with large STW programs in place, like Germany or France for instance, there is no
variation in a firm’s eligibility to take up STW. This severely complicates identification, with no obvious
method to control for the selection of firms into STW take up.
5Most studies instrument STW take up during the recession with the prior experience of firms with the
program (e.g. Boeri and Brücker, 2011; Cahuc and Carcillo, 2011; Hijzen and Martin, 2013) and find com-
peting results. Recently, Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018) offer a credible and compelling IV strategy in
the French context. They instrument STW take up using the proximity of a firm to other firms having used
STW before recessions. They also use as an alternative instrument response time variation in the adminis-
trative treatment of STW applications across French departments. They find, similar to our results, large and
significant employment effects of STW treatment.
6While a small theoretical literature shows (not surprisingly) that STW may distort both hours (Burdett
and Wright, 1989), and the allocation of workers across firms, thus reducing output (Cooper, Meyer, and
Schott, 2017), there is no clear view of the conditions under which STW programs might be socially desirable
and improve welfare.
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Our data comes from the Italian social security administration (INPS) and covers the
universe of Italian employer-employee matches in the private sector, and the universe
of all social security and transfer payments in Italy, from 1983 to 2015. Besides granular
information on firms and workers’ histories, it provides detailed information on eligi-
bility, applications and authorizations of the universe of STW episodes at both the firm
and individual levels from 2005 to 2015. This data, combined with the specificities of
the Italian STW program, which creates variation in eligibility across firms, allows us to
provide causal evidence of the effects of STW. Identification stems from the interaction
between two sources of variation in eligibility: INPS codes and firm size. First, we exploit
the fact that within 5-digit industries, certain firms, defined by particular INPS codes, are
eligible while others are not, because of the particular interpretation of the STW Law that
was given by INPS in a circular dating back to the 1970s. While this variation in STW
access across otherwise very similar firms appears exogenous to economic conditions at
such fine level today, we use the additional requirement that firms must be above a cer-
tain full-time equivalent size threshold to be eligible for the program. This enables us to
test and control for the possibility that differential time shocks affected eligible and non-
eligible INPS codes within 5-digit industries during the recession. We further provide
multiple robustness checks for the validity of our approach. In particular, we show that
our approach is not confounded by manipulation of size or INPS codes, nor by any other
change in regulations at the main eligibility size threshold.
Our results demonstrate that STW has large and significant effects on firms’ employ-
ment at both the intensive and extensive margin. Compared to counterfactual firms,
firms treated by STW experience a 40% reduction in hours worked per employee, and a
similar magnitude increase in the number of employees in the firm, with no discernible
effect on wage rates. Unpacking the full dynamics of treatment effects, we show that
these employment effects are temporary, and immediately disappear once STW treat-
ment stops. On the workers side, we similarly find that treatment effects are all concen-
trated in the short run. STW has immediate positive effects on employment probability,
but negative effects on hours, and a positive effect on total earnings and transfers. But
these effects disappear after treatment, so that STW provides no significant insurance to
workers in the medium or long run. In fact, two years after treatment, there are no sig-
nificant differences in the employment probability, earnings, and total income of workers
who were treated by STW and workers who were counterfactually laid-off.
We then analyze the selection of firms into STW and the heterogeneity in the treatment
effects of the program, to shed light on the mechanisms behind the temporary nature
of the average estimated effects and the lack of long term insurance for workers. In
particular, we show that firms that were at the bottom of the productivity distribution
before the Recession are three times more likely than higher productivity firms to take up
STW during the Recession and that employment effects for them are significantly smaller.
This clearly suggests that STW is predominantly targeting firms that have permanently
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lower productivity and helps explain why keeping workers in these firms does not entail
significant long term benefits. More importantly, this suggests that by keeping workers
in low productivity firms, STW may have significant negative reallocation effects in the
labor market.
To investigate these claims, we leverage the rich spatial variation available in Italy
across more than 600 local labor markets (LLM) and estimate how an increase in the frac-
tion of workers treated by STW in a LLM affects employment outcomes of non-treated
firms. We instrument variation in the intensity of STW treatment across LLM by the aver-
age yearly fraction of eligible workers in the LLM based on the interaction between firm
size and INPS codes in the pre-recession period, controlling for a rich set of firm and LLM
characteristics. We provide various placebo tests confirming the validity of our IV strat-
egy. Our results provide compelling evidence of the presence of equilibrium effects of
STW within labor markets. We show that STW significantly decreases the employment
growth and inflow rates of non-treated firms, and has a significant negative impact on
TFP growth in the labor market.
We finally provide a tractable search and matching framework that rationalizes these
empirical findings, and maps our estimates into a transparent welfare evaluation of STW.
While remaining general, the model adds a series of key ingredients that prove critical to
evaluate the arguments put forward in favor or against the existence of STW programs.
First, workers are risk averse and are imperfectly insured so that insurance against the
incidence of productivity shocks on workers’ earnings is socially desirable. The model
allows firms, which are subject to (idiosyncratic and/or aggregate) productivity shocks,
to adjust labor inputs along both the intensive (hours) and extensive (employment) mar-
gin.7 Wages and hours are negotiated between workers and firms, to split the surplus
generated by matches in a frictional labor market. And hours adjustments are there-
fore constrained by the outside options of workers.8 More generally, wage and hours
schedules may not always guarantee that hours and employment are set at their socially
efficient level, opening the potential need for a government intervention to stabilize em-
ployment and hours.9 In this environment, STW policies, by affecting equilibrium in
the labor market, naturally create reallocation effects between high and low productivity
firms.
Many arguments have been put forward in the public debate in favor or against STW.
STW provides insurance to workers, it provides insurance to firms against the costs of
7In that sense, our model is related to Cooper, Meyer, and Schott (2017), but with two important depar-
tures: first workers are risk averse and insurance markets are incomplete, which provides a rationale for
social insurance. And second, the hours constraint, which creates potential inefficiencies in employment is
endogenous rather than exogenous.
8As in Braun and Brügemann (2014), this means that STW may correct inefficiencies created by the un-
employment insurance system.
9Note that we do not impose restrictions on the matching environment. Assuming directed search, as in
Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018) for instance, would guarantee that hours and employment are always
socially efficient, leaving no role for STW to correct potential inefficiencies in employment and hours over
the business cycle.
Chapter 2. Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short Time Work
74
replacing workers, it mitigates hours and wage rigidities that may prevent optimal labor
adjustments, it stabilizes employment, it inefficiently reallocates labor towards low pro-
ductivity firms, etc. Thanks to its generality, our model encompasses an array of previous
frameworks used in the small theoretical literature on STW, and enables to review within
one single framework most of these important arguments. We contribute by clarifying
the conditions under which STW “works”, i.e. induces firms hit by productivity shocks
to take up the program, and increase their employment. In particular we show that wage
rigidity critically amplifies the employment responses to STW.
Importantly, our model is directly related to the public finance literature on optimal
policies in equilibrium models of the labor market (see for instance Landais, Michaillat,
and Saez, 2018a, and Michaillat and Saez, 2017). In the spirit of this sufficient statistics
literature, we use the model to provide a general formula for the optimal generosity of
STW subsidies which clarifies the key welfare tradeoffs of STW programs. The main
insight is that optimal STW not only balances the insurance value of the subsidy with
its fiscal externality but also needs to account for two additional sources of inefficien-
cies: first employment may be inefficient due to the frictional nature of the labor market,
and second, equilibrium hours may also not be at their socially optimal level due to the
missing market for hours. STW will entail positive welfare gains when equilibrium em-
ployment is suboptimally low, and hours suboptimally high, and our formula offers a
clear representation of these hours and employment inefficiency terms. The advantage
of this approach is that the formula, and the key tradeoffs underpinning it, remain the
same irrespective of the exact structure and primitives of the underlying model. In that
sense, our formula is robust to the way wages and hours are determined in the model,
to the specification of the costs of replacing or firing workers, to the presence of specific
human capital, to various sources of hours or wage rigidity, to the presence of liquid-
ity constraints, etc. Furthermore, our approach offers the possibility to conduct a local
welfare calibration using our reduced form estimates, which suggests that in the current
Italian context, both the fiscal externality and the insurance value of STW are high, and
that the marginal welfare gains of further increases in STW are small as the employment
and hours inefficiencies are equally large but of opposite sign.
Finally, we use a calibrated version of the model to run non-marginal counterfactual
analysis and quantify the welfare effects of removing STW. This analysis confirms that
the welfare gains of further increases in the generosity of STW are small, but the value
of having STW is significantly positive. In the absence of any STW subsidy, the unem-
ployment level would have been almost 2 percentage points higher during the recession,
and total TFP about 2% higher, but at a total welfare cost of about 2%. We also use the
calibrated model to explore various counterfactual scenarii and gain further insights on
the effects of STW outside the specific context of Italy, where the Great Recession trans-
formed into a long, protracted shock. We show that the immediate employment effects
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of STW are significantly larger (around 20% to 40%) when the aggregate shock is tem-
porary than when it is permanent, as firms’ desire for labor hoarding is much greater
for temporary shocks, especially when the cost of replacing workers is high, and when
the magnitude of the aggregate shock is large. This suggests that STW might have been
much more effective in the German context than in Italy during the Great Recession.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the Italian
STW institutions and the data. Section 2.3 presents the identification strategy and our
estimates of the effects of STW on firms outcomes. We explore in Section 2.4 the corre-
sponding effects of STW on the short run and long run outcomes of workers. Section
2.5 investigates selection into the program and heterogeneity in its treatment effects be-
fore presenting clear evidence of the spillover effects of the program on untreated firms.
Section 2.6 develops the model and explores the welfare implications of our findings.
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
2.2.1 The Italian Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG)
The Italian Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) was created in 1941. It represents, with
the German Kurzarbeit, one of the oldest, largest and most comprehensive short-time
work programs in the world. It was heavily used during the latest recession: in 2013,
almost 5% of the Italian workforce was on STW, for a cost of roughly 0.5% of Italian GDP.
This massive expansion of STW take-up makes Italy the perfect laboratory to analyze the
employment and welfare consequences of STW during the Great Recession.
CIG is composed of three programs: Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria (CIGO),
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (CIGS) and Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in
Deroga (CIGD). We focus throughout the paper on the second program, CIGS, which is
the main pillar of STW used in recessions.10
CIGS rules are quite standard among STW programs, and make it a good example of
most of the programs implemented across OECD countries. CIGS targets firms experi-
encing economic shocks, broadly defined: it can be a demand or revenue shock, a com-
pany crisis, a need for restructuring or reorganization, an illiquidity or insolvency issue,
etc. CIGS is a subsidy for partial or full-time hour reductions, replacing approximately
80% of the earnings forgone by the worker due to hours not worked.11 The subsidy is
10CIGO is restricted to small transitory shocks or accidents involving forced reduction of activity (e.g.
adverse weather conditions, earthquakes, power cuts). It is restricted to the manufacturing sector and has a
maximum duration of 13 weeks. CIGD is a smaller additional program created in 2009, administered at the
local level and granted ad-hoc on the basis of regional decrees.
11Hours not worked are computed against the regular hours stipulated in the labor contract. The normal
weekly working hours are 40 in Italy. There is almost no variation in the replacement rate of the subsidy
across workers. If a firm is eligible, all workers with at least 90 days of tenure are eligible to be put on CIGS,
except for apprentices and top executives of the firm. Firms are free to decide the amount of hours reductions
they request, i.e. there is no minimum or maximum amount of hours reduction in the CIGS program.
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available to workers in the private sector and is administered by the Italian Social Secu-
rity (INPS). The subsidy is remitted directly to the workers. Firms intending to use the
program must file an application to the Social Security or the Ministry of Labor, provid-
ing a justification of economic need and a recovery plan.12 Once authorized, the usage
of CIG is subject to weak conditionality requirements for both firms and workers: there
are no provisions for compulsory training nor prohibitions of dismissal by firms, and no
job-search requirements for employees. The cost to firms of putting workers on CIGS is
minimal: they pay a fee to INPS equal to 3 to 4.5% of the total amount of the subsidy to
workers.13 CIGS is otherwise financed via ordinary payroll contributions. The duration
of the program is up to 12 months, with limited possibilities of extensions. Utilization of
the program need not be on a continuous basis, but cannot exceed a maximum duration
of 36 months – including extensions – over 5-year periods that are fixed and defined by
the law. In practice, almost all firms use CIGS for exactly 12 months, with the median
and average durations of CIGS take-up both almost equal to 52 weeks.
One of the specificities of CIGS is the presence of various provisions of the law that
create quasi-exogenous variation in eligibility across firms, offering the unique possibil-
ity of identifying the causal effect of short-time work programs on firm and individual
outcomes. This is remarkable as most STW programs like the German Kurzarbeit or the
French STW, provide little to no variation in eligibility across firms, making it compli-
cated to identify the causal effect of STW in these contexts (Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux,
2018). We exploit the fact that a firm’s eligibility for CIGS depends in particular on two
dimensions: an INPS specific code called “contributory regime” and the size of the firm
prior to filing an application.
Contributory regimes (or INPS codes) are created by combining 5-digit industry codes
and 333 different “codice autorizzazione”.14 Eligibility of each INPS code to CIGS is de-
termined by a circular of the Ministry of Labor translating the provisions of the Law
on Cassa Integrazione, and made operational by INPS, dating back to the 1970s. As a
consequence, within fine-grained 5-digit industry codes (594 industries), there is varia-
tion in CIGS eligibility across otherwise very similar firms, due to regulations from the
Ministry of Labor that are quite plausibly exogenous to economic conditions at such fine
level today. To provide just a few concrete examples: within the 5-digit industry codes
11306, 11307 and 11308, which are firms in construction specialized in the installation of
electrical machinery, only those with codice autorizazzione 3N are eligible; within the
12Using data on CIGS applications and authorizations, we found that in practice, applications are never
rejected: 99.99% of applications are authorized by the Ministry of Labor.
13The fee is 3% for firms with up to 50 employees and 4.5% for larger firms. In 2015, a reform introduced an
experience rating component to the costs of CIGS to the employer by making the fee an increasing function
of the amount of subsidized hours.
14The “codice autorizzazione” is an administrative code used by INPS that, in combination with the 5-digit
industry code, defines the various programs and contributions a firm is eligible to or subject to. The combi-
nation of 5-digit industry codes and “codice autorizzazione” creates an INPS code that allows to univocally
identify the contributory regime and CIGS eligibility of any given firm.
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5-digit code 10106, which are firms that produce seeds and beans, only firms with codice
autorizzazione 3A are eligible.
Besides INPS codes, a firm eligibility to CIGS depends on its size being above a certain
threshold. This variation in eligibility across firms of different sizes allows to use non-
eligible firms within INPS codes to test and control for differential time shocks across
eligible vs non eligible INPS codes. The main size requirement is that a firm must have
employed on average more than 15 employees in full-time equivalent (FTE) units in the
six months prior to the application.15 For some industries in the retail sector, the size
requirement differs, and is set to 50 FTE. Note that employment legislation regulating
dismissals also apply in Italy when a firm reaches 15 employees within a single establish-
ment or municipality, or 60 employees in the firm in Italy as a whole.16
We explain in Section 2.3.1 how these sources of variation in eligibility across INPS
codes and firm size can be combined to identify the effects of CIGS on firms and workers.
2.2.2 Data
We use administrative data from INPS on the universe of employer-employee matches
and social security payments in the private sector in Italy from 1983 to 2015. The data in-
cludes detailed information on workers’ demographics, working histories, participation
in all social assistance and social insurance programs. It also provides detailed informa-
tion on firm characteristics such as employment, labor-force composition and industry.
Most importantly, starting from 2005, the data provides information on eligibility, appli-
cations, authorizations, duration and payments of the Italian short-time work program at
the individual and firm level. We linked the administrative archives to firm-level balance-
sheet data from CERVED via a unique identifier. CERVED is a firm register containing
balance sheet information of all incorporated limited liability companies in Italy. The
balance-sheet information covers roughly 50% of firms in the administrative records and
enables to create various measures of productivity and credit constraints.
We define STW events at the firm level as any month in which a STW episode is
reported in the INPS records, which is also authorized according to the authorization
data. When aggregating at the annual level, an event is defined as having at least one
STW episode during the year. Eligibility status is defined dynamically using INPS codes
and based on the maximum 6-month average FTE firm size in each year.17
15To be precise, eligibility to CIGS, and therefore eligibility requirements, all apply at the establishment
level. INPS codes are also establishment specific. When we refer to firms throughout the paper, we mean
“establishments”. We restrict our baseline sample to single establishment firms.
16In Section 2.3.3, we explain and provide multiple evidence that our approach is robust to the variation
in dismissal costs at the 15 FTE threshold. We use in particular multi-establishments firms that are always
subject to the dismissal cost regulation.
17The FTE size measure relevant for establishing CIGS eligibility is computed considering all employees,
including those who are not eligible for CIGS (managers, apprentices and work-from-home employees) and
those who are currently on unpaid leave (unless the firm has hired a replacement). Part-time workers are
counted in full-time equivalent units. Eligible firms must have employed on average at least 15 employees
in FTE in the 6 months prior to their application. Firms that have less than six months of activity should
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To define intensive measures of employment, we leverage detailed weekly level in-
formation on whether a worker was working full-time or part-time. When working part-
time, we have information on the percentage of part-time work. We use this information
to create a measure of hours worked for each worker. We assign 40 hours per week to
full-time workers, and weight hours for part-time work using the percentage of part-time
work, assuming a corresponding full-time contract of 40 hours.
Our main sample of analysis is a balanced panel of all ever-active private sector firms
that ever reach an average 6-month full-time equivalent firm size between 5 and 25 in
the period 2005 to 2014. Our sample of workers is a balanced panel of all workers ever
working in these firms.18 Appendix Table 2.A1 provides descriptive statistics on our main
sample of firms in 2008, prior to the start of the Great Recession. The average firm size
in our sample is close to 9 employees, with an average of 38.7 weekly hours worked per
employee. The average wage bill per employee is 20.6k euros. The table also breaks down
firms between eligible and non-eligible INPS codes. Despite being unequally distributed
across industries, firms in eligible and non-eligible INPS codes are quite similar in terms
of observable characteristics prior to the Great Recession. Firms in eligible INPS codes
are slightly larger, but are quite comparable in terms of hours worked per employee,
wage bill per employee, revenues, investment and liquidity. Table 2.A2 provides similar
information for workers in our main sample of analysis. Workers in eligible INPS codes
are more likely to be male and blue collars, and they are also slightly older than workers
in non-eligible INPS codes, which reflect the fact that manufacturing is more represented
in eligible INPS codes than in non-eligible INPS codes.
Appendix Figure 2.A1 reports additional information on the distribution of treatment
across workers in firms experiencing STW. Panel A plots the distribution of the ratio of
treated workers to eligible workers in firms currently under short time work treatment,
and shows that most firms choose to put all their eligible workers in the program and
therefore spread hours reductions across all eligible workers. Panel B reports the distri-
bution of reported weekly hours reduction of workers currently experiencing STW. The
graph shows a smooth distribution of hours reductions, with a mode around 0.25, and
an average weekly hours reduction of a little more than 35%.19
consider the average number of employees (in FTE) in the month or months of activity. In order to determine
whether a firm meets the size requirement, we use the exact FTE firm size measure that determines CIGS
eligibility as provided by INPS (the variable is called “forza aziendale”).
18We restrict the main analysis to the period up to 2014, as an important reform of Italian labor market
regulations started being implemented in 2015, which may have interfered with the effects of STW programs.
19Figure 2.A1 therefore provides evidence that STW does not work like temporary layoffs, but effectively
like hours reductions spread across all workers in the firm.
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2.3 Effects of STW on Employment and Firm Outcomes
2.3.1 Identification
The eligibility requirements of the Italian CIGS create sharp variation in a firm’s proba-
bility to use STW based on INPS codes and firm size.
Appendix Figure 2.2 provides direct evidence of this variation in access to CIGS by
INPS codes and firm size. Panel A plots, among firms with eligible INPS codes in our
sample, the evolution of the fraction of firms receiving CIGS in each calendar year t from
2005 to 2014, for firms with a maximum 6-month average size of 15 to 25 full time equiv-
alent employees in year t− 1 and for firms with a maximum 6-month average size of 5
to 15 full time equivalent employees in year t− 1. For firms with more than 15 FTE em-
ployees, CIGS take up rose sharply from less than 1% before the onset of the recession, to
roughly 8% throughout the recession. While for firms with less than 15 employees, take
up was essentially zero throughout the period. Panel B of Figure 2.2 replicates the same
exercise for firms in non-eligible INPS codes. For both firms below and above the 15 FTE
threshold, the take up is null throughout the entire period.
Our main identification strategy relies on using the interaction of being in an eligible
INPS code, and having more than 15 FTE as a source of quasi-experimental variation in
CIGS treatment after the onset of the recession in 2008. For each outcome Y, the baseline
specification underlying our reduced-form graphical evidence is:
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(2.1)
where Yigst denotes outcome Y for firm i, belonging to INPS code group g, in 5-digit in-
dustry s in year t. A firm can either be in the group of INPS codes eligible to receive
CIGS (g ∈ E ) or in the group of non-eligible firms (g ∈ E{). Ni,t−1 is firm i’s full time
equivalent size in calendar year t− 1. Note that by systematically controlling for 5-digit
industry fixed effects and their interactions with time and firm size, we only exploit vari-
ation in eligibility of INPS codes across firms within the same fine-level industry codes.
This variation stems from the interaction between industry codes and “codice autorizazz-
ione".20 To restrict our attention to comparable firms in a narrow neighborhood around
the 15 FTE cut-off, we estimate the above model on our baseline balanced panel of firms
20This approach therefore fully controls for the fact that eligible firms are not evenly distributed across
5-digit industries nor across “codice autorizazzione".
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who ever reach a size between 5 and 25 FTE. Our graphical evidence consists in plotting
the estimated coefficients γˆt1 for all years t, which capture the evolution over time of the
relative outcomes of firms that are just above and just below the 15 full-time equivalent
employee threshold in eligible INPS codes, versus firms that are just above and below the
same 15 full-time equivalent employee threshold in non-eligible INPS codes, but within
the same 5-digit industry. The omitted year in specification (2.1) is 2007, so results are
expressed relative to levels in year 2007.
Estimates of the effect of STW treatment are obtained from running IV models where
we instrument the probability of STW treatment T by the triple interaction of being after
the onset of the recession, being in an eligible INPS code and having more than 15 FTE
employees:
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(2.3)
Note that our approach allows for fully flexible 5-digit industry specific time shocks,
so that our identification is not confounded by differences in the way various industries
responded to the recession. Furthermore, within industry, we allow for fully flexible
INPS code time shocks. In other words, we allow for the fact that within industry, firms
in eligible and non-eligible INPS codes might have fared differently during the recession.
Finally, within industry, we also allow for fully flexible time shocks interacted with firm
size. This controls for the fact that, in Italian Labor Laws, firms are exposed to different
regimes when larger than 15 employees. Our strategy therefore allows for these differen-
tial regimes to impact differently over time, firms just below 15 employees and firms just
above 15 employees, within each industry.
Given this rich set of flexible controls, our identification rests on the assumption that
there are no unobservable time shocks that would be, within each industry, specific to
firms that are in the set of INPS codes eligible to CIGS and whose size is just above the
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15 FTE threshold. Or equivalently, we rely on the parallel trend assumption that size
specific time shocks are common across eligible and non-eligible INPS codes within the
same industry, and that “INPS code”-specific time shocks within a given industry are
common across firm just above and below 15.
We explore the credibility and validity of these assumptions in a series of robustness
tests in Section 2.3.3. In terms of inference, we define two groups of firm sizes: a group
with FTE above 15 in t − 1 and a group with FTE below 15 in t − 1, and we cluster all
our standard errors at the INPS code times firm size group level. We explore additional
inference approaches such as permutation tests (see footnote 24).
2.3.2 Results
Figure 2.1 Panel A starts by providing a graphical representation of the CIGS variation
used to identify the causal effects of STW. It plots the coefficients γ̂t1 for all years t from
a regression following specification (2.1), using as an outcome the probability that a firm
receives CIGS treatment. It confirms the evidence from Appendix Figure 2.2 discussed
above, that our instrument generates a sharp and significant first-stage. Our instrument
accounts for a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of CIGS take-up by firms
during the 2008 recession, starting from a baseline very close to zero for all firms prior
to the onset of the crisis. Regarding the timing, the graph also shows that CIGS take-up
quickly increased after the onset of the recession, and was high throughout the recession,
with a peak in 2013.
Figure 2.2 displays estimates of the effect of STW on employment outcomes and
wages. For each panel, we plot the coefficients γ̂t1 for all years from 2000 to 2014, based on
a regression following specification (2.1), and we also report on the graph the estimated
IV coefficient β̂ IV of the effect of CIGS treatment following the IV model in specification
(2.2).
First, the figure provides supporting evidence for our identifying assumption, by con-
firming, for each outcome, the absence of differential pre-trends between firms just below
and just above the 15 FTE threshold in eligible and non-eligible INPS codes within the
same industry.
The figure also suggests that STW has had large employment effects at both the in-
tensive and extensive margin but insignificant effects on wage rates. Panel A shows that
CIGS reaches its primary intent, by allowing firms to reduce employment at the intensive
margin. Our estimates suggest that CIGS access enables firms to significantly reduce the
number of hours worked per employee by e−0.51 − 1 = 40% on average. While reducing
employment at the intensive margin, CIGS treatment significantly increases employment
at the extensive margin, as shown in Panel B. Firms experience a large and highly signif-
icant increase in headcount employment of e0.38 − 1 ≈ 45% due to CIGS treatment. Im-
portantly, Panel C suggests that CIGS has no statistically significant effect on wage rates,
defined here as earnings per hour worked per worker. This rigidity of wages means that
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the wage bill per employee decreases significantly with CIGS, by about 45% as shown in
Panel D, since workers work less hours for the same wage rate cost to the firm.
In Table 2.1, we provide additional results of the effects of STW treatment on various
firms’ outcomes. Panel B shows that the positive employment effects are driven by an
increase in the relative number of employees in open-ended contracts. The estimated IV
coefficient for the effect of CIGS treatment on the log number (headcount) of employees
in open-ended contract is β IV = 0.61 (0.043), but the number of employees in fixed-
term contracts is negatively impacted by CIGS treatment (β IV = −0.40 (0.11)). This
reallocation of employment between open-ended and fixed-term contracts reflects the
duality of the Italian labor market (Boeri, 2011).
Panel C of Table 2.1 presents results on the effect of STW on balance-sheet and produc-
tivity outcomes. These results are estimated on the sample of firms that were matched
to their balance sheet data from CERVED. To get a better idea of the magnitude of the
effects, we report the estimated IV coefficient β IV scaled by the average value of the out-
come for non-eligible firms in the post 2008 period. Our results suggest that there is a
small positive (yet not significant) effect of STW on firms’ total output. We measure total
output by firm value added, that is, total revenues plus unsold stocks minus cost of goods
and services used in production.21 We find a small positive insignificant effect of STW
of 0.09 (0.16). Value added per worker goes down significantly by roughly 50% (12%) in
response to STW treatment. Interestingly, this result of a negative effect on value added
per worker provides evidence that the hours and employment responses to STW are real
responses, and are not simply driven by reporting behavior. One may indeed worry that
collusive avoidance behavior may occur within the firm, by which firms report less hours
to INPS so that workers may benefit from the STW subsidy, while real working hours
remain unchanged. If it were the case though, value-added per worker would remain
unchanged when measured in the CERVED data. The significant decline in value-added
per worker indicates that our estimates of hours responses to STW capture real behavior
rather than avoidance.
Finally we investigate the effect of STW on firms’ investment and liquidity, defined
as cash and cash equivalents. We do not find any effect on investment and find a posi-
tive effect (although very imprecisely estimated) on liquidity. Combined with the large
employment effect of STW and with wage rigidity, the fact that a firm’s liquidity reacts
to STW treatment, suggests that internal funds constraints may play a role in amplify-
ing employment responses to negative productivity shocks, as suggested by Schoefer
(2015).22
21In effect, this is equivalent to defining firm output as total profits plus total capital depreciation plus
total wage cost.
22We provide additional evidence on the role of liquidity constraints in Section 2.5.1.
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2.3.3 Robustness
The first potential concern with our identification strategy is that firms may endoge-
nously select into either firm size or eligible INPS code in order to benefit from STW.
In terms of firm size, treatment eligibility is determined by a firm’s largest 6-month
continuous FTE size in the year prior to STW application. While this may limit manipu-
lation opportunities in practice, firms with private information about future shocks may
still have the possibility to endogenously adjust their FTE size ex-ante. To assess to what
extent size manipulation creates significant selection susceptible of biasing our results,
we first display in Appendix Figure 2.A3 the probability density function of FTE size
over our entire sample period. Size manipulation to benefit from STW treatment in re-
sponse to the 15 FTE threshold should result in “bunching from below”, with missing
mass just below the threshold, and excess mass above. The figure displays little signs of
bunching from below. To provide more formal testing for size manipulation, we report in
Appendix Figure 2.A4 results from McCrary tests of the presence of a discontinuity in the
probability density function (pdf) of FTE size. We report the statistic from the test and
its confidence interval for each year, and separately for eligible and non eligible INPS
codes. In the presence of manipulation, we would expect the presence of a significant
discontinuity in the pdf for eligible INPS codes, that would be more pronounced during
the Recession, if access to STW is indeed valuable during Recession. The figure shows
that, for both eligible and non eligible INPS codes, no statistically significant discontinu-
ity in the pdf of FTE can be found, and that this holds for each year from 2000 to 2014.
As a final exercise to assess the robustness of our results to size manipulation, we run a
“doughnut” regression, where we exclude all firms with FTE between 12 and 18. Results,
displayed in Table 2.2 column (1) are almost identical to our baseline results, confirming
that our estimated effects are not driven by selection due to size manipulation by firms.
Beyond their FTE size, firms may be willing to manipulate their INPS code, either
through their codice autorizzazione or their industry code, in order to gain eligibility to
STW. In practice, while not impossible, such manipulation is complicated, and extremely
rare. Appendix Figure 2.A5 shows that less than 0.6% of firms change eligibility status
due to a change in their INPS code every year in our sample, with the same fraction
(≈ 0.3%) of firms moving from being eligible to non eligible and moving from being non
eligible to being eligible. Furthermore, these fractions are extremely stable over time.
These results suggest that it is highly unlikely that firms endogenously self-select into
INPS codes in order to get access to CIGS.
The identifying assumption underlying our strategy is that there is no time shock
that would be specific to firms just above 15 FTE and eligible INPS codes within 5-digit
industry codes. To assess the credibility of this assumption and the robustness of our
approach, we proceed in several steps.
First, we show that there is little evidence of significant differential time shocks be-
tween eligible and non eligible INPS codes within the same industry for firms just below
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15 FTE. To this effect, we directly estimate differential trends across INPS codes within
5-digit industry codes using only firms with FTE below 15 and therefore non eligible to
receive STW. We estimate a model of the following form on a sample restricted to firms
between 5 and 15 FTE in year t− 1.
Yigst = α1 ·
{
1[g ∈ E ] · 1[t ≥ 2009]
}
+∑
k
αk2 · 1[g ∈ E ] · 1[k = s] +∑
j
∑
k
α
jk
3 · 1[j = t] · 1[k = s] + vigst (2.4)
We report in column (2) of Table 2.2, the estimated coefficient α1 of the interaction
for being in eligible INPS codes after the start of the Great Recession. Results for all
outcomes of interest show that differential effects of the Great Recession for eligible vs
non eligible INPS codes within the same industry are either not statistically significant or
of very limited magnitude for firms below 15 FTE. These results confirm that within 5-
digit industry, variation in CIGS eligibility across INPS codes, which is mostly a product
of regulations from the Ministry of Labor in the 1970s, is quite plausibly exogenous to
economic conditions today.23
The previous evidence suggests that, for firms below 15 FTE, there is no evidence of
time shocks that would be, within 5-digit industries, specific to eligible INPS codes. But
of course finding no differential trends across eligible and non-eligible INPS codes for
firms below 15 employees does not preclude the possibility that such differential trends
exist for firms above 15 employees. Indeed, firms below and above the 15 FTE differ
in terms of the dismissal regulations they are subject to. Heterogeneity in the treatment
effects of employment regulation across INPS codes may then create differential trends
across INPS codes for firms above 15 employees. We assess the robustness of our results
to this potential threat in two simple ways.
First we can directly assess the extent of heterogeneity in the treatment effects of em-
ployment regulation across INPS codes by running placebo specifications across non-
eligible INPS codes. We restrict the sample to non eligible INPS codes only. Among these
non eligible INPS codes, we randomly select a series of INPS codes, to which we attribute
a placebo “eligible” status and then run the reduced-form of our baseline IV specification
(2.3). We replicate this procedure 100 times and obtain bootstrapped estimates of the
placebo reduced-form coefficient for the triple interaction of being a firm above the 15
FTE threshold in (placebo) eligible INPS codes after 2008. We report the mean and stan-
dard error of the distribution of these 100 bootstrapped estimates in column (4) of Table
2.2. All estimates are statistically insignificant, very close to zero, with tight standard er-
rors, showing no evidence for heterogenous responses to the recession across INPS codes
23As a consequence, this means that our baseline results do not rely much on correcting for differential
trends across eligible and non eligible INPS codes within industry, using firms with less than 15 FTE. This
can be clearly seen from results in column (3) of Table 2.2 which reports estimates from a specification where
we focus on firms between 15 and 25 FTE only, and therefore only identify the effects of STW by comparing
firms in eligible vs non eligible INPS codes, before vs after the onset of the Great Recession. Results are
indeed extremely similar to our baseline results.
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by firms just above 15 FTE. This evidence clearly alleviates the concern that our baseline
estimates may just be picking up some idiosyncratic time shocks at the INPS code level
for firms above 15 FTE during the Great Recession.24
Second, we use the fact that for some firms, the size thresholds that determine CIGS
eligibility and employment dismissal regulation do not coincide. One reason for the two
thresholds not to coincide is that employment legislation regulating dismissals apply in
Italy when a firm reaches 15 employees within a single establishment, or 60 employees in
the firm in Italy as a whole. But, as explained in footnote 15 above, eligibility to CIGS, and
therefore eligibility requirements, all apply at the establishment level. In Table 2.2, we
use a sample of multi-establishment firms that have more than 60 employees across Italy,
and compare their establishments that are around the 15 FTE, by running on this sample
our baseline IV specification (2.2). Because all these establishments are already subject to
dismissal regulation, the identifying variation in CIGS eligibility cannot be confounded
by potential heterogeneity in the treatment effect of employment protection laws. Results
reported in column (5) of Table 2.2 are qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates, with
large negative effects on employment at the intensive margin and large positive effects on
employment at the extensive margin, although much less precise due to the small size of
this sample. In column (6) of Table 2.2, we provide additional evidence of the robustness
of our results by focusing on another small group of firms in the retail sector for which
the size thresholds that determine CIGS eligibility is set at 50 FTE, and therefore does
not coincide with the 15 FTE size threshold for employment dismissal regulation. We
create a sample of single-establishment firms in the wholesale and retail sectors that ever
reach a maximum 6-month FTE size between 25 and 75. We estimate our baseline model
specification (2.2), on this sample, simply replacing the dummy variable 1[Ni,t−1 > 15]
by a dummy for reaching a maximum 6-month firm size above 50 FTE in year t − 1.
Results reported in column (6) are again very comparable to our baseline estimates, with
negative effects on hours and large positive effects on headcount employment. Although
point estimates are similar to our baseline estimates, standard errors are much larger due
to the small size of this sample.
Taken together, this set of results provides evidence of the credibility of our identify-
ing assumption, and of the robustness of our baseline results.
24This placebo procedure naturally lends itself to a simple permutation test for the estimates obtained
from our baseline specification. In other words, we can use the bootstrapped placebo estimates to determine
what the likelihood would be of getting our baseline estimates if “treated” INPS codes were actually allo-
cated randomly. We report in Appendix Figure 2.A7 the p-value from such tests for the baseline estimate of
each coefficient γˆt1 in specification (2.1), each panel corresponding to a different firm outcome. Results show
that for the outcomes (intensive and extensive employment margin, wage bill, etc) where we find large sta-
tistically significant effects in our baseline specification, the probability of finding such effects “at random”
is extremely small, and always below 5%. To the contrary, for the wage rate, where we find no statistically
significant effect in our baseline specification, the p-value is large, which further suggests that wage rates
seem to be totally unresponsive to STW.
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2.3.4 Dynamic Effects
As explained in Section 2.2, CIGS treatment is temporary. Firms can receive STW for a
maximum of 12 months over a fixed 5-year period and, in practice, both average and
median duration are very close to 52 weeks. Furthermore, INPS codes and firm size,
which determine access to STW, are persistent over time. As a result, a firm that is eligible
based on firm size and INPS code in year t is not only more likely to receive treatment in
t, but also more likely to have received treatment in t− 1, t− 2, etc. Appendix Figure 2.B1
provides direct evidence of the correlation between current eligibility and past treatment
by plotting the effect of the triple interaction 1[g ∈ E ] ∗ 1[Ni,t−1 > 15] ∗ 1[j = t] on the
probability to have been receiving treatment in the past 5 years.
Our baseline estimates β̂ IV , which use the triple interaction 1[g ∈ E ] · 1[Ni,t−1 >
15] · 1[t > 2008] as an instrument, are therefore identifying the total effect of exposure
to STW during the Great Recession. In other words, they capture both contemporaneous
effects of STW treatment and past dynamic effects of STW treatment. One may however
be interested in unpacking this sequence of dynamic effects to gain further insights on
the impact of STW on firms’ and workers’ outcomes.
To identify the the sequence of dynamic treatment effects of STW {βTOT0 , βTOT1 , ..., βTOTk },
we develop a methodology similar in spirit to the recursive identification of dynamic
treatment effects in Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010). All the details of the proce-
dure are given in Appendix 2.B.2. The main intuition is straightforward. Take all firms
that are active in 2009, and define our instrument for STW access in 2009 Z2009 as the
interaction between firm size and INPS code in 2009. The difference in outcome in 2009
of eligible firms in 2009 (Z2009 = 1) versus non-eligible firms (Z2009 = 0) only reflects the
contemporaneous effect of treatment (βTOT0 ) in 2009. This is because there is no differ-
ence in 2009 in the probability of past treatment between eligible and non-eligible firms
in 2009 as clearly shown in Appendix Figure 2.B1. Because eligible firms in 2009 are not
only more likely to be treated in 2009, but also to be treated in 2010, the difference in their
outcome in 2010 will reflect both the 1-year lagged effect of treatment in 2009 (βTOT1 ) and
the contemporaneous effect of treatment (βTOT0 ) in 2010. And so on and so forth. That
is, the difference in outcome in any year k ≥ 2009 between firms that are eligible versus
non eligible in 2009 capture the dynamic Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effect from treatment in
2009 after k years, allowing for potential future treatment.
Exploiting this intuition, we show in Appendix 2.B.2 that the sequence of ITT effects
are identified by the coefficients for each year (βRF2009, β
RF
2010, etc.) of the reduced form rela-
tionship between the outcome and Z2009. We also show that ITT effects have the following
recursive structure as a function of TOT effects:
ITT0 = βˆRF2009 = β
TOT
0 ·
dT2009
dZ2009
(2.5)
ITT1 = βˆRF2010 = β
TOT
0 ·
dT2010
dZ2009
+ βTOT1 ·
dT2009
dZ2009
, etc. (2.6)
Chapter 2. Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short Time Work
87
Using estimates of βˆRF2009, βˆ
RF
2010, etc., and of the first stages
d̂T2009
dZ2009
, d̂T2010dZ2009 , etc., we can
identify the sequence of dynamic TOT effects {βˆTOT0 , βˆTOT1 , ..., βˆTOT4 }.
Figure 2.3 reports the dynamic effects of STW treatment on hours per employee. Re-
sults suggest that the entire employment effects of STW are on impact. At the time of
treatment, log hours per employee decrease by 0.3, but this effect disappears immedi-
ately after treatment, with no significant long term impact. Appendix Figure 2.B2 shows
similar patterns for other employment outcomes. Upon treatment, log headcount em-
ployment increases by 0.2, the log wage bill decreases by 0.2, log open-ended contract
increase by 0.4, but all these effects dissipate instantly as treatment disappears. In the
long run, the recursive identification lacks precision, as it makes standard errors become
somewhat large.25 Yet point estimates are consistently small, and close to zero, indicat-
ing no significant long term effects of treatment. This dynamic pattern of results, with
short run employment effects that quickly dissipate after treatment, is confirmed by our
analysis of the dynamics of outcomes at the worker level, which we now turn to.
2.4 Dynamic Effects and Insurance Value of STW for Workers
The analysis so far has focused on firms, and firms’ outcomes. Yet, understanding how
STW policies interact with workers’ employment and earnings dynamics is equally key
to assess the welfare consequences of such programs.
In this section, we explore two important dimensions of the relationship between
workers’ labor market dynamics and STW. First, we document how the outcomes of
workers on STW compare to the outcomes of other workers, and to the outcomes of the
same workers prior and after being on STW. The difference in outcomes informs us about
the difference in marginal utility of consumption of individuals receiving vs contributing
to the STW policy, which, in the spirit of the optimal tax and social insurance literature, is
“sufficient” to evaluate the marginal welfare value of the transfer operated by the policy
(Chetty, 2006a).
Second, we are also interested in identifying the causal effect of receiving STW treat-
ment on the dynamics of workers’ labor market outcomes. One important rationale
for STW programs is that job separations may actually destroy positive surplus cre-
ated in employment relationships and can have significant short run as well as long
term negative consequences for workers (Yagan, 2017). Many different mechanisms
may participate in creating these negative effects of separations, from various labor mar-
ket frictions, to specific human capital accumulation, experience effects or other scar-
ring/discrimination effects. A prevalent idea in the public debate is that STW, by re-
ducing the incidence of separations, may therefore have beneficial dynamic “insurance”
value to workers by preserving the surplus created by the employment relationship. By
25We report bootstrapped standard errors for the TOT effects. Because of the recursive nature of identifi-
cation, standard errors using the Delta-method equally suffer from this lack of precision.
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estimating the causal effect of STW on the dynamics of workers’ outcomes, one can di-
rectly assess the validity of these claims.
2.4.1 Event Studies
We start by documenting, using event studies, the dynamics of workers’ outcomes around
STW treatment. We create a panel of the labor market histories of all employees of firms
active and with FTE firm size ∈ (5; 25] at any point between 2000 and 2015. An event
year is defined as the first year a firm experiences a STW spell. Treated individuals are
individuals who are employed in the firm at the start of the first STW spell. We run
event study regressions on this sample of treated individuals, controlling for individual
and calendar year fixed effects and report in Figure 2.4 estimates for three outcomes, the
probability of being employed, the total number of hours worked per year (unconditional
on employment), and total earnings plus all social transfers including STW. All estimates
are relative to event year -1, and scaled by the average level of the outcome among the
treated in year -1. In Figure 2.4, we also report results for two comparison groups of
similar workers not treated by STW. The first comparison group consists of workers with
similar characteristics as treated workers pre-treatment, but who cannot access STW as
they work in firms non-eligible to CIGS based on FTE size and eligibility. To create this
group, we match each treated worker, using Mahalanobis nearest-neighbour matching
without replacement, with a worker from the sample of non-eligible firms with FTE size
∈ (5; 25] in event year -1. Matching is based on gender, age, job characteristics at event
time t-1, employment status, annual weeks worked, earnings and firm size at t-1, t-2, t-3
and t-4, and main industry at t-1. The second comparison group consists of workers in
non-eligible firms in event year -1 who experience a mass layoff in event time 0, and is
created following a similar nearest-neighbor-matching strategy using the same variables.
Results of the event study estimates for all three groups and all three outcomes are
reported in Figure 2.4 and reveal interesting dynamic patterns. First, there seems to be no
differential trends pre-event across the treated workers and our comparison groups, sig-
nalling little anticipation of STW treatment in terms of labor market trajectories. Second,
treated STW workers experience, on impact, a sharp reduction of roughly 30% of their
worked hours, a reduction very close to our IV estimate of the effects of STW on hours
using firm outcomes. This sharp drop in hours translates into a milder drop of 18% in
total earnings and transfers, because of the high replacement of the STW subsidy.
When comparing the labor market outcomes of treated workers to our comparison
groups during the treatment period, it is interesting to note that workers experiencing
STW treatment maintain a probability of being employed similar to workers in non-
eligible firms, and much larger than workers in the layoff comparison group. This is
indicative that STW has indeed a positive effect on employment in the short run, as
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shown in the previous section. But despite having a similar probability of being em-
ployed, treated workers experience a reduction in hours that make their total employ-
ment, measured by total annual hours worked, much lower (≈ 25 percentage points)
than workers in non-eligible firms, and only 10 to 15 percentage point larger than laid-off
workers. But the high replacement rate of STW makes their total income from earnings
and transfers significantly larger (≈ 18%) than laid-off workers.
Labor market dynamics after treatment are also informative. After treatment is over,
treated workers experience a sharp drop in labor market outcomes, confirming the re-
versal also observed for firms’ outcomes. First, there is a sharp drop in the probability
of employment and in total hours worked in the next two years following treatment.26
There is also a significant drop in total earnings and transfers of treated workers, which,
2 years after treatment, only represent 60% of their pre-treatment level. In comparison
to non-eligible workers, treated workers fare much worse in terms of all labor market
outcomes in the medium and long run. But even more strikingly, two to three years after
treatment, labor market outcomes of treated workers are no longer significantly different
from those of non-eligible workers who were laid-off at time 0. This suggests that, while
STW offers some short run insurance, in the medium run, being laid-off or being put on
STW are somewhat equivalent in terms of labor market outcomes.
2.4.2 Identifying Causal Dynamic Effects on Workers
We want to understand to what extent the interesting dynamic patterns from the previ-
ous event studies reveal the deeper causal dynamic impact of STW treatment. Endogene-
ity concerns prevent interpreting the event study estimates on the treated as the causal
dynamic impact of short time work. The incidence and timing of CIGS treatment across
firms are indeed not random and workers within these firms may differ from other work-
ers along various characteristics affecting their labor market dynamics. Two things can be
done to tackle this issue. First, we can use event studies estimates from our comparison
groups to get bounds on counterfactuals, and therefore obtain bounds on the dynamic
treatment effects of STW. Second, we can also get a causal estimate of the dynamic effect
of STW on workers by implementing a version of our IV recursive identification method
used in Section 2.3.4, but focusing on workers outcomes instead of firms. All the details
and results of these two approaches are given in Appendix 2.B.2.
Results, displayed in Appendix Figure 2.B3, confirm that STW has a positive effect
on workers outcomes during treatment and therefore provides short term insurance to
workers in firms exposed to shocks. Yet, these effects entirely disappear after treatment
so that STW provides no longer term insurance to workers. In other words, there was
no long term beneficial effect of keeping treated workers in firms treated by CIGS during
26The decrease in total hours worked between event year 0 and 1 is a little less severe (15 percentage
points) than that of the probability of employment (around 20 percentage points), and reflects the fact that
hours conditional on employment increase post treatment, a result similar to what was observed in firm
level outcomes.
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the Great Recession in Italy. This also suggests that there is limited scope for experience
effects in the CIGS context, which confirms a stream of evidence on the absence of sig-
nificant returns to experience for workers treated by active labor market programs (Card
and Hyslop, 2005). To understand why STW provides no long term insurance to work-
ers, the next section investigates patterns of selection of firms into STW treatment, and
its implications for reallocation of workers in the labor market.
2.5 Selection and Reallocation effects
2.5.1 Selection into STW
Can the selection of firms into STW take-up explain the limited insurance value of STW
treatment for workers? To answer this, we analyze selection patterns and heterogene-
ity in treatment effects along two important dimensions: firms’ productivity levels pre-
recession, and firms’ likelihood of mass separations during the recession.
We start by ranking firms in quartiles of the distribution of their average yearly pro-
ductivity over the 2007-2008 period. We use two different measures: labor productivity,
defined as firm value-added divided by total number of hours worked in the firm, and
TFP, defined as in Section 2.3.2 above. We then run the first-stage regression (2.3) sepa-
rately for firms in each quartile of the distribution to investigate how pre-recession pro-
ductivity levels differentially affect take-up of STW. Results of the estimated coefficients
κˆ1, reported in Figure 2.5 Panel A, indicate that firms that had very low productivity
prior to the recession are significantly more likely to take up STW conditional on eligi-
bility. Firms in the bottom quartile of pre-recession TFP are almost 7 percentage point
more likely to take-up STW than firms in the top quartile, conditional on eligibility. Do
these firms benefit more from access to STW? In Panels B and C of Figure 2.5 we report
estimates of βˆ IV , from the 2SLS-IV model (2.2), again estimated separately for each quar-
tile of the pre-recession productivity distribution. Panel B shows that low productivity
firms tend to reduce hours more in response to STW treatment, but Panel C shows that
this comes with limited total effects on employment. To the contrary, firms that were ex-
periencing high productivity levels pre-recession seem to exhibit a much larger positive
treatment effect of STW treatment on employment.
Turning to the targeting efficiency of STW, we also investigate whether firms that
have a higher likelihood to separate workers are more likely to take-up STW. To investi-
gate this effect, we start by building a prediction model of the probability of mass layoff
during the recession using a rich set of regressors including balance-sheet information
and Bartik-style instruments.27 We estimate this model using LASSO on the sample of
27A mass layoff is a layoff of at least 5 workers over a time period of 120 days. We define an indicator
for mass layoff taking value 1 in each year in which we observe at least 5 layoffs occurring over a 4-month
period. The regressors included in the prediction model are: a Bartik-style index for employment shocks at
the 2-digit industry level and provincial level, labor productivity, a Whited-Wu index of credit constraints,
net revenues per employee, profits per employee, liquidity over total assets, cash flows over total assets,
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non-eligible firms with more than 15 FTE. We then use the model to predict the incidence
of mass layoff during the recession among eligible firms, and rank firms in quartiles of the
distribution of the prediction score. Finally, we replicate the selection and heterogeneity
analysis of Figure 2.5 across firms in the different quartiles of the mass layoff score. Re-
sults in Panel A of Figure 2.5 show that firms that would have been highly likely to layoff
workers in the absence of STW are 80% more likely to select into treatment, conditional
on eligibility. Interestingly, low risk firms still do take up significantly. Panel B indicates
that firms with higher mass layoff risk scores reduce hours more when treated by STW
but Panel C shows no significant heterogeneity in treatment effects on employment.
Overall, results of Figure 2.5 contribute to explaining the dynamic patterns of the
treatment effects of STW observed for firms and workers. Firms taking up STW exhibit
low productivity to begin with, and are likely to layoff workers in a downturn. When
the aggregate shock to the economy is quite persistent, as was the case during the Great
Recession in Italy, STW can only be a short term fix, which explains why the positive
employment gains of STW immediately disappear after treatment. The results suggest
that STW may be more effective at preserving employment in high productivity firms
experiencing temporary shocks. But in practice, STW subsidizes mostly firms that have
permanently lower levels of productivity, with more limited effects on employment.
2.5.2 Reallocation effects
It is often argued that labor market programs hinder the “cleansing” effect of recessions.
By keeping workers in low productivity firms, which are much more likely to take up
the program, STW is indeed susceptible of affecting the reallocation of workers towards
more productive employment relationships. To investigate such claims, we leverage the
rich spatial variation available in Italy across more than 600 local labor markets (LLM)
defined by the Italian statistical agency (ISTAT) and estimate how an increase in the frac-
tion of workers treated by STW in a LLM affects employment outcomes of non-treated
firms.28 In each LLM, we define the fraction of treated workers as the total numbers of
workers on STW divided by the total number of employed workers observed from INPS
records.29 Appendix Figure 2.C1 shows the large amount of variation in the intensity of
STW treatment across LLM during the recession. Importantly, this spatial variation arises
mostly within rather than between Italian regions. Yet, variation in the intensity of STW
treatment across LLM will be of course endogenous to local economic and labor market
conditions during the Great Recession, which might affect employment outcomes of non-
treated firms. To account for this threat, we instrument the fraction of workers treated by
STW during the recession by the average yearly fraction of eligible workers in the LLM
tangible and intangible assets over total assets. All regressors enter the model in levels, one-year lags and
first differences.
28We use the ISTAT 2011 classification of municipalities into 611 local labor markets.
29For employed workers, we use information about the address of the place of work available in the INPS
individual records.
Chapter 2. Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short Time Work
92
based on the interaction between firm size and INPS codes in the pre-recession period, in
the years 2005 to 2008. We identify the reallocation effects of STW on non-treated firms
at the LLM level based on the following model:
∆
t,t′
Yij = α+ βRIV ∆t,t′
Tj + X′jγ0 +W
′
iγ1 + ε ij (2.7)
The model is estimated on the sample of all firms i that are non-eligible to STW based
on their characteristics in 2008. ∆
t,t′
Yij are long differences in average yearly employment
outcomes of firm i in LLM j between the recession period t′ and the pre-recession pe-
riod t.30 ∆
t,t′
Tj is the long difference in the average yearly fraction of workers treated by
STW in LLM j between period t and t′. The long difference in the fraction of workers
treated by STW in LLM j is instrumented by the average yearly fraction Zj of workers
of LLM j that are eligible to STW during the pre-recession period based on the interac-
tion between their firm size and INPS code in the pre-recession period. We control for a
rich vector Wi of firm characteristics, correlated with CIGS take-up, and likely to affect
firm employment outcomes during the recession. The vector is composed of 5-digit in-
dustry fixed effects and codice autorizzazione fixed-effects, as well as bins of firm size in
2008. We also control for LLM characteristics that could be correlated with the fraction
of treated workers and likely to affect employment outcomes during the recession, such
as the industry and firm size composition of the LLM and the initial unemployment rate
in the LLM prior to the recession. Identification therefore comes from comparing LLM
with similar characteristics, including firm size composition and industry composition,
but with different allocations of workers within firm size times INPS codes bins during
the pre-recession period. We propose various tests for the validity of our exclusion re-
striction below. Standard errors are clustered at the LLM level. Appendix Figure 2.C2
provides evidence of the strong first-stage relationship between the fraction of eligible
workers in a LLM during the pre-recession years 2005-2008 and the fraction of workers
on STW during the recession conditional on controls for firm and LLM characteristics.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 provides striking evidence of the presence of significant reallo-
cation effects of STW within LLMs. The graph is a bin-scatter plot of the reduced-form
of the IV model (2.7), that is, the relationship between the instrument Z (the fraction of
eligible workers in the pre-recession period in a LLM based on the interaction of firm size
and INPS codes) and the long difference in log employment of non-eligible firms. The
reduced-form relationship is strongly negative, indicating that in LLMs with a larger frac-
tion of eligible workers in the pre-recession period, employment growth of non-eligible
firms was significantly worse during the recession. The corresponding IV estimate is
βRIV=-0.94 (0.22), which means that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of treated
30In our baseline estimation of model (2.7), we compare the recession years 2010-2013 to the pre-recession
years 2005 to 2008. Results are robust to the precise definition of the pre and post recession periods.
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workers in a LLM reduces employment of non-eligible firms by 0.94%. Another way of
assessing the magnitude of these spillover effects on non-treated firms is to ask the fol-
lowing question: what is the impact of preserving one employment relationship in a firm
treated by STW on the number of jobs in non-treated firms. Given our estimates of the
effect of STW treatment on employment of treated firms, our βRIV estimates imply that for
one job “saved” by STW in a treated firm, employment in non-treated firms decreases by
0.03 job. Table 2.3 summarizes the results, and also shows that the employment effects are
driven by a significant decline in inflows in non-eligible firms (measured as the number
of new hires) as the fraction of workers treated by STW increases in the LLM.
By keeping more workers in low productivity firms, and by reducing the number of
workers reallocating to non-treated firms, which have higher productivity than treated
firms on average, STW is likely to affect overall productivity within the LLM. We explore
this possibility by computing LLM level measures of TFP and running IV model similar
to (2.7) with LLM TFP long differences as an outcome.31 The IV results, displayed in Table
2.3, confirm that STW has a significant negative impact on overall TFP within LLM, with
a one percentage increase in the fraction of workers treated by STW translating into a
roughly 2% decrease in TFP.
One may worry about the validity of the exclusion restriction underpinning the IV
estimates. This restriction may be violated if the fraction of workers eligible to CIGS in
the pre-recession period based on the interaction of firm size and INPS code is correlated
with other unobserved characteristics of the LLM affecting employment and TFP growth.
To assess the credibility of our strategy we run placebo models similar to (2.7) where we
now compare long differences between 2000-2005 and 2005-2008, and use as a placebo
instrument the fraction of eligible workers in the LLM based on the interaction between
firm size and INPS codes in the 2000-2005 period. Because there is no take-up of CIGS
during the 2005-2008 period, there is no first stage in this model, so that our placebo in-
strument will only pick up an effect if the exclusion restriction does not hold, and the
instrument is correlated with other determinants of employment and TFP growth within
a LLM. The reduced-form relationship of the placebo model for employment growth
of non-eligible firms in the LLM are reported in Panel B Figure 2.6. We clearly see no
significant relationship between the placebo instrument and the outcomes, which pro-
vides comforting evidence for the validity of our exclusion restriction. We report similar
placebo models for TFP growth in Table 2.3 and find no significant relationship between
our instrument and TFP growth in the LLM in the pre-recession period.
Overall, by leveraging the rich spatial variation across LLM in Italy, and the variation
in STW treatment created by the interaction of firm size and INPS codes, these results
provide compelling evidence that STW has significant equilibrium effects within labor
31 We define TFP as TFP = VA/(LαKβ), but we now aggregate all variables (VA, L and K) at the LLM
level.
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markets. STW creates significant spillover effects on non-treated firms through reallo-
cation of workers. Non-treated firms are less able to grow and hire new workers as a
result. And by tilting the allocation of workers towards less productive firms, STW has a
significant negative impact on TFP growth in the labor market.
2.6 Welfare Implications for STW Programs
To understand the welfare implications of our empirical results, this section develops a
simple search and matching framework of labor market equilibrium, allowing for labor
adjustments both at the intensive and extensive margin. The model serves three impor-
tant purposes. First, it offers a general tractable model in which one can rationalize the
empirical evidence of Sections (2.3) to (2.5). In particular, we clarify the conditions under
which general search and matching models can generate the observed employment re-
sponses to STW treatment. Second, we derive a general formula for the optimal subsidy
rate of STW policies and clarify the welfare tradeoffs inherent to STW policies. Finally,
we calibrate a version of the model based on our reduced-form evidence to provide esti-
mates of the welfare effects of STW and conduct counterfactual policy analysis.
2.6.1 A General Model with Intensive and Extensive Labor Adjustments
We consider a unit mass of risk averse workers in a frictional labor market where firms
are exposed to both idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks. For simplicity, we
assume that for each level of the aggregate shock, there are two levels of idiosyncratic
productivity (high eH and low eL) and we denote by ρ the (endogenous) fraction of high
productivity employment in stationary equilibrium.
In each period t, ut unemployed workers meet firms with a vacancy at a rate described
by a constant returns to scale matching technology function M(ut, vt), increasing and
concave in both arguments. We define labor market tightness θt ≡ vtut as the ratio of
vacancies to unemployment, which is, given M, a sufficient statistics for both the vacancy
filling probability q(θt) and the job finding probability φ(θt). Each period, a fraction δ of
existing employment relationships is destroyed exogenously.
We assume random matching between workers and firms irrespective of their pro-
ductivity, that is, search is not directed across separate search markets for high and low
productivity firms. While some papers have explored STW in the context of directed
search models, there are a few important reasons why sticking to the more general case
of random matching might be preferable.32 First, random matching proves critical in
generating transparently the spillover effects that we observe in the data. Second, a key
feature of directed search models is that equilibrium employment will be socially effi-
cient absent STW. Consequently, there is no room for correcting potentially inefficient
employment levels over the business cycle, which makes one of the main argument in
32See Cahuc, Kramarz, and Nevoux (2018) for a static version of a directed search model with STW.
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favor of the existence of STW irrelevant. Finally, a corollary is that in directed search
models, ex-ante utility is always equalized across workers searching for high and low
productivity employment contracts. Which means that STW transfers towards low pro-
ductivity employment contracts have no insurance value. This is because the ability to
direct search across search markets for low or high productivity employment contracts
already provides insurance for workers against firms’ idiosyncratic shocks. With ran-
dom matching, workers cannot insure themselves against the risk of being matched with
a low productivity firm, which provides an additional insurance argument in favor of
STW subsidies.
Workers Workers are identical. They value consumption and have disutility in hours
worked, according to a general utility function u(c, h), u′c > 0, u′h < 0. Workers are risk-
averse in consumption, u′′c < 0 and discount the future at rate β. There is no storage
technology, agents consume all they earn every period. Workers therefore value insur-
ance against income fluctuations provided by the government, which takes two forms.
First, unemployment insurance benefits b (extensive margin insurance) are given to un-
employed workers. Second, intensive margin insurance is provided in the form of a STW
subsidy of rate τ given against earnings losses for hours reductions below a threshold
level h¯ for workers in low productivity firms. The total amount of STW benefits for a
worker in the program is therefore bSTW = τw(h¯ − h). Both UI and STW benefits are
funded by a lump sum tax t levied on all workers.
The value function of a worker when unemployed, Wu is:
Wu = u(b, 0) + β(φWe + (1− φ)Wu) (2.8)
The value function of a worker when employed by firm of productivity ek ∈ {eH, eL}, is
Wek
Wek = u(ck, hk) + β(δW
u + (1− δ)Wek ) (2.9)
Workers can endogenously quit their job every period. They will choose not to do
so whenever the employment relationship entails a positive surplus, which means that
the continuation value of being employed in a firm of productivity ek is at least equal to
the value of being unemployed Wek −Wu ≥ 0. The zero surplus condition Wek −Wu =
0 implicitly defines the reservation values of wage and hours that a worker is willing
to accept for any employment relationship. Note that these reservations values will be
functions of the UI benefits and STW subsidy. In particular, the lower bound on hours
that workers are willing to accept decreases with STW, ceteris paribus. In other words,
STW relaxes the constraint on offering lower hours contracts.
Firms Firms produce an homogeneous consumption good using labor inputs accord-
ing to the technology etF(ht, nt). We keep the production function general and allow
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the marginal product of labor to potentially differ at the intensive (hours worked per
employee h) vs extensive margin (number of employees n). This captures the simple
fact that the return to adjusting labor may differ when increasing hours per employee or
when hiring a new employee.
Firms determine every period the number of vacancies to be posted vt to maximize
profits:
Π(et, nt−1) = maxvt
{etF(ht, nt)− whtnt − cvt + βEt[Π(et+1, nt)]} (2.10)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
nt = (1− δ) · nt−1 + q(θt) · vt (2.11)
The first order condition of profit maximization implicitly determines the demand for
employment nt = n(θt, ht, w) of the firm.
Workers and firms negotiate hours and wages to split the surplus created by re-
alized matches, which translates into an hours schedule and a wage schedule. Note
that there are multiple hours and wage schedules that are compatible with equilibrium.
At this point, we allow for general hours and wage schedules: h(w, θ, e, n, b, τ, t) and
w(h, θ, e, n, b, τ, t).
Hours vs Employment Responses & STW policy In Sections 2.3 to 2.5, we showed
three important sets of empirical results regarding the hour and employment responses
of firms to STW policy. First, we showed that hours decrease strongly with STW. Second,
we showed that this hours decrease was met by a large positive employment response.
Finally, we showed that low productivity firms are more likely to take up STW.
In Appendix 2.D.2, we characterize the hours schedule and the firm’s hours and em-
ployment responses to variation in productivity and variation in STW generosity, condi-
tional on the wage schedule. This characterization of hours and employment responses to
STW enables to transparently understand the conditions under which our general model
delivers the observed reduced form results of Sections 2.3 to 2.5. This exercise highlights
the critical role of rigid wage schedules in amplifying the employment responses to STW.
In particular, we show that hours decrease strongly and employment increases strongly
with STW, and low productivity firms select more into STW, when four conditions are
met: (i) the marginal utility of employment for workers is strongly decreasing in hours;
(ii) the wage schedule is relatively rigid; (iii) technology is relatively linear in employ-
ment n but (iv) relatively concave in hours h.
The intuition for (i) is quite straightforward. When the return to an additional hours
in terms of utility decreases strongly, which can be due to large risk aversion in consump-
tion or a very convex disutility of work, STW subsidies reduce more drastically workers’
reservation hours, making the hours schedule more responsive to the introduction of
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STW. Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) also have an intuitive interpretation. When productiv-
ity goes down, firms want to reduce more their labor inputs, especially when wages are
rigid. The more concave technology is in hours relative to employment, the more firms
want to “hoard labor” and reduce hours relative to employment. Without STW, out-
side option of workers reduces the extent to which firms can reduce hours, and they will
reduce employment instead. With STW, firms can offer lower hours, and increase em-
ployment instead. Rigid wages magnify again this employment response: when hours
decrease in response to STW, the net profit of a filled job increases more when wages are
more rigid, driving a larger positive employment response.
Interestingly, we showed clear empirical evidence that wages exhibit a significant
level of rigidity in our context. This means that condition (ii) is likely to be met, and
helps explaining why we find such strong and significant effects of STW on firms’ hours
and employment.
Equilibrium & Spillover Effects A steady state equilibrium consists in a set of: (i)
hours schedules h and wage schedules w that split the surplus in high and in low pro-
ductivity firms subject to the incentive constraint that Wek −Wu ≥ 0; (ii) labor demand
functions nd in high and in low productivity firms that maximizes firms’ profits and (iii)
a labor market tightness θ that clears the labor market subject to the steady state equality
of flows in and out of employment.
To understand the logic of the equilibrium effects of STW in the labor market, we
borrow the equilibrium representation of Michaillat (2012). This representation allows
for a transparent representation of the effects of various labor market policies on equi-
librium (e.g. Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2018a) and of the mechanisms underlying
equilibrium spillover effects across workers or firms (Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller,
2015).
In this representation, the steady state equality of flows in and out of employment
characterizes a labor supply ns(θ, δ), which is an increasing function of θ in the {n, θ}
space. The profit maximization of firms determines a labor demand demand nd(θ), which
will be a decreasing function of θ when the marginal product of n is decreasing, and hor-
izontal otherwise (i.e. if technology is linear in n). With random matching, aggregate la-
bor demand is simply the weighted sum of demands of high and low productivity firms.
Equilibrium tightness and equilibrium employment are determined at the intersection of
aggregate demand and supply. When STW is introduced, labor demand of low produc-
tivity firms increases, especially so when tightness is low (and hiring is therefore cheap).
This in turn increases aggregate demand, and equilibrium tightness. This increase in
equilibrium tightness is the force driving our observed spillover effects in the data. It
makes hiring more costly for all firms, and therefore reduces employment of firms non
treated by STW. This equilibrium mechanism captures the negative reallocation effects of
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STW which distorts employment towards low productivity firms rather than high pro-
ductivity firms. Again, this effect will be stronger the more horizontal labor demands are
(that is, the more linear technology is in n). A graphical illustration of these equilibrium
mechanisms, using the calibrated version of our model, is offered in Appendix Figure
2.D1.
2.6.2 Optimal STW Subsidy
We now use the general model presented above to characterize the optimal STW subsidy
rate and clarify the welfare tradeoffs implied in STW policies.
Planner’s problem The planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function Γ(WeH,
WeL, W
u, n, ρ) = n · [ρ ·WeH + (1 − ρ) ·WeL] + (1 − n) ·Wu, using government policies
T = {τ, b, t} where τ is the STW subsidy rate, b is the UI benefit level given to the
unemployed, and t is a lump sum tax financing both STW and UI. The planner maximizes
social welfare subject to three set of constraints. First, the government budget needs to
balanced. Second the government needs to account for the optimal behavior of workers
and firms that are function of the policy instruments. Finally, the labor market must be in
equilibrium. We further assume that profits are fully taxed and redistributed lump sum
to all workers.
Proposition 2. Assuming differentiability, an interior optimal subsidy rate τ balances the trans-
fer value of the policy with the fiscal externality, the employment externality and the hour exter-
nality of the policy and needs to satisfy:
1+
{
εn,τ
(1− ρ)bSTW − b
bSTW
− εhL ,τ
hL
h¯− hL
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fiscal Externalities
=
Value of Transfer︷︸︸︷
GL +εθ,τ
θ
E
·
Employment Externalities︷ ︸︸ ︷{
Φ′(θ)∆+ q′(θ)C
}
+ εhL ,τ
nL · hL
E
·
{
[FhL − w] + [w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h] ·GL
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hours Externalities
,
(2.12)
where εY,X = dYdX
X
Y denote the elasticity of Y w.r.t. X. nL = (1− ρ)n is employment in low
productivity firms and hL is contracted hours in these firms. FhL =
eL
nL
· ∂F(hL,nL)∂h is the marginal
product of an increase in hours in low productivity firms. E = τ · nL · w · (1 − hL) is total
expenditures on the STW policy. GL is the social welfare weight on workers currently in low
productivity firms. ∆ is the weighted wedge in utility between being employed and unemployed
and C = c · v is total recruiting costs. MRSLc,h = u
′
c(cL,hL)
u′h(cL,hL)
is the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and hours for workers in low productivity firms.
Proof. See Appendix 2.E.
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The first two terms correspond to the traditional public finance formula for optimal
tax/transfer, which simply states that, absent pre-existing distortions, the optimal trans-
fer balances the value of the transfer with its fiscal externality at the margin. In our
context, two additional sources of potential inefficiencies arise, that the planner needs to
account for when setting the subsidy τ. First labor market frictions do not ensure that
employment is at a socially efficient level to start with. Second, there is no market for
hours.
To better understand and interpret the formula, we now turn to each of its terms
separately, and provide a local calibration of the welfare effects of a marginal change in
the subsidy τ from its current level, based on our reduced-form empirical estimates of
Sections 2.3 to 2.5.33
Value of STW Transfer The social value of transferring one euro from all taxpayers to
workers currently in low productivity firms is captured by GL = ΩLnL
u′c(cL,hL)
µ where µ is
the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint in the planner’s problem, which cap-
tures the social value of one euro redistributed lump sum to all workers. ΩL is a weight
that captures the expected relative time that workers currently in a low productivity firm
will spend in low vs high productivity firms or in unemployment.34 The value of STW
transfers depends critically on the marginal utility of consumption of treated workers
(u′c(cL, hL)) relative to that of the whole population of workers µ. Figure 2.4 Panel C
shows that treated workers have total earnings and transfers that are significantly be-
low (≈ 18% lower) that of their matched non-treated workers. This indicates that their
marginal utility of consumption might be significantly higher than that of the average
worker. In Appendix 2.E.2, using these estimates and a coefficient of relative risk aversion
of 2.5, we calibrate GL and find that the value of transfer is relatively large: GL ≈ 1.45.
Fiscal externality Transferring one euro to workers in STW programs costs more than
1 euro, because workers and firms do not internalize the effect of their change in behav-
iors on the government budget constraint, which creates a fiscal externality. This fiscal
externality is captured by two terms. The first term, εn,τ
(1−ρ)bSTW−b
bSTW captures the cost to
the government of employment responses. When employment increases in response to
an increase in τ, (εn,τ > 0), this moves individuals out of unemployment, which saves
the government on the unemployment benefits b they collected. But it also increases the
number of individuals receiving STW benefits bSTW . The relative generosity of STW vs
UI benefits and the fraction of workers in low productivity firms therefore determine
the sign of this fiscal externality. When UI benefits are very generous and the fraction
of workers in low productivity firms receiving STW is small, the employment responses
may have a positive effect on the government’s budget. The second term captures the
33All the details of the local calibration are provided in Appendix 2.E.2.
34If on average more time is spent in, say, the low productivity state, then the social planner places greater
weight on welfare in this state. The precise definition of the weights is provided in Appendix 2.E.
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hours response to the program: −εhL,τ hLh¯−hL . Because of the large negative responses of
hours to the policy εhL,τ ≈ −0.4, this term increases the fiscal externality of STW signif-
icantly. Using our estimates, we show in Appendix 2.E.2, that the total estimated fiscal
externality is quite large, and equal to 0.37. Interestingly, it is quite close to the calibrated
value of the transfer. This means that the welfare value of a marginal increase in the
subsidy rate above its current level would be quite small, unless the hours and employ-
ment externality terms are very large. To investigate this, we now turn to these two extra
externality terms.
Employment Externalities Our empirical evidence shows that STW affects equilibrium
employment, creating employment spillovers on untreated firms. As shown in Landais,
Michaillat, and Saez (2018a), in frictional labor markets, such equilibrium effects have
potential welfare consequences, and the design of labor market policies need to account
for them. The reason is that in frictional labor market, market tightness θ, and, as a
consequence equilibrium employment, need not be at their socially efficient level, which
is defined by the Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990). Here, the Hosios condition will hold
when the term
{
Φ′(θ)∆ + q′(θ)C
}
is equal to zero. This term captures the competing
search externalities created by a change in equilibrium tightness. On the one hand, an
increase in θ will increase the probability for workers to find jobs (Φ′(θ) > 0), and being
employed gives them an increase in utility equal to the wedge between the average utility
of being employed vs unemployed ∆. On the other hand, an increase in θ will decrease
the probability that vacancies are matched (q′(θ) < 0), increasing the overall cost C of
replacing workers for firms.35 In specific models (directed search for instance), these
two opposite externalities may exactly cancel out. But in general, there is no particular
reason for the Hosios condition to hold. If we believe that equilibrium employment is
suboptimally low in Recessions, then any policy increasing labor market tightness like
STW may have positive employment externalities that are socially desirable.
While it is tricky to calibrate the Hosios term, in Appendix 2.E.2 we use our reduced-
form estimates to provide evidence that (i) the curvature of the matching function is large,
and that (ii) the utility wedge between employment and unemployment is large. These
two facts indicate that the employment externality is likely to be positive, suggesting that
employment is indeed suboptimally low during recessions.
Hours Externalities Incorporating the intensive margin of hours in the model has im-
portant welfare implications as the missing market for hours creates an additional source
of externalities that the planner needs to account for. While hours and wages are set to
35Note that ∆ will be larger in the presence of specific human capital, or experience effects. But the cost
of replacing a worker with a similarly productive one C, will also be larger when it is hard to find similar
workers due to specific human capital, experience effects. It is therefore unclear how the presence of experi-
ence effects or specific human capital affects the socially efficient level of tightness and the optimal level of
the subsidy τ.
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split the surplus between workers and firms, there is no reason for hours to be set at the
socially efficient level. As is clear from our formula, hours are at the first best optimum
when the marginal rate of substitution MRSLc,h is equal to the marginal rate of transforma-
tion (the marginal product of an hour FhL ) and equal to the wage rate w. In some models,
such as directed search, hours will be optimally set at the first best. But this is not always
the case in our more general framework. If equilibrium hours deviate from this level, the
large negative effect of STW on equilibrium hours (εhL,τ < 0) entails welfare effects.
As we discuss in Appendix 2.E.2, signing and calibrating the hours externality term
remains tricky in practice. On the one hand, the large employment responses to the
reduction in hours in firms treated by STW indicates that [FhL − w] < 0. On the other
hand, there is ample evidence that the fraction of workers reporting that they are willing
to work more hours increases drastically during recessions (e.g. Canon, Kudlyak, and
Reed, 2014). This would indicate that w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h ≥ 0. In which case decreasing
equilibrium hours has a negative externality on workers.36
2.6.3 Calibration and Counterfactual Policy Analysis
The previous characterization of the optimal STW subsidy is useful to clarify the trade-
offs involved in STW policies in the general class of search-and-matching models we
presented, and get a sense of the welfare consequences of local deviations from the exist-
ing policy. We now turn to a structural calibration of our model. While this calibration
comes at the cost of putting more assumptions on the structure of the model, it delivers
the additional benefits of enabling the exact computation of the externality terms in for-
mula (2.12), which can be hard to measure empirically. More importantly, it allows the
counterfactual explorations of non-local policy changes, such as removing STW.
When specifying the model for the purpose of calibration, we make a series of as-
sumptions. In particular, we assume that in low productivity firms, all the bargaining
power is on the firm’s side, so that all the surplus goes to the firms and workers are kept
at their outside option. Besides greatly simplifying the computation of the hours sched-
ule, a useful by-product of this modelling feature is that it generates quite large variations
in bargained hours in response to STW. For wages, we assume that they are a somewhat
rigid function of productivity, and, following our empirical evidence, that they do not
respond to the STW policy.37
All further details on functional form specifications and parameter calibrations are
given in Appendix 2.F. Importantly, we explain in this section how our reduced-form
empirical evidence, using quasi-experimental variation, allows us to calibrate most of
the key parameters of the model. In particular, parameters of the demand function can be
identified by the reduced form evidence of the hours and employment responses of firms
36This effect on welfare is weighted by the social marginal welfare weight of workers in low productivity
firms experiencing this decline.
37As in Hall (2005) and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2018b), we assume a wage schedule of the following
form w(e) = wsewa , with wa < 1.
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to STW treatment. Second, our reduced form evidence on spillover effects identifies key
parameters of the matching function. Final parameters of model, that cannot be identi-
fied from quasi-experimental variation, nor directly calibrated from external sources, are
estimated using GMM to match a set of key moments of firms above 15 FTE eligible to
STW during the Great Recession. In effect, our calibration relies on the thought experi-
ment that we have a version of the Italian economy where all firms correspond to firms
above 15 FTE, and are eligible to STW. Furthermore, we treat the overall period 2008-2014
of the Great Recession as a steady state equilibrium.
In Figure 2.7, we display results of a counterfactual analysis of this steady state equi-
librium during the recession, for various levels of the STW subsidy τ. Panel A shows
that a higher STW subsidy significantly decreases the level of unemployment. In partic-
ular, in the absence of any STW subsidy (τ = 0), the unemployment level would have
been almost 2 percentage point higher during the recession. As shown in Panel C, this
comes at the cost of a significant decline in total TFP of about 2%. Yet, overall, Panel D
shows that the total welfare effect of having STW is positive: compared to a situation
without STW, welfare was about 2% higher during the recession. Results also confirm
that the marginal welfare effect of increasing or decreasing the subsidy is close to zero.
The reason is that the subsidy is already large enough that workers are willing to accept
extremely low hours: Panel B shows that, at τ = 0.8, the hours constraint on low produc-
tivity firms does not bite any longer, so that any further increase in the subsidy does not
affect the hours and employment allocation any more.
The previous calibration considers the Great Recession in Italy as a steady state, and
asks what the value is, in such a steady state, of having STW subsidies target firms with
negative idiosyncratic shocks. But the nature of shocks, whether they are permanent or
transitory, aggregate or idiosyncratic, may matter as well in assessing the effects of STW
policies. Firms may be more willing to hoard labor when they expect a shock to be tem-
porary, and therefore relaxing constraints to labor hoarding may be more effective for
temporary shocks.38 To get further insights on this, in Appendix 2.F.3, we use our cali-
brated model and simulate the effects of STW under two different scenarii of aggregate
shocks: a permanent shock and a transitory shock.
Results, reported in Appendix Figure 2.F1 show that hoarding is indeed more valu-
able when the shock is transitory than permanent, and that labor hoarding is significantly
larger when the cost to firms of replacing their workers increases. As a consequence, the
employment effects of having STW also differ according to the permanence of the aggre-
gate shock. The employment effects of STW on impact are significantly larger (around
20% to 40%) when the shock is temporary than when it is permanent. This, again, is es-
pecially true when the cost of replacing workers is high, and when the magnitude of the
aggregate shock is large.
38Our previous analysis in Figure 2.5 indeed indicates that employment effects of STW are larger for firms
that were high productivity prior to the recession, suggesting that STW may be more effective for high
productivity firms experiencing a transitory negative shock than for permanently low productivity firms.
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These counterfactual simulations help put into perspective our empirical results, and
gauge their external validity outside the Italian context of the Great Recession. In par-
ticular, they help explain why the effectiveness of STW may have proved very different
in Italy compared to other countries such as Germany during the Great Recession. First,
the recession was a very transitory and very large shock in Germany (due to the col-
lapse of world trade in 2009) and a much longer and protracted shock in Italy (due to the
European debt crisis that followed). Second it is mostly high productivity exporting man-
ufacturers that were affected in Germany, with high skilled workers that are very costly
to replace, while, as we showed, it is mostly low productivity firms with lower skilled
workers that were affected in Italy. This suggests that STW might have been much more
effective in the German context than in Italy during the Great Recession.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
STW programs have attracted a lot of attention as a tool to subsidize labor hoarding, and
have been aggressively used during the Great Recession. Yet, very little is known on their
effects and welfare consequences. This paper contributes by providing new high quality
administrative data, a compelling quasi-experimental setting and a general framework to
interpret our results. We show that STW has large, but temporary effects on labor inputs,
and no significant long run insurance value to workers. We provide evidence that the
dynamics of these effects has to do with the particular selection of firms into STW and
the nature of the shock they face. Furthermore, we show that STW does significantly
affect reallocation in the labor market.
Our framework then enables to use this empirical evidence to characterize the welfare
consequences of STW. We derive a formula for the optimal STW subsidy in a general class
of search and matching models. The fundamental insight is that, above the traditional
trade-off between the value of transfers and fiscal externalities, STW will entail positive
welfare gains when equilibrium employment is suboptimally low, and hours subopti-
mally high. Importantly, our formula offers a clear representation of these hours and
employment inefficiency terms that connects to the data. The advantage of this approach
is that the formula, and the key tradeoffs underpinning it, remain the same irrespective
of the exact structure and primitives of the underlying model. In that sense, our formula
is robust to the way wages and hours are determined in the model, to the specification
of the costs of replacing or firing workers, to the presence of specific human capital, to
various sources of hours or wage rigidity, to the presence of liquidity constraints, etc.
Based on our empirical evidence, we show that STW has positive, albeit small, welfare
effects. While more work needs to be done to better understand STW programs, the
calibrated version of our model already enables to explore the validity of our findings
outside the Italian context, and suggests that STW will be significantly more effective
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for large but transitory shocks in contexts where labor hoarding is constrained by wage
rigidities, hours rigidities or financial rigidities.
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2.8 Figures
FIGURE 2.1: FIRMS’ AND WORKERS’ PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING SHORT
TIME WORK TREATMENT BY FIRM SIZE AND SECTOR
A. Firm
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Notes: The graphs show the coefficients γˆt1 estimated from equation (2.1) for all years t ∈ [2005, 2014] using
the probability of STW receipt as outcome. This coefficient captures the triple interaction between being a
firm with an INPS code eligible to STW, having had a firm size above the eligibility threshold in the 6 month
prior and being in year t. The omitted year is 2007, so all results are relative to 2007. Panels A and B plot
the estimated coefficients for the probability of STW receipt at firm level and at worker level respectively.
We cluster standard errors at the INPS code times firm size group level. The vertical bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. See text for details.
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FIGURE 2.2: ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SHORT TIME WORK ON
FIRMS’ OUTCOMES
A. Log Number of Hours B. Log Firm Size
Per Employee (Headcount)
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C. Log Wage Rate D. Log Wage Bill
Per Employee
βIV=.032(.028)
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Notes: The graphs show the coefficients γˆt1 estimated from equation (2.1) for all years t ∈ [2000, 2014] for
different firm-level outcomes. The omitted year is 2007, so all results are relative to 2007. We cluster standard
errors at the INPS code times firm size group level. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based
on cluster-robust standard errors. Each graph also reports the coefficient βˆ IV estimated from equation 2.2
and its associated standard error. The wage rate is defined as earnings per hour worked per employee.
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FIGURE 2.3: TOT ESTIMATES OF THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF SHORT TIME
WORK: LOG NUMBER OF HOURS
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficients ˆβTOTk for k ∈ [0, ..., 4] for the dynamic effects of STW treatment
on hours worked per employee. These effects are estimated recursively as illustrated in Appendix 2.B. The
βTOTk coefficients identify the dynamic treatment effects of STW receipt in year k = 0 on outcomes in years
k ∈ [0, ..., 4]. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. The
graph indicates that the effects of STW treatment are only felt on impact, and disappear immediately after
treatment. There are no significant long term treatment effects of STW on firms’ employment outcomes. See
text for details.
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FIGURE 2.4: DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CIGS TREATMENT ON WORKERS’
OUTCOMES
A. Probability of Employment B. Number of Hours Worked
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C. Earnings + CIGS/Transfers
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Notes: The graphs report the estimated coefficients of event study regressions for different outcomes and
different event-year definitions at the worker level. All estimates are relative to event-year -1 and are scaled
by the average level of the outcome in that year. Individual and calendar year fixed effects are included in
the event-time specification. The dashed lines around the estimates indicate 95% confidence intervals based
on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. For the treatment group (indicated by solid cir-
cles), an event year is defined as the first year in which the worker experiences a STW event, conditional on
the worker being in a firm with 6-month average FTE size ∈ (15; 25] at event time -1. The first comparison
group (indicated by solid triangles) consist of workers employed at firms with 6-month average FTE size
∈ (5; 25] at event time -1, which are not eligible for STW due to either their INPS code or FTE size. The
second comparison group (indicated by solid squares) consist of workers employed at non-eligible firms
with 6-month average FTE size ∈ (5; 25] at event time -1 and who experience a mass layoff in event time
0. Individuals in the two comparison groups are matched to individuals in the treatment group using Ma-
halanobis nearest-neighbor matching without replacement based on gender, age, job characteristics at event
time -1, employment status, annual weeks worked, earnings and firm size at event times -1, -2, -3 and -4, and
main industry at event time-1. Total hours worked and total earnings are unconditional on employment. In
Panel C, we report the evolution of all earnings, and all transfers received (including STW or any other social
assistance program or tax transfer).
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FIGURE 2.5: SELECTION OF FIRMS INTO STW AND HETEROGENEOUS
TREATMENT EFFECTS
A. Take-Up B. IV Estimates of the Effect
on Hours Per Employee
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Notes: The graphs show heterogeneity in STW take-up and treatment effects across different firm character-
istics. Panel A displays the estimated coefficient κˆ1 from specification (2.3) for the probability of STW take-up
for groups of firms with different levels of productivity and with different predicted likelihood of mass lay-
offs. For productivity, firms are ranked into four quartiles of the distribution of average yearly productivity
in 2007-2008. Productivity is measured as labor productivity (defined as value added per week worked)
or total factor productivity (defined as described in Section 2.3.2). Firms are also ranked into quartiles of
the distribution of their predicted probability of mass layoff, as described in Section 2.5.1. The vertical bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors. Panels B and C report the esti-
mated βˆ IV from specification (2.2) for the log of hours worked per employee and the log of total employment
headcount. The two panels are constructed in the same way as Panel A. See text for details.
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FIGURE 2.6: REALLOCATION EFFECTS: EMPLOYMENT GROWTH OF NON-
ELIGIBLE FIRMS AS A FUNCTION OF STW TREATMENT IN THE LOCAL LA-
BOR MARKET
A. Employment Growth
2005-2008 to 2010-2013
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B. Placebo: Employment Growth
2000-2005 to 2005-2008
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Notes: The graphs show binned scatter plots of the reduced form of equation (2.7). Panel A plots the reduced
form relationship between the change in average log firm size headcount of firms non-eligible to STW in a
local labor market (LLM) between 2005-2008 and 2010-2013, and the fraction of eligible workers in 2005-2008
in the LLM based on the interaction between firm size and INPS codes. Both variables are residualized
on firm level and LLM level controls. Panel A also reports the βˆ IV coefficient from equation 2.7 and its
associated robust standard error clustered at the LLM level. Panel B is constructed in the same way as Panel
A and shows the placebo relationship between the change in average log firm size headcount of firms non-
eligible to STW in a LLM between 2000-2005 and 2005-2008, and the fraction of eligible workers in 2000-2005
in the LLM. Panel B also reports the reduced-form βˆRF coefficient from equation (2.7) and its associated
robust standard error clustered at the LLM level.
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FIGURE 2.7: COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS: EFFECTS OF CHANGING
STW GENEROSITY τ
A. Unemployment B. Hours
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Short time work subsidy, 
0.106
0.108
0.11
0.112
0.114
0.116
0.118
0.12
0.122
0.124
0.126
Un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Short time work subsidy, 
15
20
25
30
35
40
Co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 h
ou
rs
Low productivity firm hours
High productivity firm hours
C. Total Factor Productivity D. Welfare
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Short time work subsidy, 
0.98
0.982
0.984
0.986
0.988
0.99
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1
To
ta
l f
ac
to
r p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Short time work subsidy, 
1
1.002
1.004
1.006
1.008
1.01
1.012
1.014
1.016
1.018
1.02
W
el
fa
re
Notes: The figure displays results of a counterfactual analysis of steady state equilibria of the Italian econ-
omy during the Great Recession using our calibrated model and varying the level of the STW subsidy τ.
Panel A shows counterfactual values of the equilibrium unemployment rate, Panel B displays counterfac-
tual values of the hours per employee for low and high productivity firms. Panel C shows the counterfactual
values of total factor productivity. Panel D shows counterfactual values of total welfare (i.e. including firms
profits which are rebated lump sum to workers). For Panels C and D, results are normalized to the level of
the outcome in the steady state equilibrium without STW (τ=0). All details of the calibration of the model
are given in Appendix 2.F.
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2.9 Tables
TABLE 2.1: EFFECTS OF STW TREATMENT ON FIRMS’ AND WORKERS’
OUTCOMES
IV Estimate Std Error N
A. First Stage
Proba. of CIGS Take-Up .05 (.002) 3029855
B. Employment Outcomes
Log Number of Hours Per Employee -.511 (.036) 2843205
Log Number of Full-Time Weeks Per Employee -.461 (.034) 2843205
Log Firm Size (Headcount) .382 (.036) 2843205
Log Wage Rate .032 (.028) 2843205
Log Wage Bill Per Employee -.556 (.046) 2843205
Log Number of Open-Ended Contracts .432 (.047) 2843205
Log Number of Fixed-Term Contracts -.367 (0.128) 2843205
Firm Survival Probability (in t + 1) -.014 (.009) 2570917
C. Balance-Sheet & Productivity Outcomes
Firm Value-Added .095 (.159) 873839
Value-Added Per Worker -.508 (.120) 873839
Tangible Investment -.003 (.672) 873839
Liquidity .939 (.461) 873839
Notes: Panel A reports the estimates of the coefficient κˆ1 from specification (2.3) and its associated cluster-
robust standard error in parenthesis. Panels B and C report the βˆ IV coefficients estimated from equation (2.2)
and their associated cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis for a set of different firm-level outcomes.
The wage rate is defined as total earnings per hours worked per employee. For survival probability, the
reported coefficient is the IV estimate scaled by average survival probability in t + 1: βˆ IV/Y¯. Value added
is defined as total revenues plus unsold stocks minus cost of goods and services used in production, or
equivalently total profits plus total capital depreciation and total wage costs. Liquidity is defined as cash
and cash equivalents.
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TABLE 2.2: ROBUSTNESS OF BASELINE EFFECTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Doughnut” Only Only Permutation No Dismissal
Regression ≤ 15 FTE >15 FTE Test Rule Change
>60FTE 50FTE
(Placebo) (Placebo) Across Italy threshold
First Stage
Proba. of .053 .002 .051 .000 .055 .041
CIGS Take-Up (.002) (.000) (.002) (.000) (.005) (.004)
Outcomes
IV RF IV RF IV IV
Log Hrs per wker -.449 -.011 -.602 .000 -.670 -.156
(.037) (.020) (.081) (.010) (.230) (.132)
Log Empl. .284 -.020 .306 -.001 .848 .338
(.032) (.030) (.099) (.009) (.297) (.258)
Log Wage Bill -.544 -.026 -.498 .000 -.568 -.390
(.049) (.030) (.155) (.013) (.297) (.709)
N 2686140 2608383 429490 2978239 152753 44793
Notes: The upper panel of the table reports the estimated coefficient κˆ1 from specification (2.3). Cluster-
robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient. The lower panel reports either
reduced form or IV coefficients for different firm-level outcomes. Column (1) reports the coefficients of a
doughnut version of specification (2.2) excluding firms with 6-month average FTE size ∈ (12, 18]. Column
(2) reports the reduced-form coefficient αˆ1 for specification (2.4) restricting the sample to firms with 6-month
average FTE size ∈ (5, 15]. It shows little evidence of differential trends during the recession between eligible
and ineligible INPS codes. Column (3) reports the IV coefficients for specification (2.4) restricting the sample
to firms with 6-month average FTE size ∈ (15, 25] and instrumenting STW take-up with {1[g ∈ E ] · 1[t ≥
2009]}. Column (4) reports reduced-form coefficients for a placebo-version of specification (2.2) in which the
sample is restricted to firms with non-eligible INPS codes and placebo “eligibility” status is assigned to a
randomly chosen subgroup of INPS codes. Column (5) reports the estimated IV coefficients for specification
(2.2) for a sample of establishments with 6-month FTE size ∈ (0, 40] that belong to multi-establishment firms
with FTE size > 60. For this group of firms, employment protection legislation does not apply differentially
for firms above and below the 15 threshold. Column (6) reports the estimated IV coefficients for specification
(2.2) for a sample of firms with INPS codes in the retail sectors and with 6-month FTE size ∈ (25, 75]. For this
small group of firms, the size threshold that determines eligibility is set at 50 and employment protection
legislation does not apply differentially above and below the threshold.
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TABLE 2.3: EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF STW ON NON-TREATED FIRM OUT-
COMES
Reallocation Effects Placebo Estimates
IV IV IV RF RF RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Employment Spillovers
on Non-Eligible Firms
Log Employment -0.492 -0.918 -0.937 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
(0.137) (0.216) (0.216) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log Inflows -3.594 -4.406 -3.176 -0.047 -0.046 -0.030
(1.947) (2.380) (1.440) (0.112) (0.113) (0.107)
LLM Controls × × × ×
Firm-level Controls × ×
N 3023166 2784567
B. Labor Market Effects on Productivity
Log TFP -2.307 -2.093 -0.161 -0.161
(0.593) (0.606) (0.129) (0.129)
LLM Controls × ×
N 1222 1222
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) of the table report the βˆRIV estimated from equation (2.7) and its associated robust
standard errors clustered at the LLM level in parenthesis. Columns (4)-(6) report reduced-form placebo
estimates of equation 2.7 comparing outcome growth during a placebo pre-recession periods (2000-2005) vs
(2005-2008). LLM controls include the unemployment rate and the firm size and industrial composition of
employment (employment shares by industry) in the LLM in the pre-recession period. Firm-level controls
are the probability of STW take-up, firm size in 2008, a dummy for whether the firm ever has an eligible INPS
code and 5-digit industry dummies. In Panel B, we estimate IV model similar to (2.7) but where the outcome
is long differences of TFP, at the LLM level. We define TFP as TFP = VA/(LαKβ), where we aggregate all
variables (VA, L and K) at the LLM level.
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2.A Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
2.A.1 Descriptive Statistics
TABLE 2.A1: DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS’ CHARACTERISTICS IN MAIN SAM-
PLE, BROKEN DOWN ACROSS ELIGIBLE AND NON-ELIGIBLE INPS CODES
(2008)
(1) (2) (3)
All INPS codes Eligible Non-eligible
INPS codes INPS codes
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Employees (headcount) 8.72 5.16 9.78 5.55 8.22 4.90
Employees (FTE) 8.04 4.78 9.35 5.38 7.42 4.33
Employees on open-ended contracts 7.80 4.91 8.96 5.35 7.25 4.60
Employees on fixed-term contracts 0.92 2.11 0.81 1.78 0.98 2.25
Annual hours worked per employee 2015.26 1008.70 2043.69 980.97 2001.86 1021.24
Annual wage bill per employee (000) 20.66 12.38 22.49 13.22 19.80 11.86
Net revenue per week worked (000) 6.22 49.55 5.94 52.77 6.48 46.31
Value added per week worked (000) 1.11 11.36 1.22 14.41 1.01 7.42
Liquidity 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.15
Investment in tangible assets 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11
Investment in intangible assets 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06
North-West 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.46
North-East 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.44
Center 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
South 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42
Observations 321580 102757 218823
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level variables for firms in our
sample as of 2008. The summary statistics refer to year 2008. Column (1) refers to both firms with eligible
and non-eligible INPS codes. Column (2) restricts the sample to firms with eligible codes and column (3)
to firms with non-eligible codes. Revenue, value-added, liquidity and investments come from the CERVED
data which covers approximately 50% of firms in our sample. Value added is defined as total revenues
plus unsold stocks minus cost of goods and services used in production, or equivalently total profits plus
total capital depreciation and total wage costs. Liquidity is defined as cash and cash equivalents. All mon-
etary figures are expressed in 2008 euros. North-West, North-East, Center and South are dummies for the
geographic region of location of the firm within Italy.
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TABLE 2.A2: DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS’ CHARACTERISTICS IN MAIN
SAMPLE, BROKEN DOWN ACROSS ELIGIBLE AND NON-ELIGIBLE INPS
CODES (2008)
(1) (2) (3)
All INPS codes Eligible Non-eligible
INPS codes INPS codes
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Proportion female 0.38 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.45 0.50
Age 36.89 10.72 38.53 10.51 36.04 10.72
Proportion aged <40 0.57 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.60 0.49
Proportion aged 40-54 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.33 0.47
Proportion aged 55+ 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
Experience (years) 14.23 10.58 16.04 10.81 13.30 10.34
Tenure (months) 59.49 71.52 66.72 76.83 55.75 68.31
Proportion on full-time contract 0.82 0.38 0.90 0.30 0.78 0.42
Proportion on open-ended contract 0.83 0.37 0.88 0.32 0.81 0.40
Proportion on fixed-term contract 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.38
Proportion on seasonal contract 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.15
Proportion blue collar 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.61 0.49
Proportion white collar 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45
Proportion manager 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05
Proportion apprentice 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.28
Proportion native born 0.84 0.36 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.37
Observations 3350203 1140981 2209222
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of worker-level variables for workers
who are employed at firms in our sample at some point during year 2008. The summary statistics refer to
year 2008. Column (1) refers to workers in both firms with eligible and non-eligible INPS codes. Column
(2) restricts the sample to workers in firms with eligible codes and column (3) to workers in firms with
non-eligible codes.
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FIGURE 2.A1: DISTRIBUTION OF STW TREATMENT ACROSS WORKERS IN
FIRMS EXPERIENCING STW
A. Distribution of Fraction of Eligible Workers
Put on STW in Treated Firms
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Across Treated Workers
Notes: The figure reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of treatment across workers in firms ex-
periencing STW. Panel A plots the distribution of the ratio of treated workers to eligible workers in firms
currently under short time work treatment. Note that apprentices and top executives are not eligible for
STW. But there are no other differential incentives to put workers on STW across workers in the Italian
system. Panel A shows that most firms choose to put all their eligible workers in the STW program and
therefore spread hours reductions across all eligible workers. Panel B reports the distribution of reported
weekly hours reduction of workers currently experiencing STW. The graph shows a smooth distribution of
hours reductions, with a mode around .25, and an average weekly hours reduction of a little more than 35%.
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2.A.2 Identification and Robustness: Additional Evidence
FIGURE 2.A2: FRACTION OF FIRM’S RECEIVING STW TREATMENT BY
FIRM SIZE AND INPS CODE
A. Eligible INPS codes
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B. Non-eligible INPS codes
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Notes: The graphs show the fraction of firms receiving STW in each calendar year t ∈ [2005, 2014] by eligi-
bility status and maximum 6-month average FTE firm size. Panel A plots, among firms with eligible INPS
codes in our sample, the evolution of the fraction of firms receiving STW in each calendar year t from 2005 to
2014, for firms with a maximum 6-month average FTE size ∈ (15, 25] in year t and for firms with a maximum
6-month average FTE size ∈ (5, 15] in year t. Panel B replicates Panel A for firms in non-eligible INPS codes.
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FIGURE 2.A3: DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS’ FTE SIZE (2000-2015)
McCrary test: -.008 (.005)
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Notes: The graph shows the probability density function of FTE firm size by 1-unit bins for the years 2000-
2015. The graph also reports the McCrary test statistics for the presence of a discontinuity in the probability
density function of FTE size at 15 and its standard error. FTE firm size is defined as the full-time equivalent
of all employees in the firm, including those who are not eligible for CIGS (managers, apprentices and
work-from-home employees) and those who are currently on unpaid leave (unless the firm has hired a
replacement). Part-time workers are counted in full-time equivalent units.
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FIGURE 2.A4: MCCRARY TEST STATISTIC OF DISCONTINUITY IN FIRMS’
SIZE DISTRIBUTION
A. Eligible INPS codes
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B. Non-eligible INPS codes
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Notes: The graphs show the McCrary test statistic for the presence of a discontinuity in the probability
density function of FTE size at 15 and its confidence interval for each year t ∈ [2000, 2014], and for eligible
and non-eligible INPS codes separately. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. FTE firm size
is defined as the full-time equivalent of all employees in the firm, including those who are not eligible for
CIGS (managers, apprentices and work-from-home employees) and those who are currently on unpaid leave
(unless the firm has hired a replacement). Part-time workers are counted in full-time equivalent units.
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FIGURE 2.A5: FRACTION OF FIRMS CHANGING ELIGIBILITY STATUS DUE
TO INPS CODE CHANGES (2000-2014)
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Notes: The graphs shows the fraction of firms that change eligibility status due to a change in their INPS
code for each year t ∈ [2000, 2014], and separately for firms changing their status from eligible to non-eligible
and vice versa.
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FIGURE 2.A6: PLACEBO ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SHORT TIME
WORK ON FIRMS’ OUTCOMES
A. Log Number of Hours B. Log Firm Size
Per Employee (Headcount)
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C. Log Wage Rate D. Log Wage Bill
Per Employee
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Notes:These graphs show the coefficients γˆt1 estimated from a placebo version of equation 2.1 for all years
t ∈ [2000, 2014] for different firm-level outcomes. Restricting the sample to non-eligible INPS codes, we
select a random series of INPS codes to which we assign a placebo “eligible” status. On this sample we run
specification 2.1. The omitted year is 2007, so all results are relative to 2007. The vertical bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors from 100 replications of the placebo estimation.
The wage rate is defined as total earnings per week worked per employee.
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FIGURE 2.A7: P-VALUES OF PERMUTATION TEST ON BASELINE ESTI-
MATES USING BOOTSTRAPPED PLACEBO ESTIMATES
A. Log Number of Hours B. Log Firm Size
Per Employee (Headcount)
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Notes:These graphs report the p-values of a test of equality of the baseline reduced-form estimates of model
2.1 reported in Figure 2.2 and the bootstrapped placebo estimates reported in Figure 2.A6 for the years 2009
to 2014. The p-values indicate the probability of randomly estimating an effect at least as large as our baseline
estimates. The wage rate is defined as total earnings per week worked per employee.
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2.B Appendix B: Dynamic Treatment Effects
2.B.1 Recursive Identification of Dynamic Treatment Effects for Firms’ Out-
comes
To identify the full sequence of dynamic effects of STW treatment, we develop a method-
ology similar in spirit to the recursive identification of dynamic treatment effects in Cellini,
Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010). We would like to identify the sequence of dynamic treat-
ment effects {βTOT0 , βTOT1 , ..., βTOTk } which capture the effect of receiving STW treatment
on outcome in the year of treatment (βTOT0 ), one year after treatment (β
TOT
1 ), etc., up to
k years after treatment (βTOTk ). We focus our sample on all firms that are active in 2009,
and with FTE firm size between 5 and 25 workers in 2008. We create the instrumental
variable Z2009, equal to one if a firm is eligible to STW in 2009, that is equal to the triple
interaction of being above the 15 FTE firm size threshold in 2008 and being in an eligible
INPS code in 2009. We know that this variable will be correlated with the probability of
STW treatment in 2009 (T2009), but also with the probability of treatment in 2010 (T2010),
in 2011 (T2010), etc. We also know from Appendix Figure 2.B3 that Z2009 is not correlated
with treatment in the past (T2008, T2007, etc.). If we now run on this sample the following
reduced-form regression:
Yigst = ∑
j
βRFj · Z2009 · 1[j = t]
+∑
j
∑
k
γ
jk
2 ·
{
1[g ∈ E ] ∗ 1[k = s] ∗ 1[j = t]
}
+∑
j
∑
k
γ
jk
3 ·
{
1[k = s] ∗ 1[Ni,t−1 > 15] ∗ 1[j = t]
}
+∑
j
∑
k
γ
jk
4 ·
{
1[k = s] ∗ 1[j = t]
}
+∑
k
γk5 ·
{
1[g ∈ E ] ∗ 1[k = s] ∗ 1[Ni,t−1 > 15]
}
+∑
k
γk6 ·
{
1[g ∈ E ] ∗ 1[k = s]
}
+ vigst
(2.B1)
of the baseline IV model (see equation (2.2)) using Z2009 as an instrument, the estimated
coefficients of the reduced form for each year 2009, 2010, etc. (βRF2009, β
RF
2010, etc.) capture the
dynamic Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effects from in 2009, letting potential future treatment
occur.
βRF2009 = β
TOT
0 ·
dT2009
dZ2009
(2.B2)
βRF2010 = β
TOT
0 ·
dT2010
dZ2009
+ βTOT1 ·
dT2009
dZ2009
(2.B3)
Chapter 2. Subsidizing Labor Hoarding in Recessions:
The Employment and Welfare Effects of Short Time Work
125
The first stage regressions of Tigst on Z2009 enable us to identify dT2009dZ2009 ,
dT2010
dZ2009
, etc. Us-
ing these estimates, the estimates of the ITT effects βˆRFt and the recursive structure of
equations (2.B2), (2.B3), etc., we can identify the sequence of dynamic treatment effects
{βTOT0 , βTOT1 , ..., βTOTk }.
We display in Figure 2.B2 the results of these dynamic TOT effects, for various out-
comes. The results suggest that the effects are large on impact, but disappear immediately
once treatment stops.
FIGURE 2.B1: EFFECT OF INPS CODE AND FIRM SIZE ELIGIBILITY INTER-
ACTION ON THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING RECEIVED STW TREATMENT
IN THE PAST 5 YEARS
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Notes: The graph shows the coefficients γˆt1 estimated from equation 2.1 for all years t ∈ [2006, 2014] using
as an outcome the probability of having received STW in the previous five years. The probability of STW
receipt in the previous 5 years is at the firm level. The omitted year is 2007, so all results are relative to 2007.
The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors.
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FIGURE 2.B2: TOT ESTIMATES OF THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF SHORT TIME
WORK
A. Log Number of Hours B. Log Firm Size
Per Employee (Headcount)
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Notes:The graphs report the coefficients ˆβTOTk for k ∈ [0, ..., 4] estimated recursively as illustrated in Ap-
pendix 2.B. The βTOTk identify dynamic treatment effects of STW receipt at time k = 0 on outcomes at time
k ∈ [0, ..., 4]. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. The
wage rate is defined as total earnings per hour worked per employee.
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2.B.2 Identification of Dynamic Treatment Effects for Workers
We want to understand to what extent the interesting dynamic patterns from the pre-
vious event studies reveal the deeper causal dynamic impact of STW treatment. Endo-
geneity concerns prevent interpreting the event study estimates on the treated as the
causal dynamic impact of short time work. The incidence and timing of CIGS treatment
across firms are indeed not random and workers within these firms may differ from other
workers along various characteristics affecting their labor market dynamics. We start by
explaining these issues, and show how two things can be done to tackle this issue.
Model We start by formulating a general statistical model of the dynamics of workers
outcomes:
Yi,j,t+k = ηi + X′itαk + βk1[Tjt = 1] + ε j,t+k + µi,t+k
where Yi,j,t+k is the outcome of worker i in year t + k, given the worker was in firm j at
time t. This outcome depends on some observed and unobserved individual character-
istics ηi and Xit, on having received STW treatment or not at time t. This outcome also
depends on the dynamics of two types of unobserved shocks: firm level shocks ε j,t+k and
individual level shocks µi,t+k.
To identify the sequence of dynamic effects of STW βk, we first need to control for
individual fixed effects ηi: this is easily done using individual fixed effect panel mod-
els. Second, we need to control for individual level characteristics of workers X, as they
may affect dynamics of labor market: this is done creating proper control groups using
nearest-neighbor matching.
The next important concern is that firms who select into STW in t are subject to (un-
observable) bad shocks in t (ε j,t), that are possibly quite time persistent, creating a corre-
lation between STW treatment and ε j,t+k. In other words, workers treated by STW will
do bad because the firms that trigger STW experience bad shocks. A final issue is the
potential correlation between 1[Tjt = 1] and µi,t+k.
A first simple way to address these two concerns is to create counterfactual event
studies that put bounds on the values of these firm and individual shocks, and therefore
bounds on the treatment effects of STW. Another approach is to use our instrument for
STW treatment Tjt, based on the interaction between firm size and INPS codes.
Bounds on Dynamic Treatment Effects Using Counterfactual Event Studies The idea
here is to use comparison groups as bounds on the distribution of the unobserved shocks,
and therefore bound causal effect of STW.
Intuitively, treated workers at time t are selected on the basis that the firm in which
they are employed experiences a negative (unobservable) shock in t.
Counterfactual 1: Similar worker at time t− 1 from any non eligible firms due to firm
size and INPS code. Because only the worse shocks select into STW, the outcomes for
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workers in this comparison group can be thought of as an upper bound counterfactual
for what would have happened to treated workers in the absence of the program. And
the comparison between the event study estimates for treated workers and workers of
this first comparison group provide therefore a lower bound estimate on the dynamic
treatment effect of STW.
Counterfactual 2: Similar worker at time t − 1 from non eligible firms due to firm
size and INPS code that experience mass layoff in t. We assume that the shock triggering
mass layoff is at least as bad as STW shock and that the firms would have used STW
instead if they were eligible. As we show in Section 2.5.1, not all firms who take up STW
would have been laying off workers. In that sense, the layoff comparison group is clearly
more negatively selected than our treated group. Under this assumption, workers in this
mass layoff comparison group can be thought as a lower bound counterfactual for what
would have happened to treated workers absent STW. And the comparison between the
event study estimates for treated workers and workers of this second comparison group
provides an upper bound estimate of the effect of STW.
IV-based Recursive Identification We can also get a causal estimate of the dynamic
effect of STW on workers by implementing a version of our IV recursive identification
method used in Section 2.3.4, but focusing on workers outcomes instead of firms. The
methodology relies on using the interaction between firm size and INPS code of the firm
in which the worker is working in 2008 as an instrument for STW treatment (using the the
same controls as in our baseline IV for firms). The intuition for identification is similar to
the one in Section 2.3.4. Working in an eligible firm in 2008 (Z2008) is an instrument for
being treated in 2009. The reduced form regression of outcomes in 2009 on the instrument
identifies the contemporaneous effect of STW treatment in 2009. But our instrument Z2008
is also correlated with treatment in 2010. The reduced form regression of outcomes in
2010 on the instrument identifies both the one year lagged effect of treatment in 2009 and
the contemporaneous effect of treatment in 2010. And so on and so forth. Exploiting
this recursive structure, we can back out the dynamic TOT effects of STW on workers
outcomes. While this approach has the advantage of identifying the causal dynamic
effect of STW on workers, one drawback is that, given the recursive structure of estimates,
standard errors are quite large.
Results In Figure 2.B3, we overlay the upper bound and lower bound estimates from
the event study approach with the IV-based TOT estimate of the dynamic effect of STW
treatment. In Panel A, we show the effect for employment, and in Panel B the effect on
worker’s total gross earnings plus transfers. The graph shows that in both cases, the
upper bound estimate, which compares treated workers to their layoff counterfactual, is
positive at the time of treatment (event year 0), but quickly converges to being close to
zero, as suggested by the event studies in Figure 2.4. The point estimates for the TOT
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effects are interestingly extremely close to these upper bound estimates, although more
imprecisely estimated.
Overall, these results confirm that STW has a positive effect on workers outcomes
during treatment and therefore provides short term insurance to workers in firms ex-
posed to shocks. Yet, these effects entirely disappear after treatment when looking at
total earnings and transfers, so that STW provides no longer term insurance to workers.
In other words, there was no long term beneficial effect of keeping treated workers in
firms treated by CIGS during the Great Recession in Italy. This also suggests that there
is limited scope for experience effects in the CIGS context, which confirms a stream of
evidence on the absence of significant returns to experience for workers treated by active
labor market programs.
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FIGURE 2.B3: DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF STW ON WORKERS’ OUTCOMES:
A. Probability of Employment
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B. Earnings + CIGS/Transfers
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Notes: The graphs report TOT estimates of the dynamic treatment effect of STW receipt on workers’ em-
ployment probability and total earnings including social insurance transfers and STW. The coefficients ˆβTOTk
(indicated by darker solid diamonds) for k ∈ [0, ..., 4] and are estimated recursively as illustrated in Ap-
pendix 2.B. The βTOTk identify dynamic treatment effects of STW receipt at time k = 0 on outcomes at time
k ∈ [0, ..., 4]. The vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. The
shaded area shows upper- and lower-bound estimates of the dynamic effect from the event study graphs
reported in Figure 2.4. The upper bound (indicated by lighter solid diamonds) compares treated individuals
with the layoff counterfactual. The lower bound (indicated by lighter circles) compares treated workers with
workers in non-eligible firms.
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2.C Appendix C: Selection and Spillover Effects - Additional Ev-
idence
FIGURE 2.C1: FRACTION OF WORKERS TREATED BY CIGS ACROSS ITAL-
IAN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS (2010-2013)
Notes: The graph shows a map of the Italian territory subdivided into 611 local labor markets (LLM), as
defined by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The graph reports the fraction of workers treated by CIGS
in the years 2010 to 2013 by LLM. The fraction of treated workers is defined as the number of workers with
at least one STW spell divided by the total number of employees in the LLM.
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FIGURE 2.C2: FRACTION OF WORKERS ELIGIBLE TO CIGS IN A LLM
BASED ON FIRM SIZE AND INPS CODES DURING THE PRE-RECESSION PE-
RIOD VS FRACTION OF WORKERS ON CIGS DURING THE RECESSION
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Notes: The graph reports a binned scatter plot of the relationship between the fraction of employees on STW
in 2010-2013 and the fraction of workers eligible to STW in 2005-2008 at the local labor market level based
on the interaction between firm size and INPS codes. Both variables are residualized on firm level and LLM
level controls (see text for details). This relationship corresponds to the first stage of the IV model in equation
2.7.
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2.D Appendix D: Model - Details and Further Results
2.D.1 Firm’s Problem
Firms faces productivity shocks et. The firm receives profits, Π, given their production
function F and productivity, less labour and hiring costs. There is exogenous separation
at rate δ, and hiring costs c. The firms vacancy filling probability is q(θt). Firms discount
the future at the same rate β as workers.
Firms determine every period the number of vacancies to be posted vt to maximize
profits:
Π(et, nt−1) = maxvt
{etF(ht, nt)− whtnt − cvt + βEt[Π(et+1, nt)]} (2.D1)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
nt = (1− δ) · nt−1 + q(θt) · vt (2.D2)
The first order condition of profit maximization implicitly determines the demand for
employment nt = n(θt, ht, w) of the firm.
{n} etF′n(ht, nt) = wht +
c
q(θt)
− βEt(Πn(et+1, nt)) (2.D3)
Given the firm’s envelope condition:
Π′n(et+1, nt) = (1− δ)
c
q(θt+1)
(2.D4)
Therefore the FOC with respect to n, equation (2.D3), becomes:
etF′n(ht, nt) = wht +
c
q(θt)
− β(1− δ)Et( cq(θt+1) ) (2.D5)
In a stationary equilibrium, θt = θt+1 = θ, equation (2.D5) reduces to:
etF′n(ht, nt) = wht + (1− β(1− δ))
c
q(θ)
(2.D6)
2.D.2 Characterization of Hours Schedule and Employment Responses to STW
Optimal employment is determined by FOC (2.D6) above of maximization of total profits
w.r.t. to vacancies. This determines employment as a function of hours, wages, and
tightness.
Workers and firms bargain over the surplus created by realized matches, which trans-
lates into an hours schedule and a wage schedule. When firms and workers bargain
over hours and wages there are a large number of general hours and wage schedules:
h(w, θ, e, n, b, τ, t) and w(h, θ, e, n, b, τ, t) that offer potential solutions to the bargaining
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problem, because hours and wages are imperfect substitutes in both sides’ objective func-
tions. But since each side receives a share of the overall surplus, given an agreed wage,
the level of agreed hours must maximize the shared surplus. Note that this does not co-
incide with Nash’s Pareto efficiency axiom for a bargaining solution because it may be
possible to make both sides better off with a different wage and hours schedule. But if
wages are determined by some form of rigid rule, which corresponds to most wage bar-
gaining setting, then such an hours solution seems plausible. In practice, in Italy, wages
are negotiated by industry-wide bargaining over fixed periods of time (of approximately
three years).
Given a particular fixed wage rule w(h, θ, e, n, b, τ, t) we can now characterize hours
schedule conditional on this particular wage schedule. To see how the implied hours
schedule behaves when it is determined in this manner, we first reanalyze the worker
continuation values
WH =u(cH, hH) + β[δWU + (1− δ)WH ],
WL =u(cL, hL) + β[δWU + (1− δ)WL],
WU =u(cU , 0) + β[(1− φ(θ))WU + φ(θ){ρWH + (1− ρ)WL}]
Referring to WH, WL, and WU as unknowns; we have three equations and three un-
knowns. Let us solve out for the unknowns
WH =
F(θ)
1− β(1− δ)
[
βδu(cU , hU) +
{
1+
β2δφ(θ)ρ
1− β(1− δ)
}
u(cH, hH) +
β2δφ(θ)(1− ρ)
1− β(1− δ) u(cL, hL)
]
,
WL =
F(θ)
1− β(1− δ)
[
βδu(cU , hU) +
β2δφ(θ)ρ
1− β(1− δ)u(cH, hH) +
{
1+
β2δφ(θ)(1− ρ)
1− β(1− δ)
}
u(cL, hL)
]
,
WU =F(θ)
[
u(cU , hU) +
βφ(θ)ρ
1− β(1− δ)u(cH, hH) +
βφ(θ)(1− ρ)
1− β(1− δ) u(cL, hL)
]
where F(θ) = 1−β(1−δ)
(1−β(1−φ(θ))(1−β(1−δ))−β2δφ(θ) . So the continuation values are a convex com-
bination of instantaneous utility from different states, where the weighting depends on
an endogenous variables - labor market tightness. Using previous notation, we can rep-
resent this in matrix form
W = Λ′U,
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where W = [WH, WL, WU ]′ and U = [u(cH, hH), u(cL, hL), u(cU , hU)]′. From this, we can
see that
Wi −WU =(1− βφ(θ))u(ci, hi)− (1− β)u(cu, 0)1− β(1− δ− φ(θ)) ,
⇒ d(Wi −WU)
dhi
=(1− β(1− δ− φ(θ)))−2
{
[1− β(1− δ− φ(θ))] . . .
. . .
[
(1− βφ(θ))(wi(1− τi)uc(ci, hi) + uh(ci, hi))− βu(ci, hi)dφ(θ)dhi
]
. . .
. . .− [(1− βφ(θ))u(ci, hi)− (1− β)u(cu, 0)]βdφ(θ)dhi
}
Since the agents considering the bargaining process are atomistic relative to the total
size of the economy, we can ignore general equilibrium effects on market tightness
d(Wi −WU)
dhi
=η(θ)[wi(1− τi)uc(ci, hi) + uh(ci, hi)],
⇒ d
2(Wi −WU)
dh2i
=η(θ)[w2i (1− τi)2ucc(ci, hi) + uhh(ci, hi)],
⇒ d
2(WL −WU)
dhLdτ
=η(θ)
[
− wLuc(cL, hL)− w2L(1− τL)hLucc(cL, hL) +
dhL
dτL
uhh(cL, hL)]
]
,
⇒ d
2(WH −WU)
dhHdτ
=0,
⇒ d
2(Wi −WU)
dhidε i
=η(θ)
[
dwi
dε i
(1− τi)uc(ci, hi) . . .
. . . + wi(1− τi)
[
dwi
dε i
(1− τi)h + w(1− τ)dhidε i
]
ucc(ci, hi)
+
dhi
dε i
uhh(ci, hi)]
]
where η(θ) = 1−βφ(θ)1−β(1−δ−φ(θ)) and we assume separability in hours and consumption.
Therefore, assuming as a benchmark that a worker is on their neoclassical intratempo-
ral first order condition, the difference Wi −WU increases with hi if the probability of
finding a job decreases in hi.
If we assume that productivity follows a martingale process or that we are in a sta-
tionary environment, the surplus for a match between a worker and a level i productivity
firm is
Si =Wi −WU + ε iFn(hi, ni)− wihi
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As explained above, for a given wage schedule this should be maximized with respect
to hi
dSi
dhi
=
d(Wi −WU)
dhi
+ ε iFnh(hi, ni) + ε iFnn(hi, ni)
dni
dhi
− wi − hi dwidhi = 0
This equation implicitly determines a level of hours, so given a unique solution we
can do comparative statics. Firstly, looking at the STW the τ parameter, and assuming
that third derivatives of the production function are small, we have,
dhi
dτ
=
−
[
d2(Wi−WU)
dhidτ
+ ε iFnn(hi, ni)
d2ni
dhidτ
− dwidτ − d
2wi
dhidτ
hi
]
d2(Wi−WU)
dh2i
+ ε iFnn(hi, ni)
d2ni
dh2i
− d2widh2i hi − 2
dwi
dhi
Now looking at the productivity parameter ε i, we find:
dhi
dε i
=
−
[
d2(Wi−WU)
dhidεi
+ Fnh(hi, ni) + Fnn(hi, ni)
dni
dhi
+ ε iFnn(hi, ni)
d2ni
dhidεi
− dwidεi −
d2wi
dhidεi
hi
]
d2(Wi−WU)
dh2i
+ ε iFnn(hi, ni)
d2ni
dh2i
− d2widh2i hi − 2
dwi
dhi
So hours will react more strongly to the subsidy rate and firms experiencing pro-
ductivity drops dε i will want to reduce hours and take up the program more when the
following conditions are met: (i) utility gain from employment Wi −WU is more strongly
decreasing in hours; (ii) wages are relatively rigid w.r.t the subsidy rate, and (iii) technol-
ogy closer to linear in headcount employment but more concave in hours.
Note that we can also look at the reaction of employment to different variables by
taking the firms’ first order condition for employment in a stationary environment:
Ai[ε iFn(hi, ni)− wihi] = 1q(θ)
where AH =
ρ(1−β(1−δ))
cv and AL =
(1−ρ)(1−β(1−δ))
cv . So total differentiation gives us
dni
dhi
=
wi + hi
dwi
dhi
− ε iFnh(hi, ni)
ε iFnn(hi, ni)
where we use the fact that firms do not internalize their impact on market tightness.
This implies that positive employment responses to the STW-induced reductions in hours
will occur when wages are above the marginal product of an additional input of hour.
Additionally, these responses will be larger the more rigid wages are as a function of
hours.
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2.D.3 Equilibrium and Spillover Effects
A steady state equilibrium consists in a set of: (i) hours schedules h and wage schedules
w that split the surplus in high and in low productivity firms subject to the incentive
constraint that Wek −Wu ≥ 0; (ii) labor demand functions nd in high and in low produc-
tivity firms that maximizes firms’ profits and (iii) a labor market tightness θ that clears
the labor market subject to the steady state equality of flows in and out of employment.
We borrow the equilibrium representation of Michaillat (2012). A graphical illustration,
using the calibrated version of our model, is presented in Figure 2.D1 below.
In this representation, the steady state equality of flows in and out of employment
characterizes a labor supply ns(θ, δ), which is an increasing function of θ in the {n, θ}
space. The profit maximization of firms determines a labor demand supply nd(θ), which
will be a decreasing function of θ when the marginal product of n is decreasing, and hor-
izontal otherwise (Panel A). With random matching, aggregate labor demand is simply
the weighted sum of demands of high and low productivity firms. Equilibrium tightness
and equilibrium employment are determined at the intersection of aggregate demand
and supply (Panel B). When STW is introduced, labor demand of low productivity firms
increases, especially so when tightness is low (and hiring is therefore cheap). This in turn
increases aggregate demand, and equilibrium tightness (Panel C). This increase in equi-
librium tightness is the force driving our observed spillover effects in the data. It makes
hiring more costly for all firms, and therefore reduces employment of firms non treated
by STW. This equilibrium mechanism captures the negative reallocation effects of STW
which distorts employment towards low productivity firms rather than high productiv-
ity firms. Again, this effect will be stronger the more horizontal labor demands are (that
is, the more linear technology is in n) (Panel D).
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FIGURE 2.D1: EQUILIBRIUM REPRESENTATION AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
OF STW
A. Labor Demands: B. Aggregate Labor
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Notes: The figure offers a graphical illustration of labor market equilibrium using the calibrated version of
our model. In this representation, the steady state equality of flows in and out of employment characterizes
a labor supply ns(θ, δ), which is an increasing function of θ in the {n, θ} space. The profit maximization of
firms determines a labor demand supply nd(θ), which will be a decreasing function of θ when the marginal
product of n is decreasing, and horizontal otherwise (Panel A). With random matching, aggregate labor
demand is simply the weighted sum of demands of high and low productivity firms. Equilibrium tightness
and equilibrium employment are determined at the intersection of aggregate demand and supply (Panel B).
When STW is introduced, labor demand of low productivity firms increases, especially so when tightness
is low (and hiring is therefore cheap). This in turn increases aggregate demand, and equilibrium tightness
(Panel C). This increase in equilibrium tightness is the force driving our observed spillover effects in the data.
It makes hiring more costly for all firms, and therefore reduces employment of firms non treated by STW.
This equilibrium mechanism captures the negative reallocation effects of STW which distorts employment
towards low productivity firms rather than high productivity firms. This effect will be stronger the more
horizontal labor demands are (that is, the more linear technology is in n) (Panel D).
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2.E Appendix E: Optimal STW Formula - Derivation and Cali-
bration
2.E.1 Derivation of Proposition 1
The social planner problem is
max
T
L(T) = t + piH + piL −Ub− τnLw(1− hL) + 1
µ
Γ(WH, WL, WU , nH, nL)
s.t (1) (1− β(1− δ))[eH Fn(hH, nH)− whH ] = cv
ρq(θ)
,
(2) (1− β(1− δ))[eLFn(hL, nL)− whL] = cv
(1− ρ)q(θ) ,
(3) n =
φ(θ)
δ+ φ(θ)
where n = nH + nL and U = 1− n.
Firstly, we focus on the social welfare effects,
1
µnLw(1− hL)
{
dΓ(WH, WL, WU , nH, nL)
dτ
}
=
1
µnLw(1− hL)
{
nH
dWH
dτ
+ nL
dWL
dτ
+ (1− n)dWU
dτ
+
dnH
dτ
[WH −WU ] + dnLdτ [WL −WU ]
}
In a steady state equilibrium, nH = ρn and nL = (1− ρ)n so we can rewrite the above
1
µnLw(1− hL)
{
dΓ(WH, WL, WU , nH, nL)
dτ
}
=
1
µnLw(1− hL)
{
n
[
ρ
dWH
dτ
+ (1− ρ)dWL
dτ
]
+ (1− n)dWU
dτ
+
dn
dτ
[
ρWH + (1− ρ)WL −WU
]}
In order to expand and interpret this equation we define a matrix
Λ =
λH|H λL|H λU|HλH|L λL|L λU|L
λH|U λL|U λU|U
 = [ΛH : ΛL : ΛU ]
=[1− β(1− δ− φ(θ))]−1
1− β(1− ρφ(θ)) β(1− ρ)φ(θ) βδβρφ(θ) 1− β(1− (1− ρ)φ(θ)) βδ
βφ(θ)ρ βφ(θ)(1− ρ) 1− β(1− δ)

These new objects have a simple interpretation, λH|L is the proportion of time spent
employed in the high productivity firm over the lifetime of a worker who is currently
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employed in the low productivity firm. Similarly, λU|H is the proportion of time spent
unemployed over the lifetime of a worker who is currently employed in the low produc-
tivity firm, and so on.
We define another vector to account for the proportions of employed - in the high and
low productivity firms - and unemployed workers
N = 1
1− β
 ρn(1− ρ)n
1− n

where the scalar multiplication will account for the fact that we are dealing with infinite
streams of utility.
Lastly, we define the following scalars
Ωi = N ′Λi for i = H, L
∆ =
ρu(cH, hH) + (1− ρ)u(cL, hL)− u(cU , 0)
1− β(1− δ− φ(θ))
1
µ
,
Φ′(θ) = φ′(θ)
[
U
δ+ φ(θ)
+ΩU
]
,
E = τnLw(1− hL),
uci =
du(ci, hi)
dc
for i = H, L,
Gi =
Ωi
ni
uci
µ
for i = H, L
where E is total expenditure on the policy. ∆ is the weighted wedge in utility between
being employed and unemployed. Gi is the adjusted marginal social welfare weights on
either the employed in the low or high productivity firm. The adjustment comes from
the Ωini term, which accounts for the fact that individuals spend different amounts of time
in the high or low productivity firm. If on average more time is spent in, say, the low
productivity firm, then the social planner places greater weight on welfare in this state.
Now we can rewrite the original expression
1
µnLw(1− hL)
{
dΓ(WH, WL, WU , nH, nL)
dτ
}
=εhH ,τ
nH · hH
[
w−MRSHc,h
]
E
GH
1− ρ
ρ
+
εnL·hL,τ
hL
[
w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h
]
E
GL+
εθ,τ
θΦ′(θ)∆
E
+GL
where MRSic,h =
u′c(ci ,hi)
u′h(ci ,hi)
is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
hours for workers in firms of productivity level i. Let εY,X = dYdX
X
Y denote the elasticity of
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Y w.r.t. X. Therefore, the overall optimality condition is
1−
[
εpiH ,τpiH + εpiL,τpiL
E
+εhL,τ
hL
1− hL + εn,τ
b− τ(1− ρ)w(1− hL)
τw(1− hL)
]
=
εhH ,τ
nH · hH
[
w−MRSHc,h
]
E
GH
1− ρ
ρ
+ εhL,τ
hL
[
w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h
]
E
gL
+ εθ,τ
θΦ′(θ)∆
E
+GL
We assume, based on empirical evidence, that εhH ,τ ≈ 0. Using this and rewriting the
effect on profits into the externalities component yields
1+
{
εn,τ
(1− ρ)bSTW − b
bSTW
− εhL,τ
hL
h¯− hL
}
=εhL,τ
nL · hL
E
·
{
[w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h]GL + (FhL − nL)
}
+ εθ,τ
θ
E
{
Φ′(θ)∆+ q′(θ)C
}
+GL
where bSTW = τw(h¯− h) is the total amount of STW benefits for a worker in the program.
FhL =
eL
nL
· ∂F(hL,nL)∂h is the marginal product of an increase in hours in low productivity firms
and C = c · v is total recruiting costs.
2.E.2 Local Calibration of Optimal STW Using Reduced-Form Estimates
Value of Transfer To calibrate the social value of transfer GL = ΩLnL
u′c(cL,hL)
µ , we first fo-
cus on the term u
′
c(cL,hL)
µ . This term refers to the marginal utility of consumption of treated
workers (u′c(cL, hL)) relative to that of the whole population of workers µ = E[u′c(c, h)].
To calibrate this, we use our event studies estimates of Figure 2.4 Panel C. They show
that treated workers have total earnings and transfers that are significantly below (≈
18% lower) that of their matched non-treated workers from non eligible firms. This dif-
ference between treated workers and the matched non-treated workers from non eligible
firms represent the difference in total earnings and transfer between treated workers and
counterfactual average workers in the economy. To translate this difference in earnings
and transfer into a difference in marginal utility of consumption, we further assume that
workers do not have access to additional self insurance, and that utility is separable be-
tween hours and consumption. Using a simple first-order Taylor expansion, we have that
u′c(cL,hL)
µ =
u′c(cL,hL)
E[u′c(c,h)]
≈ 1 + u′c(cL,hL)−u′c(c¯,h)u′c(c¯,h) ≈ 1 + σc
c¯−cL
c¯ . Using our estimates, this suggests
that the wedge in marginal utility is approximately equal to 1 + σc · 0.18, where σc is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. The value of STW transfers is therefore potentially
large. Assuming a coefficient of risk aversion of 2.5, (which is somewhat of the mid point
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of the accepted range of estimates in the literature), we get that u
′
c(cL,hL)
µ ≈ 1.45 . To cali-
brate ΩLnL we use the definition of ΩL and the observed values of time spent in the various
states conditional on today’s state and find ΩLnL ≈ 1. As a result, our local calibration
delivers GL ≈ 1.45.
Fiscal Externality We start with calibrating the first term of the fiscal externality, cap-
turing the fiscal cost of employment responses: εn,τ
(1−ρ)bSTW−b
bSTW .
This fiscal cost depends on the relative generosity of UI vs STW benefits: (1−ρ)b
STW−b
bSTW
To calibrate this, we set the unemployment benefit, b to match the net replacement rate for
the average worker in Italy in 2008, which is around 70%. For our purposes, this is 70% of
the wage obtained if working the full hours endowment h¯ = 40, i.e. b = 0.7 ·w · h¯. We set
τ at its current level of 80%. ρ is the fraction of total employment from low productivity
firms. To define low productivity firms, we use the fraction of eligible firms taking up
STW during the Great Recession from 2009 to 2014= 13%. h = 20 is set to the average
level of hours observed in these low productivity firms during the Recession. Using these
values, we have that (1−ρ)b
STW−b
bSTW = −1.62.
We now calibrate the employment elasticity εn,τ. We can decompose total employ-
ment response between low and high productivity employment responses dn/ndτ/τ = (1−
ρ) dnL/nLdτ/τ + ρ
dnH/nH
dτ/τ To calibrate
dnL/nL
dτ/τ we use our estimate of the effect of STW on em-
ployment= e.38 − 1=.45 To calibrate dnH/nHdτ/τ we use our spillover estimates: we know that
employment decreases by 0.93% when the fraction treated increases by 1%. We also know
that the availability of STW policy increases the fraction treated by 5% (our first stage es-
timate from Table 2.1). This means that dnH/nHdτ/τ = 0.0093 · 5.
Using again the fact that the fraction of low productivity firm is 1− ρ =13% (which
corresponds to the fraction of eligible firms ever taking up STW during recession), we
have that the total employment response to the policy is εn,τ = 0.13 · 0.45− 0.87 · (0.0093 ·
5) = 1.8%.
The second term of the fiscal externality captures the hours response to the program:
−εhL,τ hLh¯−hL . We can easily calibrate this term using the large estimated negative responses
of hours to the policy from Section 2.3.2: εhL,τ = e
−0.51 − 1 = 0.4. Using again h¯ = 40
and h=20, we find that the fiscal externality created by the hours response to the program
is large and equal to 0.4, which trumps the small fiscal externality from employment
responses.
The total fiscal externality, combining the employment and hours response is: 0.018 ·
(−1.62) + 0.4 = 0.37.
Employment externality To get a sense of the sign and magnitude of the employment
externality, we proceed in two steps.
First, we calibrate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas matching function from our
reduced-form evidence to get a sense of the relative magnitude of Φ′(θ) and q′(θ). All
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the details of this calibration exercise are reported below in Appendix 2.F. Our estimate of
the curvature of the matching function is 0.53. At low levels of tightness, such as during
a recession, this curvature parameter implies that Φ′(θ) > q′(θ).
Second, we turn to our event study estimates to get an idea of ∆, the lifetime utility
gain from employment vs unemployment today. We use an approach similar to Shimer
and Werning (2007) and look at the average drop in wage rate at reemployment vs prior
to unemployment for unemployed workers. This information tells us the willingness-to-
pay to be employed vs unemployed, and provides an estimate of ∆. In our context, this
drop is relatively large with an average wage rate drop around 8% at reemployment com-
pared to pre-unemployment wage rate. How does ∆ compare to C, the total recruitment
cost of an additional worker? We have very little evidence on C. The most recent evi-
dence from Mühlemann and Strupler Leiser (2015) using Swiss data, suggests recruiting
costs vary between less than 2% of wages for large firms to around 20% for very small
firms, and are sensitive to the business cycle. Overall, if we assume that C is actually
close to ∆, the employment externality remains positive to the extent that Φ′(θ) > q′(θ).
Hours Externality Signing and calibrating the hours externality term remains tricky in
practice.
We proceed in two steps. First, we examine the term [FhL − w]. By implicitly differ-
entiating the FOC of firms profit maximization w.r.t employment, we get that the em-
ployment response of low productivity firms to their change in hours with STW is an
increasing function of the wedge between wages and the marginal product of hours:
dnL
dhL
= f (w − FhL). In other words, the large observed employment responses to STW
indicate that [FhL − w] < 0 and that the wedge is potentially large in magnitude.
Second, we examine the second term w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h. When workers freely choose
hours in a complete market for hours, their optimal choice of hours is such that the MRS is
equal to the net-of-tax wage rate. Interestingly, there is ample evidence that the fraction of
workers reporting that they are willing to work more hours increases drastically during
recessions (e.g. Canon, Kudlyak, and Reed, 2014). This would indicate that recessions are
actually characterized by w(1− τ)−MRSLc,h ≥ 0. In which case decreasing equilibrium
hours has a negative externality on workers.
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2.F Appendix F: Model Calibration and Counterfactual Analysis
The following appendix describes the details of the calibration of the model: the choice
of functional form specifications, the calibration of the various parameters using quasi-
experimental evidence, the GMM estimation of the parameters that could not be directly
calibrated from reduced-form evidence, and the details of the counterfactual exercises.
2.F.1 Exogenous Parameters
Parameter Description Calibrated value
β Discount factor 0.935
α Hour share 0.6
η Labour share 0.7
γ Matching function curvature 0.53
wa Wage function curvature 0.2
h¯ Total hours endowment 40
δ Separation rate 0.05
b Unemployment benefit 0.7 · h¯ · ws
τ STW replacement rate 0.8
σc Coefficient of risk aversion 2.5
σh Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply 3.5
ß Markov transition matrix of firm productivity [0.88 0.12; 0.88 0.12]
e Productivity values [1 1.62]
Matching Function, γ
We consider the Cobb-Douglas matching function:
M(ut, vt) = µu
γ
t v
1−γ
t (2.F1)
The vacancy filling probability q(θ) is therefore, as above:
q(θt) =
M(ut, vt)
vt
= µ
(ut
vt
)γ
= µθ−γt (2.F2)
Log linearizing the above equation yields:
ln(
M
vt
) = ln(µ)− γln(θ) (2.F3)
To obtain information on the measures of hires per vacancy, M/vt, and labor market
tightness at the local labor market level, θ we use the RIL 2007, 2010 and 2015 surveys
from INAPP. Using question C7 (and question C8 for 2015) we can compute vRILj,t the total
number of vacancies (number of individuals the firm seeks to hire) in the RIL data at time
t in labor market j.
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To scale the vacancies in the RIL data to the whole local labor market level, we use
the ratio of total employment of firms in the RIL data at time t in labor market j to total
employment at time t in labor market j computed from the INPS administrative data,
that is we have:
vj,t =
nj,t
nRILj,t
· vRILj,t (2.F4)
Once a measure of vacancies vj,t is obtained, this is combined with measures of matches
Mj,t and of unemployment uj,t from the ISTAT data to create qj,t and θj,t. For Mj,t we com-
pute the total number of new hires (inflows) in firms of LLM j in year t from the INPS
data, and for uj,t we compute the total number of unemployed in LLM j at time t from
the INPS data on paid unemployment.
We therefore can run the following specification:
log qj,t = a + b log
(
θj,t
)
+ cj + ζt + νj,t (2.F5)
For b to identify −γ, exogenous variation in θj,t is required. We use exposure to CIG
treatment as an instrument. Intuitively, the intensity of CIG treatment offers an exoge-
nous shock to labor demand in the LLM as depicted in Figure 2.D1 Panel C. This shock
allows us to move along the “supply curve” of steady state equality of flows in the la-
bor market, and therefore identify the curvature of the matching function. We use again
the interaction between firm size and INPS codes in the pre-recession period as an in-
strument for the change in the number of unemployed (and therefore for the change in
tightness) during the recession. Therefore, we obtain the 2SLS model:
∆ log qj,t = b∆ log
(
θˆj,t
)
+W ′jµ1 + ζt + νj,t (2.F6)
∆ log
(
θj,t
)
= Z2005−2008j +W
′
jµ0 + µj,t
where ∆ is the difference operator between pre vs post 2008.39 Zj is the average yearly
fraction of workers of LLM j that are eligible to STW during the pre-recession period
based on the interaction between their firm size and INPS code in the pre-recession pe-
riod. Wj is a vector of LLM characteristics that could be correlated with the fraction of
treated workers and likely to affect equilibrium labor market outcomes during the re-
cession, such as the industry and firm size composition of the LLM and the initial un-
employment rate in the LLM prior to the recession. Identification therefore comes from
comparing LLM with similar characteristics, including firm size composition and indus-
try composition, but with different allocations of workers within firm size times INPS
codes bins during the pre-recession period. From this specification, we obtain γ = 0.53.
39Because only three waves of the survey are available (2007, 2010 and 2015), the pre 2008 data are obser-
vations for 2007, and post 2008 data are an average of the 2010 and 2015 observations.
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Production Function, α and η
We assume that the production function of the firm is of the form:
F(ht, nt) = hαt n
η
t (2.F7)
Log-linearization of the first order condition of the firm’s profit maximization with
respect to employment gives:
log n =
α
1− η log h−
1
1− η log(wh)−
1− β(1− δ)
1− η
c
whq(θ)
+
1
1− η log(εη) (2.F8)
Letting ν = 11−η log(εη), and re-arranging we obtain:
log n =
α− 1
1− η log h−
1
1− η log w−
1− β(1− δ)
1− η
c
whq(θ)
+ ν (2.F9)
A third specification can be obtained through consolidating the whole wage bill as fol-
lows: W = wh¯ + (hmax − h¯)τf w. Before 2015, the experience rating of the STW program
was almost zero: τf ≈ 0 so W = wh but after 2015, the introduction of τf > 0 for firms
on CIG introduces some exogenous variation in the wage bill. The new specification
becomes:
log n =
α
1− η log h−
1
1− η log W −
1− β(1− δ)
1− η
c
W · q(θ) + ν (2.F10)
The previous log-linearization suggests the following estimation model:
log ni,j,t = γi + ζ j + µt + α1 log hi,j,t + α2 log Wi,j,t + α3
1
Wi,j,tq(θj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xi,j,t
+ νi,j,t
where i indexes firms, and j indexes LLM. Structurally, the coefficients from this regres-
sion α1 and α2 and α3 identify the key parameters of the demand function. We estimate
the previous specification instrumenting the change in hours by STW treatment and the
change in the wage bill by the interaction of STW treatment and being after 2015, when
the reform introduced some positive experience rating τf > 0. Solving for these parame-
ters gives α = 0.6, η = 0.7.
Utility Function
We use the following isoelastic, additively separable utility function:
u(c, h) =
c1−σc − 1
1− σc − ϕ
h1+σh
1+ σh
(2.F11)
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σc, the coefficient of risk aversion is set to 2.5. The parameter σh can be interpreted as
the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity. We set this parameter to σh = 3.5 in line
with conventional calibrations from New Keynesian models (see Galí, 2011).
Firm Productivity Transition Matrix
Assume a firm’s productivity level can take the value of one of two states, high and
low (H and L). Assume that firms transition between these two states freely, where the
probability of transitioning from one state to the other is solely dependent on the state
which a firm finds themselves in. We therefore obtain the following Markov transition
matrix, where piST is the conditional probability of moving to state S, conditional on being
in state T:
et = H et = L
et+1 = H piHH 1− piHH
et+1 = L 1− piLL piLL
TABLE 2.F1: MARKOV TRANSITION MATRIX BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY
STATES
From this transition matrix, we obtain the following equations, telling us the total
number of firms in each state in the next period. Let nit be the number of firms in state i
at time t:
piHH · nht + (1− piLL) · nlt = nht+1 (2.F12)
piLL · nlt + (1− piHH) · nht = nlt+1
Assume that we observe the steady state:
nht = n
h
t+1 = nh (2.F13)
nlt = n
l
t+1 = nl
And we therefore obtain:
piHH · nh + (1− piLL) · nl = nh (2.F14)
piLL · nl + (1− piHH) · nh = nl
It’s clear that these two equations in fact provide no new information, and both reduce
to:
(1− piHH) · nh = (1− piLL) · nl (2.F15)
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However, we also have an extra condition: as we are in the steady state the proportions
piHH and piLL must add up to 1. We therefore obtain two equations:
piHH + piLL = 1 (2.F16)
(1− piHH) · nh = (1− piLL) · nl
which reduces to simply:
piHH = nh/(nl + nh) (2.F17)
We must define now define how to interpret productivity within the data. Take low
productivity firms as those who are eligible for CIG and who have at least one CIG event
in post 2009. High productivity firms are those eligible but do not take up CIG at any
point post 2009.
We observe that 13% of firms are treated post 2009 in the baseline DD sample. We
thus obtain piHH = 0.87. Further, taking the mean (log) total factor productivity of these
firms, and normalising the low productivity value to 1 yields: el = 1, eh = 1.62.
Wage Schedule and Hours Schedule
We assume that the wage has the following form:
w(e) = wsewa (2.F18)
with wa < 1. The wage is therefore a somewhat rigid function of productivity. Besides,
it does not respond to variation in the STW subsidy, nor to variation in hours, consistent
with our empirical evidence. The wage responsiveness to firm productivity, wa, is set to
0.2, in line with similar models in the literature, c.f. Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2018a).
The hours schedule in the low productivity firm is obtained by assuming that firms
have all the bargaining power in low productivity firms, therefore leaving workers at
their outside option. For high productivity firms, we consider a simple exogeneous hours
schedule:
h(θ, e) = hssehsaθhsb (2.F19)
To estimate the parameter hsb, the responsiveness of the hours function to a change in
labour market tightness, we regress log hours among ineligible firms at LLM level against
log tightness, instrumented by eligibility of CIG. This model obtains a coefficient of 0.14.
Transfer Generosity
The unemployment benefit, b, is set to match the net replacement rate for the average
worker in Italy in 2008, which is around 70%. For our purposes, this is 70% of the wage
obtained if working the full hours endowment.
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The STW replacement rate, τ, is the policy parameter, which is determined by the
legal implementation of CIG. This rate is defined as 80% of the total remuneration that
would have been paid to the worker for the hours of work not provided, bounded be-
tween 0 and the fully contracted time.
Miscellaneous Parameters
The model imposes an exogenous separation rate, δ. This is set to 0.2, which is the implied
probability of being displaced from an specific firm in a specific contract. The model’s
discount factor, β, is set to 0.935, implying an annual interest rate of 7%.
2.F.2 Endogenous Parameters and Target Moments
After setting the exogenous parameters, we are left with 5 endogenous parameters: We
Parameter Description
µ Matching function scaling
c Vacancy cost
ϕ Utility function labour scaling
hsa Hours schedule productivity curvature
ws Wage function scaling
obtain these parameters through the method of simulated moments, with five target mo-
ments:
Target Moments Value
Unemployment rate 0.108
High productivity hours level 34
Low productivity hours level, without STW 39
Low productivity hours level, with STW 20
Proportion of labour demand that is high productivity 0.9
The target unemployment rate is the Italian unemployment rate computed from the
ISTAT/INAPP data. We target the average unemployment rate in the period 2008-2014:
0.108. Low productivity firms is defined as:
• For eligible firms, those that take up CIG
• For non-eligible firms, in eligible 5-digit industries, firms whose total factor pro-
duction is in the bottom 12% of the distribution, post 2009
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2.F.3 Counterfactual Analysis: Permanent vs Transitory Shocks
Our baseline calibration considers the Great Recession in Italy as a steady state, and asks
what the value is, in such a steady state, of having STW subsidies target firms with nega-
tive idiosyncratic shocks. But the nature of shocks, whether they are permanent or tran-
sitory, aggregate or idiosyncratic, may matter as well in assessing the effects of STW poli-
cies. Firms may be more willing to hoard labor when they expect a shock to be temporary,
and therefore relaxing constraints to labor hoarding may be more effective for temporary
shocks. Our previous analysis in Figure 2.5 indeed indicates that employment effects of
STW are larger for firms that were high productivity prior to the recession, suggesting
that STW may be more effective for high productivity firms experiencing a transitory
negative shock than for permanently low productivity firms. To get further insights on
this, we now use our calibrated model and simulate the effects of STW under two dif-
ferent scenarii of aggregate shocks: a permanent shock and a transitory shock. In both
scenarii, we start from the steady state, and firms face in period 0 a surprise 10% nega-
tive aggregate productivity shock. In the first case, the shock is permanent, in the second,
the shock is only transitory and the aggregate productivity level recovers linearly over
3 periods. Note that in both cases, the initial shock in period 0 is unexpected, but firms
then have rational expectations with respect to future states of aggregate productivity
(i.e. they know, once realized, whether the shock is permanent or transitory).
The simulated employment response on impact (at time 0) to the permanent shock
(n˙(0)|perm.) is, not surprisingly, larger than the employment response to the temporary
shock (n˙(0)|temp.).Figure 2.F1 Panel A shows the difference in simulated employment
responses n˙(0)|temp. − n˙(0)|perm., expressed as a fraction of the employment loss to
the permanent shock −n˙(0)|perm., for various values of the discount factor and of the
hiring costs C. The graph confirms that, in the transitory shock scenario, firms do “hoard
labor” on impact and keep 10 to 15% of the workers that they would get rid of if they
knew the shock was permanent. Importantly, the figure shows that labor hoarding is
significantly larger when the cost to firms of replacing their workers increases.
Because hoarding is more valuable when the shock is transitory then permanent, the
employment effects of having STW also differ according to the permanence of the aggre-
gate shock. To document this, we simulate n˙(0)|perm. and n˙(0)|temp. in a world with-
out STW (τ = 0), and compute the employment effects of STW, ∆n˙(0) = n˙(0)|τ=0.8 −
n˙(0)|τ=0, in both scenarii of the aggregate shock. Panel B of Figure 2.F1 plots the differ-
ence in employment effects of STW, ∆n˙(0)|temp. − ∆n˙(0)|perm., expressed as a fraction
of the employment effects of STW in the permanent shock scenario ∆n˙(0)|perm.. The
graph confirms that the employment effects of STW on impact are significantly larger
(around 20% to 40%) when the shock is temporary than when it is permanent. This,
again, is especially true when the cost of replacing workers is high, and when the magni-
tude of the aggregate shock is large.
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FIGURE 2.F1: LABOR HOARDING AND MAGNITUDE OF STW EFFECTS ON
EMPLOYMENT: TRANSITORY VS PERMANENT AGGREGATE SHOCK
A. Simulated Labor Hoarding for Transitory Shock
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Notes: The figure uses the calibrated model to simulate the extent of labor hoarding and the employment
effects of STW under two different scenarii of aggregate shocks: a permanent shock and a transitory shock.
In both scenarii, we start from the steady state, and firms face in period 0 a surprise 10% negative aggregate
productivity shock. In the first case, the shock is permanent, in the second, the shock is only transitory and
the aggregate productivity level recovers linearly over 3 periods. Once the shock is realized, firms have
rational expectations with respect to future states of aggregate productivity. Panel A shows the difference
between the simulated employment response on impact (at time 0) to the permanent shock (n˙(0)|perm.) and
the employment response to the temporary shock (n˙(0)|temp.), expressed as a fraction of the employment
loss to the permanent shock−n˙(0)|perm., for various values of the discount factor and of the costs of replac-
ing workers C. The graph confirms that, in the transitory shock scenario, firms do “hoard labor” on impact
and keep 10 to 15% of the workers that they would get rid of if they knew the shock was permanent. We then
simulate n˙(0)|perm. and n˙(0)|temp. in a world without STW (τ = 0), and compute the employment effects
of STW, ∆n˙(0) = n˙(0)|τ=.8− n˙(0)|τ=0, in both scenarii of the aggregate shock. Panel B plots the difference in
employment effects of STW, ∆n˙(0)|temp. − ∆n˙(0)|perm., expressed as a fraction of the employment effects
of STW in the permanent shock scenario ∆n˙(0)|perm.. The graph confirms that the employment effects of
STW on impact are significantly larger (around 20% to 40%) when the shock is temporary than when it is
permanent.
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Chapter 3
Changing the Structure of Minimum
Wages:
Firm Adjustment and Wage
Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
The by now centennial history of minimum wages and their widespread application
across developed and developing countries has triggered a great deal of academic re-
search on the topic. Recent years have seen a burst of renewed interest in this topic in
both academic and policy settings around the world. In this paper, we study what hap-
pened to a range of economic outcomes when there was a substantive recent change in
the structure of a minimum wage setting policy. This occurred in the UK when a govern-
ment that had traditionally been hostile to minimum wages introduced an unexpected
and sizable increase for older workers by introducing a new minimum wage rate – the
National Living Wage (NLW). This new minimum wage rate for workers aged 25 and
over moved the number of minimum wages in operation in the UK labor market up from
four to five and, in doing so, structurally altered the minimum wage policy in operation
in the labor market.
We are interested in analyzing the consequences of this change in the UK minimum
wage structure on three big areas of research that have been traditionally explored in
the minimum wage literature. Firstly, wage and employment effects are studied in the
context of workers and firms in the UK care home sector, which has been argued to be
a good testing ground for evaluating minimum wage effects on employment in earlier
research (Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson, 2004). Secondly, we
exploit the change in minimum wage structure to study whether the UK National Living
Wage induced wage or employment spillovers onto workers under 25 as the minimum
wage setting process was altered. Thirdly, we explore the possibility that care homes
responded to the wage cost shock by altering other margins, such as prices, productivity
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and the quality of care services provided. In addition, we consider whether the policy
had implications for aggregate employment and firm dynamics (entry and exit). We do
so by leveraging the unique natural experiment offered by the UK policy setting, coupled
with rich matched employer-employee data including detailed information on individual
hourly wages for the English care home sector. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper in which wage and employment effects, wage spillovers and margins of
adjustment other than employment are studied in a unified framework.
To preview the key findings, the changed minimum wage structure and associated
higher minimum wage for those aged 25 and above significantly impacted on wages,
but there is much less evidence of adverse employment effects, and no significant impact
on firm closure nor on entry/exit dynamics more generally one year after. Rather the
margin of adjustment that was used was the quality of care services. Care homes bound
more tightly by the NLW exhibited smaller short run improvements in the quality of care
services than less-bound homes.
There is also strong evidence of wage spillovers resulting from the new structure of
minimum wages brought about by NLW introduction as younger workers’ wages rose in
tandem with the higher adult minimum wage, but with there being no spillover impact
on their employment. We discuss potential explanations for this pattern of spillovers,
including preferences for pay fairness and administrative simplicity. The evidence sug-
gests that employers’ – rather than workers’ – preferences for fairness play an important
role in within-firm wage setting policies in the sector that is studied.
The content of this paper relates to all of the three main streams along which the
minimum wage literature has evolved through time. Firstly, the primary focus of this
literature has been on the employment and unemployment effects of minimum wages.1
Secondly and partly in response to the fact that, in a number of settings, employment
effects have proven elusive to track down, a smaller but growing body of research has
examined other margins of adjustment by firms, such as prices, profits and firm value.2
Thirdly, another strand of the minimum wage literature has studied the impact on wage
inequality at the bottom of the distribution and at spillover effects up the wage distri-
bution.3 Thanks to a combination of rich data sources and a novel research setting, we
1Following an early and mostly US-based time-series work that found negative employment effects
among teenagers (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen, 1982), starting from the early 1990s quasi-experimental micro-
based studies found no evidence of disemployment effects in the US and the UK (Card and Krueger, 1994;
Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2003; Stewart, 2004). A recent revival of minimum wage research in the
US has adopted spatial identification strategies, also mostly finding it hard to detect evidence of job cuts
due to minimum wages (Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; Baskaya and Rubinstein, 2015; Dube, Lester, and
Reich, 2016; Clemens and Wither, 2019). In a rather different context of union bargained minima, Kreiner,
Reck, and Skov (2017) study the effect of a change in the youth minimum wage in Denmark and find an
employment elasticity to the wage rate of -0.8.
2On prices, see Aaronson (2001), MaCurdy (2015) or Harasztosi and Lindner (forthcoming); on profits,
see Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011); and on stock market values, see Bell and Machin (2018). Mul-
tiple adjustment channels are studied in Harasztosi and Lindner (forthcoming) and Hirsch, Kaufman, and
Zelenska (2015). Sorkin (2015) emphasizes the distinction between modes of adjustment in the short and
long run.
3See DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999) and Autor, Manning, and Smith (2016).
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contribute to this literature by providing a comprehensive assessment of the impact of
the NLW introduction on employment and other margins of firm adjustment, as well as
novel evidence on downward wage spillovers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 first illustrates the UK NLW
introduction and then describes the care home sector studied in the empirical work that
follows. Section 3.3 describes the data, together with some descriptive statistics and a
discussion of representativeness. Section 3.4 presents the main results of the impact of
the changed minimum wage structure on wages, employment and total hours. Section
3.5 illustrates the analysis of wage and employment spillovers, and Section 3.6 discusses
possible explanations for the observed pattern of results. Additional margins of adjust-
ments are considered in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Minimum Wages and the Care Home Sector
3.2.1 Minimum Wage Setting in the UK and the National Living Wage
In different settings around the world, national minimum wages have seen a burst of
renewed interest in recent years as political parties have recognized the popularity of
mandated wage floors with the general public.4 This has probably become more marked
in places where real wages have not been rising and where living standards have stag-
nated, as raising the minimum wage is a genuine policy lever that governments can use
to generate wage increases at the bottom end of the wage distribution.
In this paper we consider the economic effects of one such change. The context is the
introduction of the National Living Wage in the United Kingdom. Yet, the UK is not the
only country in which minimum wages have recently been high on the policy agenda.
Indeed, for example, Germany has introduced a national minimum wage at a high level,
and some big increases have been observed in parts of the United States.5
4A 2014 Gallup poll reported that 66 percent of respondents in the UK and 76 percent in the US were in
favor of minimum wage increases. According to another recent Gallup poll, in 2016, 56 percent of Americans
supported raising the national minimum wage from $7.25 to $15.00 per hour by 2020, 36 percent opposed
the idea and 7 percent had no opinion on the matter.
5 In January 2015, Germany introduced a national minimum wage of e8.50 an hour (approximately £6.40
at that time). Before then, wage rates were based on industry-level collective agreements negotiated by
trade unions and business representatives, which however led to an uneven application of wage minima
across sectors with more and less established trade unions. As of January 2017, the statutory minimum
has reached e8.84 (£7.60). In the Unites States, the Obama administration pushed for a substantial increase
in the federal minimum rate from $7.25 an hour to $10.10 an hour, motivated by the desire to boost wage
growth at the bottom of the wage distribution and by many US studies of minimum wages (cited above) in
which detrimental employment effects have proven elusive. The US federal minimum wage has remained
at $7.25 per hour since July 2009, but in 2015 cities such as Seattle and Los Angeles legislated measures
to progressively increase the minimum wage to $15.00 per hour in 2017 and 2020 respectively. For recent
research studying the big Seattle increase see Jardim et al. (2017) and on California see Reich, Allegretto, and
Montialoux (2017).
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The UK introduced a National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999. Prior to that,
there used to be industry-level wage floors – the Wage Councils – that were in force be-
tween 1909 and 1993, but that covered only approximately 12 percent of the workforce
at the time of their repeal. In the 1997 elections, the Labour Government committed to
introducing a national minimum wage and established the Low Pay Commission (LPC),
an independent advisory body set up by the National Minimum Wage Act in 1998. The
LPC is composed of nine members, of which three representatives of business organiza-
tions, three of employees and three of social partners (these include the Chair and two
academics). The LPC’s remit is set by the Government and requires that the LPC provide
evidence-based advice to the Government on minimum wage rates and uprates.6 The
body submits its recommendations to the Government, which can accept or reject them.
If accepted, the recommended uprating subsequently becomes effective.
In April 1999, a minimum hourly wage of £3.60 for workers aged 22 and over, and
a lower rate of £3.00 for workers aged between 18 and 21 were established. Additional
rates have been introduced for workers aged 16-17 in 2004 and for apprentices in 2010.
Additionally, in 2010 the adult wage group was expanded to workers aged 21. As of
October 2015, the NMW rates were as follows: an adult minimum rate of £6.70 for work-
ers aged 21 and over, a youth development rate of £5.30 for those aged 18-20, a youth
minimum of £3.87 for 16-17 year olds and an apprentice rate of £3.30.7
After winning the May 2015 election, the new Conservative Party government called
an emergency budget on July 8th 2015, in which the Chancellor George Osborne unex-
pectedly announced the introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW). This changed
the structure of minimum wages by introducing a new minimum wage rate of £7.20 an
hour for workers aged 25 or above, while leaving the minimum wage rates for younger
workers unchanged. Now there are five minimum wages, the NLW for workers aged 25
and over, the NMW for 21-24 year olds, the youth development rate for 18-20 year olds,
the young worker rate for 16 and 17 year old and the apprentice minimum wage. Addi-
tionally, the NLW was set to achieve a 2020 target of £9.00.8 The main justification for the
NLW introduction was to offset the sizable cuts in tax credits that were simultaneously
announced as part of the emergency budget but de facto did not take place. Figure 3.B1 in
Appendix 3.B shows the evolution of minimum wage rates since the NMW introduction
in 1999.
The NLW introduction was an unexpected and radical political intervention for var-
ious reasons. Firstly, it arises from a party that traditionally opposed minimum wages,
6The LPC assesses research and considers evidence from a wide set of sources, including academic re-
search, site visits around the country, and oral evidence taken from a broad range of stakeholders.
7The LPC’s recommendations have been almost always accepted by the UK government. The apprentice
rate has, however, twice been changed by the Government beyond the LPC recommendations: firstly in
2011, when the rate was increased by £0.05 even though the LPC recommended a freeze; secondly in 2015,
when the business secretary uprated the apprentice minimum by an additional £0.50, substantially pushing
it up from £2.73 in 2014 to £3.30 in 2015.
8The suggested target for 2020 is more precisely 60 percent of median earnings, which – at the time of the
announcement – was forecasted to be £9.00 by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility.
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especially at the time of the NMW introduction in April 1999. Admittedly, the stagnant
profile of real wages in the UK since the beginning of the crisis and the growing popu-
larity of minimum wages amongst the general public made political parties of different
views recognize that minimum wages can help raise wages and improve living stan-
dards, and generated a bipartisan call for a minimum wage increase. Secondly, the NLW
introduction generated a wage change much larger than recent uprates, namely an in-
crease of 10.8 percent at the time of announcement in July 2015 and of 7.5 percent when
made effective on April 1st 2016. As a result of the change, the number of workers cov-
ered by minimum wages (formally those paid at or below the relevant minimum and up
to £0.05 above) has grown from 1.6 million to 2.5 million in April 2016, and is expected to
reach 3.8 million by 2020. Finally, the intervention significantly modifies the role of the
LPC in providing future recommendations, given that it sets a target for 2020 and alters
the structure of minimum wage rates by establishing an additional age band.
Most importantly for our analysis, the unexpected and sizable wage shock generated
by the NLW introduction provides a unique “experiment” to study the wage and em-
ployment consequences of a change in the minimum wage structure.
3.2.2 The Residential Care Home Sector
We look at the impact of the NLW introduction on workers and firms operating in the res-
idential care home industry. Residential care refers to the provision of accommodation
and personal care to adults in a communal residential center, which may or may not pro-
vide nursing facilities. Members of staff in residential care homes are predominantly care
assistants, who provide 24-hour supervision, meals and help with personal care needs.
As has been detailed in the earlier research on the sector in the period surrounding
the NMW introduction (Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson, 2004),
the choice of looking at care homes as a good testing ground for studying the economic
effects of minimum wage floors is motivated by several reasons. Firstly, the sector is
highly vulnerable to changes in minimum wages, since it employs a large number of
low-paid workers. Of these, many are aged 25 and over, making the setting especially
suited to analyzing the NLW introduction. Secondly, the sector provides an example
of what could be closely considered a competitive labor market. It consists of a large
number of relatively small firms providing a rather homogeneous service. It is very labor
intensive and not unionized. Consequently, a minimum wage change is likely to have a
substantial impact on total costs, potentially affecting the economic outcomes of workers
and firms that are more affected. Thirdly, the sector is also interesting as residents fees
are regulated and paid for by local authorities. Indeed, even though approximately 75
percent of residential care places are owned and managed by private-sector firms, up to
60 percent of places are funded by local authorities at regulated prices (LaingBuisson,
2015). The inability to pass on higher costs in the form of higher prices increases the
likelihood of finding large employment effects from wage shocks. Fourth, focusing on
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the adult social care sector allows us to have good quality data on hourly wages, which
are necessary to answer well questions related to minimum wage changes.
Besides its pay and market structure, the residential care home sector is also interest-
ing from a socio-demographic perspective. The aging of the population is generating a
growing need of care services for the elderly. Yet, soaring staff costs coupled with tight
local authority budgets appear to be putting the care home industry at strain and might
have important consequences for access to social care.9
Although studying care workers raises concerns about sample selection issue and
related questions of generalizability to the UK workforce more widely, we believe our
estimates may be relevant for other low-pay sectors, such as hospitality and retail, where
minimum wage floors are likely to have the largest effects.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data Sources
The main data source that is used in the analysis is the National Minimum Dataset for
Social Care (NMDS-SC).10 This is an online system administered by Skills for Care and
funded by the Department of Health that collects information on the adult social care
workforce in England. Social care providers can use NMDS-SC to store and organize
efficiently information about their workers, such as payroll data, training and develop-
ment, job roles, qualifications and basic demographics. By having an account and up-
dating it regularly, providers can easily view and analyze their data, apply for training
and development funds, compare their staffing and compensation profile with that of
other providers locally, regionally or nationally, access publications about the social care
sector, access e-learning resources for free and directly share their data and returns with
governmental authorities such as the Care Quality Commission and the NHS. Access to
NMDS-SC is free of charge. However, access to services such as the Workforce Develop-
ment Fund is conditional on the account being updated yearly.
The dataset is a panel of matched employer-employee data. For each provider, we
have information on the industry and main service provided, service capacity and up-
take level, number of staff employed, geographic location and system update dates. For
workers, we have information on demographics (gender, age, nationality), job role, con-
tracted and additional weekly hours of work, hourly pay rate, date in which the hourly
pay is uprated and qualification. We have access to the snapshot of the NMDS-SC online
9For the years 2016/17, the Government allowed local authorities who provide social care to adults to
increase the council tax by up to 2 percent to fund adult social care only. Known as the “adult social care
precept”, this increase is in addition to the usual funding of adult social care through council tax. Of the 152
authorities with adult social care responsibilities (unitary authority districts, metropolitan boroughs, London
boroughs and county councils), 144 used some or all of the precept. The almost unanimous adoption of the
adult social care precepts leaves does not allow us to analyze whether the precept had any role in helping
care providers cope with the NLW introduction.
10NMDS-SC (2013).
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system at monthly frequency from September 2015 to March 2017, each snapshot includ-
ing all providers in the system at that date and the latest date in which they updated their
account.
A second source of information is the Care Quality Commission (CQC) registry. The
registry contains a complete record of all active English care providers regulated by CQC
at monthly frequency. It provides information on the activity status of businesses and
so can be utilized to identify when homes shut down and when new homes enter the
sector. Moreover, the registry includes firm-level ratings of the quality of care from the
inspection reports conducted by the CQC. The ratings – which will be described in more
detail in Section 3.7.3 – are an invaluable source of information to assess the effects of the
minimum wage increase on the quality of services provided.
3.3.2 Sample Design
Around 22,000 providers are registered with NMDS-SC as of March 2016. Of these, ap-
proximately 10,000 are residential care homes with or without nursing. We match the
sample of residential care homes with the CQC registry of active locations from Septem-
ber 2015 to March 2017, from which we can obtain information on whether a firm is active
or closed in a given month. Our sample comprises care homes that meet the following
three requirements: (i) being open in March 2016, (ii) having a record on NMDS-SC for
all the months in which the firm is open according to the CQC registry and (iii) having
updated their NMDS-SC account at least once after March 2016. In order to avoid sample
selection driven by unobservable worker and firm characteristics that may be correlated
with the timing and frequency of updating, we do not condition our sample on a specific
update date and only require that a firm update its records once in the twelve months
after April 1st 2016.11 This selection leaves us with a balanced panel of 4,134 firms that
are active in March 2016 and remain open until March 2017.12
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the balanced sample of firms from one month
before the NLW introduction that took place in April 2016 to three, six and twelve months
after. The relatively low hourly pay and large fraction of workers aged 25 and over in
the pre-NLW data confirm the high vulnerability of the care home sector to the NLW
introduction, which therefore appears particularly pertinent to study the impact of the
NLW as it potentially affected a large proportion of workers.
11Approximately 90 percent of NMDS-SC users update within a year.
12According to the 2017 report on the care home market of the Competition and Markets Authority (2017),
there are approximately 9,500 care homes in England. This implies that our sample represents approximately
43 percent of the market for care homes.
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The statistics reported in Table 3.1 also show that the care home sector is character-
ized by small-to-medium size establishments working close to full capacity (the occu-
pancy rate measured as the ratio of residents to beds is above 90 percent). Mean and
median employment are approximately 39 and 32 respectively. The workforce is pre-
dominantly female (84 percent), on average older than 40 and working approximately 29
hours per week. The main occupation in this sector is care assistant, which accounts for
56 percent of the workforce. Only 4 percent of the workers hold a nursing qualification.
All these characteristics remain fairly constant before and after April 2017, suggesting
that the NLW did not induce a compositional change in the productive structure of care
homes.
3.3.4 Representativeness
It is important to assess the representativeness of our sample as compared to the full
population of care homes and their workforce. Estimates from Skills for Care indicate that
the NMDS-SC data cover more than 50 percent of the workforce in CQC regulated homes,
suggesting that the system might provide a good representation of the sector in England.
We also compare the characteristics of our sample with statistics on firms and workers
in the care home sector that we derive from the ONS Business Registry and the Labour
Force Survey. According to the 2016 ONS Business Registry, firms in the residential care
industry for the elderly and disabled have an average firm size that matches the one in
our sample (approximately 37 on ONS). Similarly, looking at baseline characteristics for
carers in the LFS for the first quarter of 2016, we find that they line up quite satisfactorily
with those in our sample of workers, as in the LFS the proportion of female carers is
0.85, average age 42, average hourly wage £7.77 and average weekly hours worked 34.
Overall, these statistics are reassuring of our ability to draw any general conclusions from
the analysis of the data we undertake.
3.4 Wages and Employment Impacts of National Living Wage
Introduction
3.4.1 Wages Impact
As previously noted, the residential care home sector appears to be potentially vulnera-
ble to the NLW introduction given its wage structure and workforce’s age composition.
In this section we confirm that the NLW had real “bite” in the care home sector and
generated the expected effects on hourly wages and their distribution. This is clearly a
necessary condition before analyzing the employment and other economic consequences
of minimum wages.
Table 3.2 reports measures of the bite of the NLW. Specifically, these are the propor-
tion of workers paid less than the NLW (or less than the age-specific NMW if younger
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than 25), the percentage paid exactly at the minimum and the wage gap. The latter is a
measure of how much wages would have to increase in a given firm in order to meet the
new legal requirements and is computed as follows:
GAPj =
∑i hij max{Wminij −Wij , 0}
∑i hijWij
(3.1)
where hij is weekly hours worked by worker i in firm j, Wij is the hourly wage of worker
i in firm j and Wminij is the new age-specific minimum wage (i.e. £3.87 for workers aged
16-17, £5.30 for workers aged 18-20, £6.70 for workers aged 21-24 and £7.20 for older
workers). As before, pre- and post-NLW statistics are reported for care homes in the
balanced panel.
The residential care sector has clear potential to be heavily affected by the NLW.
Around 55 percent of workers aged 25 and over, who would be legally affected by the
NLW, were paid below the NLW before it was introduced and only 3 percent were paid
exactly at £7.20. Given the small proportion of young workers, similar figures are found
for the whole sample of workers (51 and 3 percent respectively). The NLW wage gap
averaged 4 percent before the NLW introduction.
Results in Table 3.2 also demonstrate that the NLW strongly affected care home wages.
The post-NLW data show a larger drop in underpayment over time (of 16, 18 and 29 per-
centage points after three, six and twelve months respectively), a halving of the wage
gap and a noticeable spike of up to 20 percent at the new minimum. A substantial dis-
tributional impact of the NLW on wages can also be seen by looking at Figure 3.1, which
plots the hourly wage distribution for care assistants one month before and three, six and
twelve months after the NLW introduction. The charts provide compelling evidence of
the sizable compression effect the NLW had at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution
and the emergence of a sharp spike at the new minimum after its introduction. Among
care assistants, the spike reached 20 percent in June 2016, 26 percent in September 2016
and 30 percent by March 2017.13
Having established a strong impact of the minimum wage on wages in the care home
industry, we now show that homes with the highest potential to be affected were indeed
the most affected. To this end, we estimate hourly wage change equations of the follow-
ing form:
∆q ln Wj,t = α1,t + β1,t ·MINj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ1,t + ε j,t (3.2)
where ∆q ln Wj,t is the quarter-on-quarter change in the logarithm of the average hourly
wage in firm j between quarter t and quarter t − 1; MINj,Mar2016 is a measure of the
13Figure 3.B2 in Appendix 3.Breplicates Figure 3.1 for a subsample of workers whose wages were updated
within given time windows. Specifically, the top left panel includes workers with wage updates between Oc-
tober 2015 and March 2016, the top right panel between April and June 2016, the bottom left panel between
April and September 2016, and the bottom right panel between April 2016 and March 2017. The histograms
show a spectacular spike at £6.70 in the pre-NLW period, and an even larger, sharper spike of around 40
percent at the new minimum in the post-NLW period.
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NLW bite at the care home level, that is either the initial proportion of workers paid
below the NLW or the NLW wage gap; X is a vector of pre-NLW firm-level characteristics
measured in March 2016, including the proportion of female workers, the average age,
the proportion working as care assistants, the proportion with nursing qualification, the
occupancy rate and a set of indicators for the nine English regions; ε is a disturbance
term.14
The parameter of interest is β1,t for t = 1, . . . , 4, which measures the relationship
between wage growth and the minimum wage bite in the post-NLW period. The param-
eter is identified from between-home variation in pre-NLW wage levels and it therefore
identifies the causal effect of the minimum wage on wage growth only if – absent the
minimum wage change – there was no relationship between the initial level of wages
and wage growth. The coefficients β1,t for t = −4, . . . , 0 are treatment leads and provide
an easy way to test whether there is any correlation between wage growth and the NLW
bite prior to the NLW introduction. In other words, the leads allow to test whether there
were divergent trends in wage growth between firms more and less exposed to the mini-
mum wage increase before the policy change. This is equivalent to testing for the parallel
trends assumption in a traditional difference-in-differences setting.
To document the evolution of the relationship between the NLW bite and wage growth
in the post-reform quarters, we measure the outcome variable ∆q ln Wj,t as the long differ-
ence between March 2016 and, respectively, June 2016, September 2016, December 2016
and March 2017.
The coefficient estimates for model (3.2) are plotted in Panels A and B of Figure 3.2,
where MINj,Mar2016 corresponds, respectively, to the proportion of low-paid workers and
the wage gap. Both graphs report the estimated coefficients for the balanced panel of
firms that are active throughout all months between September 2015 and March 2017
(hollow circles), and for the panel of firms in our main sample (black circles). The vertical
capped bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.
Firstly, the results provide compelling evidence of the causal effect of the minimum wage
change on wage growth. Secondly, the graphs reveal that our measures of the NLW bite
are sufficiently exogenous since they display little if any correlation with wage growth
prior to the NLW introduction.15
Table 3.3 reports estimates of the wage equations in model (3.2) for the balanced panel
of firms in our main sample. Panel A uses to ∆q ln Wj,t between March 2016 and June 2016,
Panel B between March 2016 and September 2016, and Panel C between March 2016 and
March 2017. For each of the three panels, the specifications in columns (1) and (2) report
the estimated coefficient β1 for a model in which MIN is the pre-NLW proportion of
14Data on the gender and age composition, and on the occupancy rate is missing for some firms. Such
missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
15There is little if any association between the low-pay proportion and wage growth, and only some small
association between the wage gap and wage growth in the pre-NLW period. However, both appear negligi-
ble compared to the marked shift in the post-NLW period.
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workers paid below the NLW (or their age-specific NMW if less than 25 years old), while
columns (3) and (4) for a model using the wage gap as main regressor. The regression
models in columns (2) and (4) include the above-listed firm-level controls.
In all cases there is significant evidence of larger increases in wages in homes with
more low-wage workers in the pre-NLW period, as measured by the low-wage propor-
tion or the wage gap. According to the regression estimates in Panel C, a one standard
deviation increase in the proportion of low-paid workers (corresponding to a 33 percent-
age point change) implies a 1.6 percentage-point faster wage growth on a baseline of 4
percent. A similar effect of 1.6 percentage point faster wage growth is found as a result
of a one standard deviation increase in the wage gap (corresponding to a 4 percentage
point change). Both effects are sizable and establish a strong and significant relationship
between minimum wages and wage growth. We find comparable results when looking
at weekly earnings growth as shown in Table 3.C1 in Appendix 3.C.16
3.4.2 Employment Impact
Having established that the NLW had important wage and wage structure effects, we
next consider a “second stage” of whether or not the wage cost shock induced by the
NLW had consequences on employment and total hours. We start by estimating reduced-
form employment and total hours change equations similar to the wage equations illus-
trated in the previous subsection. Specifically, we regress the change in the logarithm of
the number of employees and of total weekly hours (∆q ln Yj,t) on measures of the NLW
bite, as follows:
∆q ln Yj,t = α2,t + β2,t ·MINj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ2,t + νj,t (3.3)
where MIN and X are defined as before, and ν is a disturbance term. Similar to the
wage equations, in the post-treatment period we measure the outcome variable ∆q ln Yj,t
as the long difference between March 2016 and, respectively, June 2016, September 2016,
December 2016 and March 2017 in the post-NLW quarters.
Similarly to the wage equation, the identifying assumption for β2 is that – absent the
minimum wage increase – there would be no relationship between initial wages and em-
ployment (or total hour) growth. Panels A and B of Figure 3.3 show the estimated β2,t
for t = −4, . . . , 4 from model (3.3) using employment growth as an outcome, and using
the proportion of low-paid workers and the wage gap as main regressors respectively.
Panels A and B of Figure 3.4 report similar results for total hours growth. Each graph
reports the estimated coefficients for the balanced panel of firms that are active through-
out all months between September 2015 and March 2017, and for the panel of firms in
16The coefficients reported in Columns (1) to (4) in the three panels of Table 3.C1 in Appendix 3.C closely
match those obtained for hourly wages, suggesting that the wage elasticity of weekly earnings is approx-
imately one. This is indeed what we find in columns (5) and (6) where we estimate the structural form
equation described in Section 3.4.2.
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our main sample. The correlation between MIN and employment (total hours) growth
is very small and statistically insignificant (or at the margins of statistical significance) in
the quarters preceding the NLW introduction. The only exception is a statistically signif-
icant, albeit small, negative correlation in the quarter before the policy change.17 All in
all, we take these results as evidence that model (3.3)’s identifying assumption appears
to be supported by the data.
Columns (1) to (4) of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the regression estimates of the key
parameter of interest β2 for employment and total hours respectively. The estimates re-
ported in column (2) of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in the proportion of low-paid workers reduces employment growth by 0.6 percentage
points from a baseline of 1.4 percent, and reduces total hours growth by 0.3 percentage
points from a baseline of 2.1 percent. As for the wage gap, columns (4) of Tables 3.4 and
3.5 show that a one standard deviation increase in the wage gap reduces employment and
total hours growth by 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points respectively. However, none of the
estimates is significantly different from zero despite being rather precisely estimated.18
We further investigate the employment and hours consequences of the NLW intro-
duction by estimating a structural model of labor demand of the following form:
∆q ln Yj,t = α3,t + β3,t · ∆q ln Wj,t + X′j,Mar2016 · γ3,t + ηj,t (3.4)
where all variables are as previously defined. The parameter β3 measures the wage elas-
ticity of labor demand and is estimated by instrumenting the change in the logarithm of
the average wage ∆q ln Wj,t using MINj,Mar2016 as instrumental variable. The wage equa-
tions illustrated in the previous section can be therefore considered as the first stage of
this instrumental variable model and show that the instrument is relevant. To be valid,
an instrument should also satisfy the exclusion restriction and be as good as randomly
assigned, i.e. our measures of the NLW bite should only affect the outcome through their
impact on wage growth and be uncorrelated with any other proximate determinant of
employment or total hours growth. Although neither of these two assumptions can be
formally tested, the evidence in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 seems to support the validity of
our instruments.
Estimates of the structural elasticities are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Tables
3.4 and 3.5, using the initial proportion of low paid and the wage gap as instruments
17A possible interpretation of the negative correlation in March 2016 is that care homes take actions to
decrease employment in anticipation of the NLW introduction. However, if we measure the variable MIN
in December 2015 (or September 2015), the March-2016 dip disappears – in spite of a 95 (91) percent cor-
relation in the MIN variable across quarters. This result suggests that the March 2016 dip is likely due to
idiosyncratic negative shocks affecting high-MIN homes rather than anticipation effects.
18Results reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 refer to the period between March 2016 and March 2017. Tables
3.C2 and 3.C3 in Appendix 3.C report the coefficient estimates for the periods between March and June 2016,
and March and September 2016.
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for the wage change respectively.19 The estimated wage elasticity of employment ranges
between -0.23 and -0.41 (Table 3.4), while that of hours is between -0.21 and -0.44 (Table
3.5). Evaluated at an average wage growth of approximately 4 percent, these elastici-
ties indicate that headcount employment would drop by 0.9-1.6 percent and total hours
by 0.8-1.8 percent. The estimated employment and total hours elasticities are modest,
but relatively large compared to many of the estimates in the recent minimum wage lit-
erature. However, none of the structural elasticities nor the reduced-form estimates is
significantly different from zero, leading to the conclusion that there is no clear evidence
of detrimental employment, nor hours effects, of the NLW introduction.20,21
3.5 Wage and Employment Spillovers
3.5.1 Wage Spillovers Down the Wage Distribution
The NLW increased the minimum wage for workers aged 25 and over to £7.20 per hour,
but left the minimum wage rate for workers aged 21-24 at the October 2015 level of £6.70
per hour. It is an interesting question, then, whether care homes left wages for workers
under 25 unchanged at the old NMW, or whether they decided to also raise them, perhaps
for reasons of administrative simplicity or inequality aversion within the firm.
In this subsection, we provide compelling graphical evidence that it is indeed the case
that the NLW generated positive spillover effects on the wages of younger cohorts. Figure
3.5 shows the evolution of the hourly wage distribution for care assistants aged under 25
from one month before to twelve months after the NLW introduction.22 Strikingly, we
observe a spectacular spike located at the new adult minimum after April 2016, and a
strong wage compression in the bottom half of the distribution. Both the location and
size of the spike, and the amount of bottom wage compression are analogous to what we
found for the entire sample of care assistants over all age groups. According to Figure
3.5, while 20 percent of care assistants aged under 25 were paid at the NMW in March
2016; up to 28 percent of younger workers are at the new NLW after its introduction.
19In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, both the dependent variable and the main regressor are computed as the change
between March 2016 and March 2017. Tables 3.C2 and 3.C3 in Appendix 3.C report estimates for the period
between March and June 2016 in Panel A, and between March 2016 and September 2016 in Panel B.
20In order to check that our results are not driven by the lack of updating by firms, we estimate the wage,
employment and total hours equations on the subsample of firms that updated the wages of at least 50
percent of their workers in the period between October 2015 and March 2016, and in the period after March
2016. All results hold in this subsample and are available upon request.
21The absence of employment effects could in fact mask changes in the composition of the workforce, for
a given level of employment. We find no evidence of differential levels of inflows, outflows and total flows
as a consequence of the NLW introduction, which leads us to exclude the presence of such compositional
changes.
22Figure 3.B3 in Appendix 3.B reproduces the same graphs on the subsample of care assistants whose
hourly wages were updated between October 2015 and March 2016 (top left panel), between April 2016 and
June 2016 (top right panel), between April 2016 and September 2016 (bottom left panel), and between April
2016 and March 2017 (bottom right panel).
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We complement the graphical analysis illustrated above by performing some regres-
sion analysis of spillover effects on wages. Firstly, we run a simple reduced-form model
of the growth rate of hourly wages for workers under 25 as a function of measures of the
NLW bite for older workers. The reduced-form model reads as follows:
∆q ln WYj,t = α4,t + β4,t ·MINOj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ4,t + θj,t (3.5)
where ∆q ln WYj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of the average wage of workers
under 25 in firm j between March 2016 and three, six or twelve months after; MINOj,Mar2016
indicates alternatively the initial proportion of workers aged 25 and over that are paid
below the NLW, or the NLW wage gap for older workers; X is the vector of pre-NLW
firm-level characteristics that we described in our previous analyses. The reduced-form
estimates of β4,t for t = 4 are reported in columns (1) to (4) of Table 3.6.23
We also perform a structural estimation of the cross wage elasticity between wages of
younger workers and adult workers. In the structural estimation, we regress the change
in log average wages for younger workers ∆q ln WYj,t on the change in log average wages
for older workers ∆q ln WOj,t, and we instrument the latter using MIN
O
j,Mar2016 as instru-
mental variable. The structural model reads as follows:
∆q ln WYj,t = α5,t + β5,t · ∆q ln WOj,t + X′j,Mar2016 · γ5,t + ιj,t (3.6)
Estimates of the structural cross elasticity parameter β5 are reported in columns (5)
and (6) of Table 3.6, where we respectively use the proportion of low paid workers among
those aged 25 and over, and the wage gap for older workers as instruments. The first
stage regression coefficients are reported in Table 3.C4 in Appendix 3.C.
All the estimates in Table 3.6 indicate significantly positive spillovers on the hourly
wages of younger workers and cross elasticities of approximately 0.7. According to
columns (2) and (4) of Panel C, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of
older workers paid below the NLW or in the adult wage gap (corresponding respectively
to 34 and 4 percentage points in the estimation sample) are associated with a 1.3 and
1.2 percentage point faster wage growth for younger workers, on a baseline youth wage
growth of 4.1 percent. Cross-elasticity estimates indicate that a one percent increase in
average adult wages induces a 0.7 percent increase in average youth wages.24, 25
23Panels A and B of Figure 3.B4 in Appendix 3.B provide compelling evidence that wage spillovers are
driven by the NLW introduction, as no systematic correlation between measures of the NLW bite among
older workers and wage growth among younger workers can be detected prior to the NLW introduction.
24We also investigated whether the size of wage spillovers changes with the bite of the NLW on older
workers. There was no evidence of statistically significant differential effects between firms with a propor-
tion of low-paid older workers above and below the mean in the sample (and similarly for firms with an
NLW gap for older workers above and below the mean in the sample).
25We also consider spillover effects on weekly earnings. As reported in Table 3.C5 in Appendix 3.C, the
coefficients are not as precisely estimated as those of the wage spillover equations, except for those in Panel
C that are highly statistically significant. Nonetheless, in none of the estimates in columns (5) and (6) we can
reject a coefficient magnitude comparable to the corresponding effect in Table 3.6.
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3.5.2 Employment and Total Hours Spillovers
Having documented significant and positive spillovers on wages that resulted from the
changed minimum wage structure, we also test for the presence of spillover effects on
employment and total hours for workers under 25. Indeed, firms might be induced to
raise wages of younger workers for reasons of fairness or administrative simplicity, but
at the same time may reduce youth employment along the intensive or extensive margin
if youth productivity is lower than the uprated wage.
We adopt a methodology similar to the one used to investigate wage spillovers, re-
gressing the change in the share of total employment aged under 25 and the change in the
share of total hours worked by workers under 25 (∆q ln YYj,t) on (i) measures of the NLW
bite amongst workers aged 25 and over (MINOj,Mar2016), and (ii) ∆
q ln WOj,t instrumented
using MINOj,Mar2016. Reduced-form estimates of employment and total hours spillovers
are reported in columns (1) to (4) of Tables 3.7 and 3.8, while structural cross wage elas-
ticities of demand are reported in columns (5) and (6).26 Overall we find no statistically
significant evidence of negative spillovers at the extensive and the intensive margins of
employment, suggesting that the residential care home sector has so far coped with the
NLW introduction since it managed to raise wages of legally unaffected workers without
reducing employment.27
3.6 Reasons for Wage Spillovers
3.6.1 Wage Spillovers in the Domiciliary Care Sector
In this and the next subsection, we investigate potential explanations of why the wage
spillovers that we uncovered in the previous analysis may have come about. A first ob-
vious candidate for explaining why we observe positive spillovers on younger workers
is that either workers or firms are concerned with the fairness of the within-home wage
structure and prefer that workers doing the same job receive the same wage, even though
some of them may be more productive. There is considerable evidence for such prefer-
ences for fairness in the minimum wage literature. Survey data on fast food restaurants
in Texas and administrative data on the retail sector in Finland indicate that employers
have been reluctant to apply youth sub-minima (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Böckerman and
Uusitalo, 2009), and laboratory experiments have shown that minimum wage increases
26Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report estimates for the period between March 2016 and March 2017. Estimates for the
periods between March and June 2016, and March and September 2016 can be found in Tables 3.C6 and 3.C7
in Appendix 3.C.
27The lack of spillovers on employment could in fact mask a change in the composition of the younger
workforce, for a given proportion of employees aged under 25. An analysis of inflows, outflows and total
flows of younger workers indicated that – if anything – firms that had the larger wage spillovers experi-
enced lower levels of churning amongst the younger segments of their workforce, thus excluding significant
compositional changes in response to the wage cost shock.
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generate entitlement effects and change workers’ perceptions of what a fair wage is (Falk,
Zehnder, and Fehr, 2006).
It seems plausible that if workers’ preferences for “equal pay for equal job” were en-
tirely responsible for the emergence of wage spillover effects, the latter should be stronger
for employees working in team or with direct sight of their colleagues while working. In
order to test whether spillover effects are driven by workers’ as opposed to employers’
equity concerns, we replicate our analysis of spillover effects in the domiciliary care sec-
tor for which we have data on NMDS-SC.
Domiciliary care is a social care service provided to people who live in their own
houses and require assistance with personal care routines, household tasks such as clean-
ing and cooking, or any other activities they may need to live independently. Domiciliary
care assistants typically work individually, drive their own car to visit customers’ homes,
and are often contracted on flexible working hours or zero hours contracts since domicil-
iary care work tends to be organized into short and fragmented home visits. Given the
nature and organization of work, workers employed by domiciliary care agencies tend
to have limited face-to-face interactions with co-workers on the job and are unlikely to be
fully aware of their working conditions. If downward wage spillovers were entirely due
to workers’ fairness preferences, we would expect them to be milder in the domiciliary
care sector than the care homes one, ceteris paribus.
The summary statistics reported in Table 3.9 illustrate the main differences between
firms and workers in the care home and domiciliary care sectors.28 While the gender and
age composition is essentially identical across the two sectors, and wage differentials are
relatively limited, working arrangements diverge strikingly. The incidence of zero hours
contracts is nine times as large in the domiciliary care sector when considering workers
of all ages and five times as large for workers aged under 25. Similarly the proportion
of workers on alternative work arrangements, i.e. employed with temporary, bank or
agency contracts, is almost twice as large in the domiciliary care sector (14 against 8 per-
cent). These substantial differences corroborate the notion that domiciliary care work
schedules are inherently fragmented as the nature of the job would suggest.
We replicate the analysis of wage spillover effects on the sample of domiciliary carers.
Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the hourly wage distribution for domiciliary carers
aged under 25 from one month before to twelve months after the NLW introduction.29
The similarity with the patters observed for care assistants in the care home sector is
striking. A large spike at the new minimum and a strong wage compression in the bottom
half of the wage distribution clearly emerge after April 2016. The size of the spike is in
line with the one found for care assistants aged under 25, with approximately 24 percent
28The sample of care homes is the one used in the previous analysis, while the sample of domiciliary care
agencies is selected following the same criteria used to select the sample of care homes.
29Figure 3.B5 in Appendix 3.B reproduces the same graph on the subsample of domiciliary carers whose
hourly wages were updated between October 2015 and March 2016 (top left panel), between April 2016 and
June 2016 (top right panel), between April 2016 and September 2016 (bottom left panel), and between April
2016 and March 2017 (bottom right panel).
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of young domiciliary carers being paid exactly £7.20 as of March 2017. We also estimate
empirical models (3.5) and (3.6) on the domiciliary care sample. Results are reported in
Table 3.10. None of the structural cross elasticities reported in columns (5) and (6) of
Panels A, B and C is statistically different from one, indicating that wages for younger
workers increased one for one with wages of adult workers.30, 31
Therefore, in spite of the remarkably different working arrangements documented
above, domiciliary care workers experience wage spillovers very similar in magnitude to
those we identified in the care home industry. We interpret this evidence as supportive
of the fact that team dynamics and worker-specific preferences for fairness are not key
drivers of downward minimum wage spillovers.32
3.6.2 Evidence on the “Fairness” Hypothesis
The evidence presented in the previous subsection seems to exclude a strong role for
workers’ preferences alone in within-firm wage setting. Two additional theories could
explain the emergence of downward wage spillovers. The first is fairness concerns and
inequality aversion by employers. The second is administrative simplicity, whereby em-
ployers try to minimize the costs of managing a diverse wage structure and of individual-
level bargaining. While we cannot formally test which of these two alternative theories
has the largest bearing, in this section we discuss evidence we gathered from a survey of
care homes that seems to support the “fairness hypothesis”.
For an earlier project funded by the Low Pay Commission, we ran a survey of En-
glish care homes. We obtained information on all care homes in England from the CQC
directory and sent questionnaires to all homes in January and February 2016 for the pre-
NLW part of the survey, and in late June, August and November 2016 for the post-NLW
part of the survey. We obtained a total of 1390 responses in the pre-NLW survey and of
827 responses in the post-NLW survey that were provided by the owner manager of the
care homes.33 In both the pre- and post-NLW surveys, we asked respondents about their
views on the level of the NLW. Table 3.C12 in Appendix 3.C reports answers to this ques-
tion by firms in the balanced panel, splitting the sample between firms with a pre-NLW
low-paid proportion above and below the median. Before the NLW introduction, 41.2
percent of firms with above-median low-paid proportions believed that the level of the
30Table 3.C8 in Appendix 3.C reports the coefficient estimates of the wage equations in the sample of
domiciliary care agencies. Results in columns (1) and (2) of Panels A, B and C are very much in line with
those reported in Table 3.3 for the sample of care homes. Results in columns (3) and (4) are instead smaller in
magnitude and less precisely estimated. Given the high incidence of zero hours contracts in the domiciliary
care sector, the NLW gap appears less appropriate as a measure of the NLW bite in this context as opposed
to the care home one.
31The first-stage coefficients for the wage spillover equations in the domiciliary care sector are reported in
Table 3.C9 in Appendix 3.C.
32For the sake of completeness, we also investigate employment and total hours spillovers in the domicil-
iary care sector in Tables 3.C10 and 3.C11 in Appendix 3.C. None of the estimated coefficients is statistically
significantly different from zero.
33More information on the survey of care homes is available upon request.
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NLW was about right, 16.0 percent too low and 42.8 percent too high. Interestingly, after
the implementation of the new wage floor, those same respondents appear to be much
more favorable to the minimum wage floor, with 55.1 percent considering it about right,
26.3 percent too low and only 18.6 percent too high. Such shift in preferences turns out to
be more pronounced for firms with low-paid proportions above than below the median,
lending further support to the employer’s fairness hypothesis.34 In the post-NLW sur-
vey we asked respondents to leave a verbal comment about what they believed would
be the impact of the NLW on their business. While it is not uncommon for respondents
to state that it is fair for a worker to earn a “living wage”, none of the replies refers to
administrative simplicity and bargaining costs.
We perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation and estimate what the average coun-
terfactual savings from paying all care assistants their age-specific minima would be. It
turns out that, if all care assistants were paid their minimum wage, the total wage bill
would decrease by 2.6-2.9 percent.35 The same figure would drop to 1.2-1.3 percent if
only care assistant under 25 were paid their age-specific minima. For a labor share of
total costs of approximately 60 percent and assuming no scope for efficiency wages, we
conclude that after the NLW introduction employers have been willing to take a profit
hit of up to 1.7 percent – above and beyond the 2.4 percent needed to meet the NLW
requirements – when raising wages above the legal minimum.36
3.7 Other Margins of Adjustment
Given the lack of evidence of employment effects in spite of significant wage increases for
both legally affected and unaffected workers, this section explores whether the minimum
wage increase had an impact on outcomes other than employment and total hours. It is
possible that firms respond to the wage cost shock by adjusting other margins, such as
prices, profits, productivity and the quality of care services. We consider these outcomes
in the following subsections.
3.7.1 Price Setting and Resident Intake
In theory, the lack of evidence of employment responses could be explained by the ability
to pass minimum wage increases onto consumers in the form of higher prices. In practice,
though, this is unlikely to happen since residential care fees are, in the majority of cases,
regulated by local authorities. Even though private for-profit companies dominate the
34See Table 3.C12 in Appendix 3.C for results on the group of firms with low-paid proportions below the
median.
35The age specific minima are the NLW of £7.20 for those aged 25 and over, the NMW for those under 25,
a youth development rate of £5.30 for those aged 18-20, a youth minimum of £3.87 for 16-17 year olds and
an apprentice rate of £3.30.
36We obtain an estimate of the labor share of total costs from our post-NLW survey, where we ask the
question “Approximately what percentage of your total costs are labor costs?”.
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care home industry, a large fraction of their residents are funded by local authorities.37
According to LaingBuisson, 60 percent of residential care home places were funded by
local authorities in 2014, making local authorities the largest purchaser of adult social
care services. Limited by tight budgets, local authorities have kept fee levels low, leading
to an average 5 percent reduction in real fee rates over the period 2010 to 2016 (Laing-
Buisson (2015)). Analyses based on our survey of care homes – where we collected data
on minimum and maximum weekly prices – do not provide significant evidence of larger
price increases in firms where the NLW introduction bit harder, as the presence of price
regulations would suggest.38
Firms’ limited ability to change prices may lead them to alter the care mix that they
provide by decreasing the proportion of residents paid for by the local authority or by
increasing the share of relatively more expensive services, for a given level of prices.
While we do not have information on the mix of residents in the NMDS-SC data, we
collected information on the proportion of residents funded by the local authority and
the proportion requiring specialist care in our survey of care homes. Estimates based on
the survey data do not point to significant changes in the proportion of local authority
funded residents, but are suggestive, albeit at the margins of statistical significance, of an
increase in the proportion of residents requiring specialist care.39
3.7.2 Productivity
A margin that firms may try to improve in response to the increase in costs is productivity.
In order to explore this hypothesis, we construct a measure of productivity as the loga-
rithm of residents per worker hour. We regress the change in productivity against mea-
sures of the NLW bite and the change in the logarithm of average wages appropriately
instrumented. According to the estimates reported in Table 3.11, there is no evidence of
larger productivity improvements by those firms that were more heavily affected by the
NLW introduction.40
37According to Jarret (2018), in 2014 private sector residential care places reached 74 percent of all places,
followed by voluntary sector (18 percent) and local authority places (8 percent). The role of the private
sector was even more prominent in care homes with nursing, where it had 86 percent of all places, while the
voluntary sector 8 percent and the public sector the remaining 6 percent. The data refer to the UK. In our
sample, 82 percent of homes are private sector for-profit companies, 14 percent are voluntary and 0.6 percent
local authority (the remaining 3.4 percent being classified as “Other”).
38Results available upon request.
39Results available upon request.
40Results in Table 3.11 refer to the period between March 2016 and March 2017. Analogous results for the
periods between March and June, and March and September 2016 are reported in Table 3.C14 in Appendix
3.C.
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3.7.3 Quality of Care Services
Another possibility is that firms respond to the cost shock by reducing the quality of care
services provided. We have information on the quality of care from the inspection re-
ports conducted by the CQC. The CQC is the independent regulator of health and adult
social care in England. It is responsible for setting standards of care and for monitoring,
inspecting and rating adult social care providers, to make sure that they meet fundamen-
tal standards of quality and safety. At the heart of CQC’s regulatory activity, the rating
process is based on periodic inspections of care providers followed by the publication of
reports showing the evaluation of the quality of care. The ratings are articulated into five
key lines of enquiry and an overall judgement. The five lines of enquiry ask if the ser-
vice is safe, effective, caring, responsive to people’s needs and well-led, while the overall
judgement is an aggregation of these five dimensions.41 The rating can be “outstanding”,
“good”, “requires improvement” or “inadequate”.42
We have access to the most recent firm-level CQC ratings as of March 2016 and March
2017, and can link them to observations in the NMDS-SC database. Of the 2480 homes
that we could match, 931 had been inspected and rated before and after the NLW intro-
duction.43 Figure 3.B6 in Appendix 3.B displays the distribution of ratings by key line
of enquiry as of March 2016 for the full sample (Panel A) and for the subsample of firms
with ratings both before and after March 2016 (Panel B). In a similar fashion, Panels A and
B of Figure 3.B7 in Appendix 3.B show the distribution of the change in ratings between
March 2016 and March 2017 for the two samples. Ratings tend to be concentrated in the
mid-range categories, with approximately 65 percent of homes providing a good overall
service and 35 percent requiring improvement as of March 2016 (Panel A of Figure 3.B6).
The subgroup of firms that were inspected both before and after March 2016 tend to have
poorer performances across all lines of enquiry (Panel B of Figure 3.B6), suggesting that
performance and the frequency of inspections might be negatively correlated. Ratings
vary upward or downward between March 2016 and March 2017 for approximately 50
percent of the sample inspected in both periods (Panel B of Figure 3.B7).
41The key lines of enquiry are specified as follows. Safe: residents are protected from abuse and avoidable
harm. Effective: care, treatment and support achieves good outcomes, helps residents maintain quality of
life and is based on the best available evidence. Caring: staff involve and treat residents with compassion,
kindness, dignity and respect. Responsive: services are organized so that they meet the resident’s needs.
Well-led: the leadership, management and governance of the organization make sure it is providing high-
quality care that is based around the resident’s individual needs, it encourages learning and innovation, and
it promotes an open and fair culture. Further details can be found at http://www.cqc.org.uk/what-we-do/
how-we-do-our-job/five-key-questions-we-ask.
42Outstanding: the service is performing exceptionally well. Good: the service is performing well and meet-
ing CQC’s expectations. Requires improvement: the service is not performing as well as it should and has been
told that it must improve. Inadequate: the service is performing badly and CQC has taken action against
the person or organization that runs it. Further details can be found at www.cqc.org.uk/what-we-do/
how-we-do-our-job/ratings.
43Estimates of the wage equations, employment and hours equations and wage spillover equations all
hold in this subsample and are available upon request.
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We investigate whether the NLW introduction caused a change in the quality of care
services by running regression models similar to equations (4) and (5), where – for each
line of enquiry – we regress the change in rating between March 2016 and March 2017
against measures of the NLW bite (MINj,Mar2016) and against the change in the logarithm
of the average wage (∆q ln Wj,t) instrumented with MINj,Mar2016. As pointed out before,
care homes with lower initial ratings are more likely to be inspected in the post-NLW pe-
riod, i.e. are more likely to experience a change in ratings. If initial ratings are correlated
with the initial level of wages and, in turn, with the bite of the NLW, our estimates of
the causal effect of the NLW on the quality of care would be biased. To account for the
potential confounding effect of initial ratings, we include them among the controls.
Results are reported in Table 3.12, where Panel A refers to the overall rating and sub-
sequent panels refer each to one of the five key lines of enquiry. Both reduced-form and
structural-form coefficients are negatively and statistically significantly different from
zero across all specifications and quality dimensions, indicating that the quality of care
is a margin of response to increased wage costs. According to the structural estimates
in columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, a 4 percent increase in average hourly wages leads to
a drop of approximately 0.1 in the overall rating on a baseline change of 0.11. In other
words, care homes bound more tightly by the NLW exhibited smaller short run improve-
ments in the quality of care services than less-bound homes did.
3.7.4 Firm Closure
The analysis of employment and total hours effects is based on the balanced sample of
firms that remain active throughout the period of our analysis. We are also interested in
assessing whether the wage shock induced by the NLW introduction impacted the prob-
ability of survival of firms in the residential care home sector. To this end, we consider the
panel of firms that were active in March 2016 (but may close in subsequent months) and
that we could match with the CQC registry to obtain information on the activity status
of each care home at monthly frequency. The resulting panel is composed of 4,306 care
homes, of which 0.1 percent closed by June 2016, 0.6 percent by September 2016 and 1
percent by March 2017.
In order to empirically assess whether the NLW had a role in the pattern of clo-
sures, we run reduced-form linear probability models of the probability of being closed
three, six or twelve months after the NLW introduction on our measures of the wage bite
MINj,Mar2016. Regression estimates are reported in Table 3.13, for closures as of March
2017, and in Table 3.C14 in Appendix 3.C for closures as of June 2016 and September
2016. All coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant and their magnitudes modest,
suggesting that care homes where the minimum wage change hit the most were not more
likely to go out of business, at least in the short run.
Not having access to information on profits or balance sheet data, we are unable to
assess whether the wage shock induced by the NLW introduction caused a significant
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reduction of firm profits. Even though we cannot exclude the existence of a profit hit, the
above results make it clear that any profit hit that could have occurred has so far not been
large enough to drive firms out of business.
3.7.5 Aggregate Employment and Firm Dynamics
Finally, we consider whether the NLW introduction impacted aggregate employment and
firm dynamics (entry and exit). To this end, instead of restricting the sample to firms
that were active throughout the period of analysis, we consider all firms ever active in
the months surrounding the NLW introduction. Our findings suggest that aggregate
employment did not suffer as a consequence of the NLW introduction, since jobs that
were paid below the NLW before April 2016 are fully replaced by jobs paid at or above
the NLW after its introduction. Likewise, firm dynamics – entries and exits – were not
significantly affected by the NLW in the twelve months after it came into force. The
analysis of aggregate employment effects and firm dynamics is discussed in detail in
Appendix 3.A.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the recent revival of research and policy interest in minimum
wages by studying the impact of a significant change in the structure of minimum wages
that occurred in the UK in 2016. Leveraging unique exogenous variation brought about
by the NLW introduction and novel matched employer-employee data with good-quality
information on individual wages, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of
minimum wages on employment, the wage distribution and firm adjustment levers, thus
contributing to the three key research areas in the minimum wage literature in a unified
framework.
The altered structure was brought about by the government introducing a new mini-
mum wage – the National Living Wage – for older workers. This resulted in there being a
fifth minimum wage rate in operation, as compared to the four that operated prior to the
change, with quite sizable differences in the minima paid to different age workers who
previously were paid the same.
This change in the minimum wage structure is utilized to study the wage and employ-
ment effects of minimum wages in the care homes sector of the UK economy, a sector
whose organizational structure makes it potentially particularly vulnerable to changes
in wage costs induced by minimum wages. The changed minimum wage structure is
also used as a means to identifying wage and employment spillovers because of the age-
related change in the operation of minimum wages. Margins of adjustment other than
employment are also explored.
The analysis finds that, on the labor demand side of things, care homes mostly seemed
to manage to cope with the additional wage costs that resulted from the NLW as there
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is at best modest evidence of employment changes in response to the sizable wage cost
shock that ensued, and no evidence of home exit resulting from this, at least in the short
run. Conversely, and rather worryingly from the perspective of care home residents,
the quality of care services appears to have significantly suffered as a consequence of
the wage shock. Smaller improvement in care quality seems to be the main margin of
adjustment we are able to identify amongst a range of possible firm responses.
The structure of wages by age also substantively changed, as there are significant
wage spillovers for younger workers from the NLW introduction. Thus the main wage
impact of the changed minimum wage structure was on both the wages of directly af-
fected older workers and indirectly affected younger workers, but with less evidence of
employment adjustment in response to these. Employers’ preferences for fairness emerge
as the most plausible explanation for the observed wage spillovers.
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3.9 Figures
FIGURE 3.1: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR CARE ASSISTANTS
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for care assistants. The distribution is censored at
£5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.2: EFFECT OF NLW BITE IN MARCH 2016 ON QUARTER-ON-
QUARTER WAGE GROWTH
A. Effect of low-paid proportion in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter wage growth
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B. Effect of wage gap in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter wage growth
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Notes: The graphs report the estimated coefficient β1,t from model (3.2). The outcome variable is the quarter-
on-quarter change in log average wages in the pre-treatment period, and the long difference between March
2016 and quarter t in the post-treatment period. The main regressor MINj,Mar2016 is the proportion of low-
paid workers in Panel A and the wage gap in Panel B. The graphs report estimates for both a balanced panel
of care homes always active between September 2015 and March 2017, and for the sample of firms used in the
main analysis (i.e. the panel of firms always active between March 2016 and March 2017). The vertical bars
indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in the
underlying regression are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of
care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.3: EFFECT OF NLW BITE IN MARCH 2016 ON QUARTER-ON-
QUARTER EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
A. Effect of low-paid proportion in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter employment growth
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B. Effect of wage gap in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter employment growth
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Notes: The graphs report the estimated coefficient β2,t from model (3.3). The outcome variable is the quarter-
on-quarter change in log number of employees in the pre-treatment period, and the long difference between
March 2016 and quarter t in the post-treatment period. The main regressor MINj,Mar2016 is the proportion of
low-paid workers in Panel A and the wage gap in Panel B. The graphs report estimates for both a balanced
panel of care homes always active between September 2015 and March 2017, and for the sample of firms used
in the main analysis (i.e. the panel of firms always active between March 2016 and March 2017). The vertical
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in
the underlying regression are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion
of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.4: EFFECT OF NLW BITE IN MARCH 2016 ON QUARTER-ON-
QUARTER TOTAL HOURS GROWTH
A. Effect of low-paid proportion in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter total hours growth
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B. Effect of wage gap in March 2016 on quarter-on-quarter total hours growth
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Notes: The graphs report the estimated coefficient β2,t from model (3.3). The outcome variable is the quarter-
on-quarter change in log total weekly hours in the pre-treatment period, and the long difference between
March 2016 and quarter t in the post-treatment period. The main regressor MINj,Mar2016 is the proportion of
low-paid workers in Panel A and the wage gap in Panel B. The graphs report estimates for both a balanced
panel of care homes always active between September 2015 and March 2017, and for the sample of firms used
in the main analysis (i.e. the panel of firms always active between March 2016 and March 2017). The vertical
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in
the underlying regression are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion
of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.5: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR CARE ASSISTANTS UN-
DER 25
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for care assistants aged under 25. The distribution
is censored at £5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 3.6: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR DOMICILIARY CARERS
UNDER 25
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for domiciliary carers aged under 25. The distri-
bution is censored at £5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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3.10 Tables
TABLE 3.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mar 2016 Jun 2016 Sep 2016 Mar 2017
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of employees 38.93 30.94 39.21 31.27 39.35 31.77 39.58 31.29
Median 32.00 32.00 33.00 33.00
Proportion under 25 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.09
Hourly wage 7.55 1.08 7.70 1.09 7.76 1.08 7.85 1.08
Hourly wage (25+) 7.64 1.11 7.80 1.11 7.86 1.11 7.95 1.10
Hourly wage (under 25) 6.82 0.78 6.97 0.81 7.03 0.80 7.11 0.80
Weekly hours 28.78 5.10 28.77 5.10 28.80 5.10 28.79 5.13
Weekly earnings 215.00 54.47 219.15 55.35 221.30 55.45 223.92 56.12
Proportion female 0.84 0.13 0.84 0.13 0.84 0.13 0.84 0.13
Age 42.69 4.60 42.74 4.58 42.82 4.61 43.04 4.63
Proportion carer 0.56 0.16 0.56 0.16 0.56 0.16 0.56 0.16
Prop. with nursing qual. 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07
Occupancy rate 0.92 0.15 0.92 0.14 0.92 0.14 0.92 0.14
Number of firms 4.134 4.134 4.134 4.134
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level variables for the balanced
sample of firms used in the analysis.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.2: THE BITE OF THE NATIONAL LIVING WAGE
Mar 2016 Jun 2016 Sep 2016 Mar 2017
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Prop. paid less than MW 0.51 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.22 0.30
Prop. paid less than MW (25+) 0.55 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.35 0.23 0.31
NLW gap 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
NLW gap (25+) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Prop. paid at MW 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.26
Prop. paid at MW (25+) 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.27
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level variables for the balanced
sample of firms used in the analysis. The NLW GAP is defined as GAPj =
∑i hij max{Wminij −Wij , 0}
∑i hijWij
,
where hij is weekly hours worked by worker i in firm j, Wij is the hourly wage of worker i in firm j and
Wminij is the new age-specific minimum wage (i.e. £3.87 for workers aged 16-17, £5.30 for workers aged
18-20, £6.70 for workers aged 21-24 and £7.20 for older workers).
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.3: WAGE EQUATIONS
Change in log average hourly wage
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap 0.136*** 0.110***
(0.018) (0.019)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.020
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 196.54 136.59 59.89 34.45
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap 0.264*** 0.244***
(0.023) (0.026)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.028
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 343.03 260.48 126.94 90.87
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap 0.400*** 0.390***
(0.027) (0.029)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.040
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 458.98 388.53 221.82 182.05
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient β1,t from model (3.2). The
sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and March
2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion
with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all work-
ers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.4: EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS
Change in log number of employees
March 2016 to March 2017
IV IV
Low-pay NLW gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.012 -0.020*
(0.011) (0.011)
Initial NLW gap -0.033 -0.088
(0.103) (0.111)
Change in log average hourly wage -0.410* -0.225
(0.230) (0.289)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.014
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and the
estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log number of employees
as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and March 2017.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables
are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average
age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
TABLE 3.5: HOURS EQUATIONS
Change in log total weekly hours
March 2016 to March 2017
IV IV
Low-pay NLW gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.011 -0.010
(0.013) (0.014)
Initial NLW gap -0.158 -0.173
(0.146) (0.154)
Change in log average hourly wage -0.212 -0.444
(0.280) (0.404)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.021
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and the
estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log total weekly hours as
outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and March 2017.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables
are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average
age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.6: WAGE SPILLOVER EQUATIONS
Change in log average hourly wage for employees aged under 25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.109*** 0.110***
(0.031) (0.033)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.643*** 0.592***
(0.103) (0.152)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.022
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.029*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.220*** 0.234***
(0.040) (0.043)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.747*** 0.724***
(0.089) (0.118)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.030
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.033*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.005)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.268*** 0.308***
(0.060) (0.063)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.722*** 0.654***
(0.100) (0.125)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.041
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6). The sample is a balanced panel of care
homes active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with
nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional
dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.7: EMPLOYMENT SPILLOVER EQUATIONS
Change in share of employees aged under 25
March 2016 to March 2017
IV IV
Low-pay NLW gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.002 0.007
(0.034) (0.038)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.026 0.014
(0.075) (0.080)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.009
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of employees
aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016
and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care
assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
TABLE 3.8: TOTAL HOURS SPILLOVER EQUATIONS
Change in share of total weekly hours worked by employees aged under
25
March 2016 to March 2017
IV IV
Low-pay NLW gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.009 0.020
(0.036) (0.040)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.022 0.042
(0.078) (0.084)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.008
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of total
weekly hours worked by employees aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of
care homes active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with
nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional
dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.9: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CARE HOME AND DOMICILIARY
CARE SECTORS
March 2016
Care homes Domiciliary Difference
care agencies
Firm-level outcomes
Number of employees 38.93 30.94 62.90 70.52 -23.97 ***
Proportion under 25 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.01 *
Number of firms 4,134 1,248
Worker-level outcomes
Wage 7.65 2.07 7.52 1.25 0.13 ***
Wage (under 25) 6.85 1.10 7.25 0.79 -0.41 ***
Prop. on ZHC 0.07 0.25 0.64 0.48 -0.57 ***
Prop. on ZHC (under 25) 0.12 0.33 0.67 0.47 -0.54 ***
Prop. on permanent contr. 0.90 0.29 0.83 0.38 0.08 ***
Prop. on temporary contr. 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.23 -0.04 ***
Prop. bank worker 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20 0.03 ***
Prop. agency worker 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.23 -0.05 ***
Weekly hours 28.43 11.80 12.27 15.89 16.16 ***
Weekly earnings 215.45 118.30 74.44 118.79 141.01 ***
Prop. female 0.84 0.37 0.87 0.34 -0.02 ***
Age 42.31 13.92 41.65 13.39 0.65 ***
Prop. carer 0.55 0.50 0.81 0.39 -0.26 ***
Prop. with nursing qual. 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.05 0.05 ***
Number of workers 181,888 131,680
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level and worker-
level variables for the employees working in care homes and domiciliary care agencies in
the sample used in the analysis. The last column reports the difference in means between
the care home and domiciliary care sectors and the associated significance level. P-value:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.10: WAGE SPILLOVER EQUATIONS IN THE DOMICILIARY CARE
SECTOR
Change in log average hourly wage for employees aged under 25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.183*** 0.155**
(0.069) (0.072)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.953*** 1.037***
(0.199) (0.293)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.021
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.007)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.263*** 0.226**
(0.086) (0.088)
Change in log average wage (25+) 1.001*** 1.001***
(0.173) (0.227)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.030
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.008) (0.009)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.443*** 0.417***
(0.150) (0.158)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.981*** 0.892***
(0.175) (0.178)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.044
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6). The sample is a balanced panel of
domiciliary care agencies active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female,
proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy
rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.11: PRODUCTIVITY
Change in log residents per worker hour
March 2016 to March 2017
IV IV
Low-pay NLW gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.012 0.001
(0.015) (0.015)
Initial NLW gap 0.079 0.015
(0.159) (0.169)
Change in log average wage 0.015 0.037
(0.311) (0.423)
Observations 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.011
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-
(4), and the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log
residents per worker hour as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active
between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nurs-
ing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional
dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.12: QUALITY OF CARE SERVICES
Change in rating between March 2016 and March 2017 (latest rating)
Panel A - Overall quality
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.142*** -0.125***
(0.022) (0.023)
Initial NLW gap -1.146*** -1.008***
(0.203) (0.211)
Change in log avg wage -2.441*** -2.513***
(0.485) (0.563)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.113
Panel B - Safe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.095*** -0.082***
(0.023) (0.025)
Initial NLW gap -0.815*** -0.735***
(0.221) (0.231)
Change in log avg wage -1.611*** -1.839***
(0.497) (0.594)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.088
Panel C - Effective
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.091*** -0.077***
(0.021) (0.022)
Initial NLW gap -0.628*** -0.524**
(0.200) (0.207)
Change in log avg wage -1.491*** -1.294**
(0.433) (0.517)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.099
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TABLE 3.C12 CONTINUED: QUALITY OF CARE SERVICES
Change in rating between March 2016 and March 2017 (latest rating)
Panel D - Caring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.078*** -0.077***
(0.015) (0.016)
Initial NLW gap -0.520*** -0.506***
(0.150) (0.156)
Change in log avg wage -1.512*** -1.266***
(0.335) (0.404)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.035
Panel E - Responsive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.091*** -0.075***
(0.020) (0.021)
Initial NLW gap -0.795*** -0.697***
(0.194) (0.200)
Change in log avg wage -1.460*** -1.727***
(0.423) (0.517)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.079
Panel F - Well-led
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.124*** -0.110***
(0.024) (0.026)
Initial NLW gap -0.997*** -0.883***
(0.226) (0.236)
Change in log avg wage -2.150*** -2.202***
(0.521) (0.604)
Observations 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480 2,480
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.066
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in various measure of
care quality as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016
and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the latest rating in the relevant line of enquiry as of March 2016, the initial proportion
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occu-
pancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC and CQC.
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TABLE 3.13: CLOSURES
Indicator for firm closure
March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap 0.046 0.078
(0.044) (0.050)
Observations 4,306 4,306 4,306 4,306
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.010
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from
model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), using the probability of closure as of March
2017 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes ac-
tive between March 2016, unconditional on their survival until March 2017.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, pro-
portion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average
age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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3.A Aggregate Employment and Firm Dynamics
3.A.1 Aggregate Employment Effects
We explore the aggregate employment effects of the NLW introduction using a bunching
approach as in Cengiz et al. (forthcoming). The bunching approach allows us to infer
the effect on employment throughout the wage distribution by comparing the number
of missing jobs below the minimum to the number of excess jobs above the minimum
before and after the policy change. The main intuition behind this approach is that when
a higher minimum wage is introduced, workers who used to be paid at a wage below
the new minimum can no longer be paid at their old rate. As a consequence, provided
that there is almost full compliance with the law, the mass of jobs at the bottom of the
wage distribution should disappear. Some of these jobs will obtain the wage uprate and
therefore appear at or right above the new minimum, some might be destroyed, and
some other new jobs might be created through a labor supply effect. Therefore, the size
of the excess mass above the new minimum provides an account of preserved and newly
created jobs, and the sum of the excess and the missing mass measures the total employ-
ment change, whether positive or negative. It is reasonable to believe that the bulk of the
dynamics will occur in a neighborhood of the new minimum, as changes in the upper
tail of the wage distribution are unlikely to be driven by minimum wage changes.
To implement this strategy, we consider the entire workforce of care homes ever ac-
tive between October 2015 and March 2017, therefore allowing for entries and exits. This
allows us to investigate the aggregate employment effects of the NLW introduction. We
collapse the individual data and calculate monthly employment counts at the local au-
thority district level by £0.50 hourly wage bins from six months prior to a year after the
NLW introduction, and from two pounds below to five pounds above the NLW rate of
£7.20.44 We then estimate how changes in the excess and missing mass by wage bin
evolve relative to March 2016 adopting the following fixed effect framework:
Nl,w,m = γ0 +
8
∑
k=−4
11
∑
τ 6=−1,τ=−7
γk,τ · Ikw × Iτm + φl,w,m (3.A1)
where Nl,w,m is employment headcount in local authority l, wage bin w and month m, Ikw
is an indicator taking value one if wage bin w is k-bin distant from the £7.20 bin, Iτm is
an indicator taking value one if month m is τ -month distant from April 2016 and φl,w,m
a disturbance term. The key parameters of interest are γk,τ for k = −4, . . . , 8 and τ =
−7, . . . ,−2, 0, . . . , 11, as they trace the evolution of the missing and excess mass relative
to the month before of the policy change. In this model, given that the timing of the
NLW introduction is common to all local authorities, identification comes from variation
44While we do not have any ex-ante information on what is the range over which the minimum wage
change can have distributional consequences, we draw on information in Figure 3.1 and restrict our analysis
to wages between £5.20 and £11.20.
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in the number of workers for which the minimum wage change is binding across local
authorities.
In Figure 3.B8 in Appendix 3.B the vertical bars correspond to the estimated γk,τ for
k = −4, . . . , 8 and for selected values of τ, namely τ = 2 in the top left panel, τ = 5 in
the top right panel, τ = 8 in the bottom left panel and τ = 11 in the bottom right panel.
For each bar, a capped line indicates the 95 percent confidence interval of the γˆk,τ. The
connected dots indicate instead the cumulative sum of the bin-specific effects. Across all
the panels, the missing mass is concentrated in the two wage bins right below the new
minimum and the excess mass in the first bin above it, while employment changes in the
other bins are very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The pattern of the
cumulated effects suggests that jobs previously paid below the NLW are fully replaced
by jobs in the three bins right above the new minimum, and that there are no spillover
effects in the upper part of the wage distribution.
While the previous chart displays the change in mass by wage bin for selected post-
treatment periods relative to March 2016, Figure 3.B9 in Appendix 3.B documents the
evolution of the total number of jobs below the minimum ατ = ∑−1k=−4 γ
k
τ (missing mass),
the total number of jobs above the minimum βτ = ∑8k=0 γ
k
τ (excess mass), and their sum
∆τ = ατ + βτ (net excess mass) for τ = −7, . . . ,−2, 0, . . . , 11. The numbers reported at the
bottom of the figure are the point estimates ∆ˆτ. The graph shows a sharp reduction in
the number of jobs below the NLW between the six months prior and the twelve months
after its implementation. The below mass decreases by a statistically significant amount
exactly in April 2016 – showing that the minimum wage increase had real bite – and
remains persistently negative throughout the following twelve months. The evolution of
the excess mass almost perfectly mirrors this pattern, displaying a significant and positive
jump from τ = 0 onwards. This is confirmed by the behavior of the “net excess mass”
that is very small in magnitude and never statistically different from zero. Interestingly
enough, there is no pre-trend in αˆτ nor βˆτ. According to these result, there is little if no
indication of negative aggregate employment effects due to the NLW introduction.
Following our previous investigation of potential spillover effects, we extend the
bunching framework to account for different patterns between workers aged under 25,
and workers aged 25 and over. In practice, we augment the bunching model interacting
the main regressor with an age-group dummy.45 Results are reported in Figures 3.B10
and 3.B11 in Appendix 3.B for adult workers, and in Figures 3.B12 and 3.B13 for younger
workers. The age-specific patterns are very similar to the aggregate ones. The evolu-
tion of the net excess mass in Figure 3.B13 seems to suggest a mild but nonetheless small
and statistically insignificant negative employment effect for younger workers. All in all,
we take this bunching exercise as evidence that the NLW introduction did not have any
significant aggregate employment effects.
45This model requires collapsing the data by age category, wage bin, month and local authority.
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3.A.2 Aggregate Firm Dynamics
We are also interested in whether the NLW introduction had an impact on firm entry. We
therefore consider all firms ever active in the period between March 2016 and March 2017,
allowing for both entries into and exits out of the sample. Estimating reduced-form linear
probability models for the probability of entry as we did above for the probability of exit
is infeasible, since we do not have a measure of the minimum wage bite for entrants.
We therefore collapse the data at the local authority district level and run reduced-form
regressions of the following form:
El,t = α6 + β6 ·MINl,Mar2016 + Z′l,Mar2016 · γ6 +ωl,t (3.A2)
where El,t is the proportion of entrants in local authority l between March 2016 and time
t – where t can be June 2016, September 2016 or March 2017 –, MINl,Mar2016 is either
the proportion of low-paid workers or the wage gap at local authority level in March
2016, and Z is a vector of local-authority controls including the proportion of female
workers, average age, the proportion working as care assistants, the proportion with
nursing qualification, the occupancy rate and a set of regional dummies.46 For entries
between March 2016 and March 2017, reduced form estimates are reported in columns
(1) to (4) of Panel C of Table 3.C15 in Appendix 3.C. Columns (5) and (6) instead show
structural form estimates in which MINl,Mar2016 is used as an instrument for the change
in the logarithm of the average wage in the local authority ∆ ln Wl,t.47 The statistical
insignificance of the estimated coefficients and their limited size indicate that the NLW
introduction did not have an impact on firm entry at the local authority level.
For completeness, we also report reduced-form and structural-form estimates for firm
exits at the local authority level in Table 3.C16 in Appendix 3.C. Consistently with the
firm-level results, we do not find evidence of a detrimental effect of the NLW introduction
on care home survival.
46Local authority district areas as defined by ONS split England into 326 areas of local governance.
47Estimates for entries between March and June 2016 are reported in Panel A of Table 3.C15 in Appendix
3.C, while those for entries between March and September 2016 in Panel B of the same table.
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3.B Appendix Figures
FIGURE 3.B1: NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE RATES 1999-2018
Notes: The graph reports the various minimum wage rates in the UK between 1999 and 2018. The apprentice
rate applies to apprentices. The 16-17 year-old rate to workers aged 16 and 17. The youth development rate
to workers aged 18-20. The adult rate applied to workers aged 21 and over until March 2016. From April
2016, the adult rate applies to workers aged 21-24 and the NLW to those aged 25 and over.
Source: Low Pay Commission.
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FIGURE 3.B2: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR CARE ASSISTANTS: UP-
DATED WAGES
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for care assistants. The distribution is censored
at £5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins. The top left panel includes workers with wage
updates between October 2015 and March 2016, the top right panel between April and June 2016, the bottom
left panel between April and September 2016, and the bottom right panel between April 2016 and March
2017.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 3.B3: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR CARE ASSISTANTS UN-
DER 25: UPDATED WAGES
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for care assistants aged under 25. The distribution
is censored at £5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins. The top left panel includes workers with
wage updates between October 2015 and March 2016, the top right panel between April and June 2016, the
bottom left panel between April and September 2016, and the bottom right panel between April 2016 and
March 2017.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.B4: EFFECT OF NLW BITE IN MARCH 2016 ON QUARTER-ON-
QUARTER WAGE SPILLOVERS
A. Effect of low-paid proportion among 25s and over in March 2016
on quarter-on-quarter wage growth among under 25s
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B. Effect of wage gap among 25s and over in March 2016
on quarter-on-quarter wage growth among under 25s
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Notes: The graphs report the estimated coefficient β4,t from model (3.5). The outcome variable is the quarter-
on-quarter change in log average wage for workers aged under 25 in March 2016 in the pre-treatment period,
and the long difference between March 2016 and quarter t in the post-treatment period. The main regressor
MINOj,Mar2016 is the proportion of low-paid workers aged 25 and over in Panel A and the wage gap for work-
ers aged 25 and over in Panel B. The graphs report estimates for both a balanced panel of care homes always
active between September 2015 and March 2017, and for the sample of firms used in the main analysis (i.e.
the panel of firms always active between March 2016 and March 2017). The vertical bars indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables included in the underlying regres-
sion are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants,
average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.B5: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR DOMICILIARY CARERS
UNDER 25: UPDATED WAGES
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for domiciliary carers aged under 25. The dis-
tribution is censored at £5.00 and £10.00. The data are binned into £0.10 bins. The top left panel includes
workers with wage updates between October 2015 and March 2016, the top right panel between April and
June 2016, the bottom left panel between April and September 2016, and the bottom right panel between
April 2016 and March 2017.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.B6: DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS IN MARCH 2016
A. Sample of homes inspected by CQC before March 2016
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B. Sample of homes inspected by CQC both before and after March 2016
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Notes: The graph reports the distribution of ratings by key line of enquiry in March 2016. Panel A is based
on the sample of 2480 homes with CQC ratings as of March 2016. Panel B is based on the subgroup of
firms that were inspected and rated by CQC both before and after March 2016. Legend: 1 = inadequate, 2 =
requires improvement, 3 = good, 4 = outstanding.
Source: NMDS-SC and CQC.
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FIGURE 3.B7: DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGE IN RATINGS BETWEEN MARCH
2016 AND MARCH 2017
A. Sample of homes inspected by CQC before March 2016
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B. Sample of homes inspected by CQC both before and after March 2016
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Notes: The graph reports the distribution of the change in ratings by key line of enquiry in March 2016.
Panel A is based on the sample of 2480 homes with CQC ratings as of March 2016. Panel B is based on the
subgroup of firms that were inspected and rated by CQC both before and after March 2016.
Source: NMDS-SC and CQC.
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FIGURE 3.B8: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY WAGE BIN RELATIVE TO
MARCH 2016
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
June 2016
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
September 2016
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
December 2016
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
March 2017
A
ve
ra
ge
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
y 
lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
y
Wage bin (£0.50) relative to NLW
Notes: The vertical bars correspond to the estimated γkτ from equation (3.A1) for wage bins k = −4, . . . , 8
and for τ = 2 in the top left panel, τ = 5 in the top right panel, τ = 8 in the bottom left panel and τ = 11
in the bottom right panel. Capped lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust
standard errors. The connected dots indicate the cumulative sum of the bin-specific effects.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 3.B9: EVOLUTION OF MISSING AND EXCESS MASS
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Notes: Based on model (3.A1), missing mass is the total number of jobs below the minimum ατ = ∑−1k=−1 γ
k
τ ,
excess mass the total number of jobs above the minimum βτ = ∑8k=0 γ
k
τ , net excess mass the sum ∆τ =
ατ + βτ . Coefficient estimates of the net excess mass are reported in grey at the bottom of the figure. Vertical
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust standard errors.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.B10: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY WAGE BIN RELATIVE TO
MARCH 2016: EMPLOYEES AGED 25 AND OVER
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Notes: The vertical bars correspond to the estimated γkτ from equation (3.A1) for wage bins k = −4, . . . , 8
and for τ = 2 in the top left panel, τ = 5 in the top right panel, τ = 8 in the bottom left panel and τ = 11
in the bottom right panel. Capped lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust
standard errors. The connected dots indicate the cumulative sum of the bin-specific effects.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 3.B11: EVOLUTION OF MISSING AND EXCESS MASS: EMPLOYEES
AGED 25 AND OVER
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Notes: Based on model (3.A1), missing mass is the total number of jobs below the minimum ατ = ∑−1k=−1 γ
k
τ ,
excess mass the total number of jobs above the minimum βτ = ∑8k=0 γ
k
τ , net excess mass the sum ∆τ =
ατ + βτ . Coefficient estimates of the net excess mass are reported in grey at the bottom of the figure. Vertical
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust standard errors.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 3.B12: CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT BY WAGE BIN RELATIVE TO
MARCH 2016: EMPLOYEES AGED UNDER 25
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Notes: The vertical bars correspond to the estimated γkτ from equation (3.A1) for wage bins k = −4, . . . , 8
and for τ = 2 in the top left panel, τ = 5 in the top right panel, τ = 8 in the bottom left panel and τ = 11
in the bottom right panel. Capped lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust
standard errors. The connected dots indicate the cumulative sum of the bin-specific effects.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 3.B13: EVOLUTION OF MISSING AND EXCESS MASS: EMPLOYEES
AGED UNDER 25
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Notes: Based on model (3.A1), missing mass is the total number of jobs below the minimum ατ = ∑−1k=−1 γ
k
τ ,
excess mass the total number of jobs above the minimum βτ = ∑8k=0 γ
k
τ , net excess mass the sum ∆τ =
ατ + βτ . Coefficient estimates of the net excess mass are reported in grey at the bottom of the figure. Vertical
bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals, computed using robust standard errors.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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3.C Appendix Tables
TABLE 3.C1: WEEKLY EARNINGS EQUATIONS
Change in log average weekly earnings
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005)
Initial NLW gap 0.141*** 0.122***
(0.038) (0.042)
Change in log average wage 1.015*** 1.116***
(0.219) (0.309)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.019
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.007)
Initial NLW gap 0.333*** 0.318***
(0.054) (0.060)
Change in log average wage 1.123*** 1.302***
(0.167) (0.211)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.029
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TABLE 3.C1 CONTINUED: WEEKLY EARNINGS EQUATIONS
Change in log average weekly earnings
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.063*** 0.066***
(0.007) (0.008)
Initial NLW gap 0.454*** 0.455***
(0.077) (0.082)
Change in log average wage 1.353*** 1.166***
(0.150) (0.193)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.040
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log average weekly
earnings as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and
March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care
assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C2: EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS
Change in log number of employees
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.011* -0.014**
(0.006) (0.007)
Initial NLW gap -0.104 -0.127*
(0.065) (0.068)
Change in log average wage -0.661** -1.157*
(0.325) (0.676)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.003
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.011 -0.016*
(0.008) (0.009)
Initial NLW gap -0.048 -0.086
(0.087) (0.094)
Change in log average wage -0.460* -0.354
(0.246) (0.395)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.007
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log number of
employees as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016
and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care
assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C3: TOTAL HOURS EQUATIONS
Change in log total weekly hours
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.012* -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
Initial NLW gap -0.122 -0.132
(0.078) (0.085)
Change in log average wage -0.589 -1.206
(0.371) (0.850)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.008
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.010 -0.013
(0.009) (0.010)
Initial NLW gap -0.078 -0.114
(0.101) (0.111)
Change in log average wage -0.362 -0.468
(0.289) (0.469)
Observations 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134 4,134
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.015
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log total weekly
hours as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and
March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care
assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C4: WAGE EQUATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES AGED 25 AND OVER
Change in log average hourly wage for workers aged 25 and over
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.204*** 0.186***
(0.024) (0.026)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.022
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 195.64 145.20 74.60 49.64
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.002) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.339*** 0.323***
(0.028) (0.031)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.030
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 345.61 259.28 146.53 109.92
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.467*** 0.471***
(0.031) (0.034)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.041
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 384.88 330.08 227.40 197.16
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β1,t from model (3.2),
using the change in log average wage for workers aged 25 and over as outcome and
measures of the NLW bite among workers aged 25 and over as main regressor. The
sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016 and March 2017.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing
qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate
and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C5: WEEKLY EARNINGS EQUATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES AGED UN-
DER 25
Change in log average weekly earnings for workers aged under 25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.009 0.011
(0.012) (0.013)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.046 0.079
(0.123) (0.130)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.423 0.423
(0.490) (0.688)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.023
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.027* 0.033**
(0.015) (0.017)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.209 0.272*
(0.145) (0.156)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.791** 0.840*
(0.389) (0.472)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.031
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.057*** 0.061***
(0.019) (0.020)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.471*** 0.509***
(0.175) (0.190)
Change in log average wage (25+) 1.174*** 1.082***
(0.389) (0.398)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.043
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log average weekly
earnings for workers aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes
active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing
qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C6: EMPLOYMENT SPILLOVER EQUATIONS
Change in share of employees aged under 25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.019 -0.018
(0.019) (0.022)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.052 -0.099
(0.083) (0.118)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.001
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.000 -0.013
(0.026) (0.028)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.034 -0.039
(0.071) (0.086)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.004
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of
employees aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between
March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification,
proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C7: TOTAL HOURS SPILLOVER EQUATIONS
Change in share of total weekly hours worked by employees aged under
25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.023 -0.017
(0.021) (0.023)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.027 -0.094
(0.088) (0.128)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.000
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.004 -0.013
(0.027) (0.029)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.003 -0.039
(0.074) (0.090)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.003
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of total
weekly hours worked by employees aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of
care homes active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with
nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional
dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C8: WAGE EQUATIONS IN THE DOMICILIARY CARE SECTOR
Change in log average hourly wage
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.026*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap 0.061** 0.060**
(0.030) (0.030)
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.016
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap 0.095** 0.090**
(0.041) (0.039)
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.023
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.053*** 0.050***
(0.005) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap 0.176** 0.168**
(0.077) (0.073)
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.033
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient β1,t from model (3.2). The
sample is a balanced panel of domiciliary care agencies active between March
2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial pro-
portion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care as-
sistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C9: WAGE EQUATIONS FOR EMPLOYEES AGED 25 AND OVER IN
THE DOMICILIARY CARE SECTOR
Change in log average hourly wage for workers aged 25 and over
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.169*** 0.149**
(0.058) (0.059)
Observations 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.018
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 51.84 44.69 8.47 6.51
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.266*** 0.226***
(0.078) (0.077)
Observations 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.026
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 82.28 63.85 11.55 8.57
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.050*** 0.048***
(0.005) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.518*** 0.468***
(0.145) (0.154)
Observations 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.036
F-stat (β1,t = 0): 92.22 68.44 12.79 9.26
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β1,t from model (3.2),
using the change in log average wage for workers aged 25 and over as outcome and
measures of the NLW bite among workers aged 25 and over as main regressor. The
sample is a balanced panel of domiciliary care agencies active between March 2016
and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, propor-
tion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers),
occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C10: EMPLOYMENT SPILLOVER EQUATIONS IN THE DOMICIL-
IARY CARE SECTOR
Change in share of employees aged under 25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.013 -0.006
(0.036) (0.037)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.041 -0.041
(0.128) (0.241)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.000
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.006 0.025
(0.054) (0.055)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.033 0.111
(0.135) (0.260)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.003
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.005 0.055
(0.059) (0.058)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.022 0.118
(0.120) (0.129)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.011
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of
employees aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of domiciliary care agencies
active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing
qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C11: TOTAL HOURS SPILLOVER EQUATIONS IN THE DOMICIL-
IARY CARE SECTOR
Change in share of total weekly hours worked by employees aged under
25
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) 0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.024 0.056
(0.077) (0.076)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.174 0.373
(0.247) (0.575)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.003
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
Initial NLW gap (25+) 0.056 0.118
(0.115) (0.111)
Change in log average wage (25+) 0.036 0.521
(0.251) (0.606)
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.005
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion (25+) -0.012 -0.001
(0.009) (0.011)
Initial NLW gap (25+) -0.070 0.046
(0.129) (0.120)
Change in log average wage (25+) -0.011 0.099
(0.221) (0.274)
Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.012
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β4,t from model (3.5) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β5,t from model (3.6) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of total
weekly hours worked by employees aged under 25 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of
domiciliary care agencies active between March 2016 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female,
proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy
rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C12: RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS ABOUT THE LEVEL OF THE NLW
Pre-NLW Post-NLW
Low-paid Low-paid Low-paid Low-paid
proportion proportion proportion proportion
below median above median below median above median
Level of NLW is
About right 47.15% 41.18% 58.20% 55.08%
Too low 17.07% 15.97% 13.11% 26.27%
Too high 26.83% 42.86% 23.77% 18.64%
Don’t know 8.94% 0.00% 4.92% 0.00%
Number of respondents 123 119 123 119
Notes: The data are from a survey of all CQC regulated English care homes that we ran before and
after the NLW introduction. We obtained information on all active care homes in England from the
CQC registry and sent questionnaires to all homes in January and February 2016 for the pre-NLW
part of the survey, and in late June, August and November 2016 for the post-NLW part of the survey.
Responses were provided by the owner manager of the care homes. We obtained a total of 1390 re-
sponses in the pre-NLW survey and of 827 responses in the post-NLW survey, of which 248 responded
to both surveys. In the pre-NLW survey we asked: “Do you think that the proposed level of the NLW
is: (i) about right, (ii) too high, (iii) too low, (iv) don’t know?”. In the post-NLW survey we asked:
“Do you think that the current level of the NLW is: (i) about right, (ii) too high, (iii) too low, (iv) don’t
know?”. The table reports respondents’ answers to these questions in the pre- and post-NLW waves
for the balanced panel, separately for firms with a pre-NLW proportion of low-paid workers below
and above the median.
Source: LSE-CEP Survey of Care Homes.
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TABLE 3.C13: PRODUCTIVITY
Change in log residents per worker hour
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.011 0.008
(0.008) (0.009)
Initial NLW gap 0.043 0.024
(0.088) (0.097)
Change in log average wage 0.390 0.215
(0.435) (0.869)
Observations 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.003
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.012)
Initial NLW gap -0.010 -0.016
(0.113) (0.126)
Change in log average wage 0.186 -0.064
(0.325) (0.507)
Observations 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: -0.008
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), and
the estimated IV coefficient β3,t from model (3.4) in columns (5)-(6), using the change in log residents per
worker hour as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of care homes active between March 2016
and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care
assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C14: CLOSURES
Indicator for firm closure
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Initial NLW gap 0.020 0.022
(0.020) (0.024)
Observations 4,306 4,306 4,306 4,306
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.001
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Initial NLW gap 0.037 0.051
(0.037) (0.043)
Observations 4,306 4,306 4,306 4,306
Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.006
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β2,t from
model (3.3) in columns (1)-(4), using the probability of closure as of June
2016 and September 2016 as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced
panel of care homes active between March 2016, unconditional on their
survival until March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the
initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion
of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and regional
dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C15: FIRM ENTRIES AT LOCAL AUTHORITY LEVEL
Probability of firm entry
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.010)
Initial NLW gap 0.008 -0.006
(0.054) (0.115)
Change in log average wage 0.095 -0.033
(0.374) (0.616)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.005
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.010)
Initial NLW gap 0.008 -0.006
(0.054) (0.115)
Change in log average wage 0.055 -0.019
(0.235) (0.337)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.005
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.011)
Initial NLW gap 0.029 -0.009
(0.058) (0.119)
Change in log average wage 0.065 -0.017
(0.199) (0.232)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.006
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β6 from model (3.A2) in columns (1)-(4)
and the corresponding IV coefficient in columns (5) and (6), using the probability of firm entry as outcome
variable. The sample is a balanced panel of local authority districts. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female,
proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy
rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 3.C16: FIRM EXITS AT LOCAL AUTHORITY LEVEL
Probability of firm exit
Panel A - March 2016 to June 2016
IV IV
Low-
pay
NLW
gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004)
Initial NLW gap 0.029 0.055
(0.022) (0.037)
Change in log average wage 0.225 0.294
(0.153) (0.224)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.005
Panel B - March 2016 to September 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.001 -0.004
(0.007) (0.009)
Initial NLW gap 0.002 -0.008
(0.061) (0.078)
Change in log average wage -0.106 -0.023
(0.220) (0.229)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.006
Panel C - March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.003 0.004
(0.014) (0.018)
Initial NLW gap -0.030 -0.036
(0.123) (0.162)
Change in log average wage 0.073 -0.070
(0.338) (0.319)
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 321
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.: 0.006
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient β6 from model (3.A2) in columns (1)-(4)
and the corresponding IV coefficient in columns (5) and (6), using the probability of firm exit as outcome
variable. The sample is a balanced panel of local authority districts. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female,
proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy
rate and regional dummies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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Chapter 4
Zero Hours Contracts and Labor
Market Policy
4.1 Introduction
Contemporary labor markets feature the use of “atypical” work arrangements. Some of
these – like self-employment and agency work – have emerged in their current format
as an evolution of previous work structures. Others – like short hours and zero hours
contracts – reflect more the work demands of the modern age, with their introduction
driven by technical and social change.1 The increased incidence of this kind of work
has led to discussions of there being a trade-off between additional flexibility and the
emergence of low wage, dead end jobs, which function outside the job legislation offered
in conventional forms of employment.
From a research perspective, it is important to try to determine which side of this
trade-off dominates, and if it differs by work arrangement. In this paper, we consider
the case of the UK labor market where the rise of atypical work has been a key feature
of the post-financial crisis period. The focus is placed specifically on one kind of alterna-
tive work arrangement that has increasingly entered the UK setting, namely zero hours
contracts (ZHCs). Almost a million people are on ZHCs at the time of writing, out of a
total workforce of 32 million. Many of these ZHC work positions are prominent in the
low-wage sectors of employment. Their relevance to labor market policy that affects low
wage levels is therefore high.
The principal focus of the paper is placed upon developing a better understanding
of ZHCs and labor market policy. More specifically, in doing this, the paper has two
main aims. The first is to empirically document the evolution and characterization of
ZHCs in the UK setting. There are two parts to this, the first drawing on data from
the Quarterly Labour Force Survey and the second on newly collected survey data on
alternative work arrangements. Part of the latter survey is devoted to ZHCs, which are
only limitedly surveyed and understood in existing survey data sources (Abraham and
1Workers on zero hours contracts agree to be available for work as and when required, with no guaran-
teed hours or times of work.
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Amaya, 2018) and – consequently – in the literature, and the intention is to fill this gap
with new evidence.
The second aim is to explore the extent to which labor market institutions have the
scope to be, at least partly, responsible for the increased diffusion of flexible work ar-
rangements, or – conversely – whether the latter are a consequence of factors that have
little to do with labor market institutions and rigidities. In this paper, a particular policy
focus is placed on minimum wages, where we are interested in understanding whether
higher minimum wages have potential to induce a larger utilization of alternative work
arrangements by firms and, consequently, a shift in the composition of their workforce
towards more flexible, but also insecure jobs.
In Europe, the rise of alternative work arrangements and gig-economy jobs is often
considered an expression of the duality of the labor market, whereby the existence of
rigidities in the “primary” market creates the conditions for an expansion of more flexi-
ble contractual relationships in the “secondary” market. Alternative work arrangements
have also grown in the US, where labor markets are overall less rigid than in Europe,
but minimum wages are an important component of labor market policies. By providing
direct evidence on the role – or lack thereof – of minimum wage policies on the incidence
of flexible work arrangements, this paper contributes to understanding a policy question
relevant to both the US and European labor markets.
In the first part of the paper, survey-based evidence is presented to show that ZHCs
are a key contract type in some, predominantly low wage, sectors of the UK labor mar-
ket. They are characterized by the flexibility/dead end jobs trade-off already introduced
above. They also feature, in different guises or by different names, in other countries’
employment structures. The second part of the paper analyzes minimum wage policy
and ZHC utilization by exploiting a substantial increase in the minimum wage rate for
workers aged 25 and over that took place in the UK in April 2016, when a new minimum
wage rate – the National Living Wage (NLW) – was introduced (Bell and Machin, 2018;
Giupponi and Machin, 2018). In the UK setting, ZHC usage by employers does seem to
have been affected by changes in labor market policy, as the sizable hike of the minimum
wage that occurred when the NLW was introduced did shift more workers onto ZHC
positions in the adult social care sector (and in low wage sectors more generally). To our
knowledge, this is the first study connecting minimum wage changes to employer use of
different types of job contracts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, a description of the atyp-
ical work arrangement under study, ZHCs, is given, together with a discussion of the
extent to which other countries have similar job contracts. In Section 4.3, the relevant lit-
erature to the subject matter of the paper is discussed. Section 4.4 reports the analysis that
documents the patterns of ZHC coverage in the UK labor market. Section 4.5 describes
the evidence on minimum wages and ZHC jobs. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Atypical Work Arrangements: Zero Hours Contracts
4.2.1 Zero Hours Contracts in the UK
ZHCs are an employment contract under which a worker is not guaranteed any hours
and is only paid for work carried out. It can be viewed as a form of on-call working,
as workers can be offered hours at short notice, as and when an employer needs them.
Workers are not obliged to accept work that has been offered to them and, similarly,
employers are not obliged to offer any work.2 Thus, ZHCs offer flexibility to both the
employer and the employee, and, as a result, some workers may prefer them to typical
fixed hour employment contracts. Conversely, due to the lack of security and guaranteed
income, they are unlikely to be suitable for many workers. Such contracts have become
prevalent in particular industries such as retail, health, and hospitality.
ZHCs have, in theory, always been possible to be used by employers in the UK and
have no specific legal status, rather being an informal term to refer to a type of contract.
Their use has seen an increase over the past decade. Estimates from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) suggest that in 2008 143,000 employees were on ZHCs whereas by 2017
this figure was 883,000. Until 1998, ZHCs were often used to “clock off” workers during
quiet periods nonetheless expecting them to stay on site, though this exploitative practice
was ended in 1998 with the passing of the Working Time Regulations.
Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of various legislation coverage for different forms of
employment relation in the UK setting. While ZHC workers are covered by some em-
ployment legislation, such as minimum wage coverage and holiday pay, legal complica-
tions have arisen due to the nature of the contract. One key area of contention has been
whether a worker is also considered an “employee”, which would in turn grant them ad-
ditional rights, such as unfair dismissal protection (Adams, Freedman, and Prassl, 2018).3
While the contract itself would not classify workers as employees, case law in the UK to
date has concentrated more on whether there is a pattern of regular work being accepted,
and if so the employee classification would be granted (Pyper and McGuinness, 2018).
ZHCs have received a fair amount of attention both in the UK media and from the
UK Parliament. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that was in
power from 2010 to 2015 launched a review of the use of ZHCs in 2013. This raised four
main areas of concern – exclusivity clauses, transparency of contracts offered to workers,
uncertainty of earnings and an imbalance in the employment relationship. Up to now, the
only area which has been legislatively addressed is that concerning exclusivity clauses,
i.e. clauses that prevented workers on ZHCs from working for more than one employer.
As of March 2015, the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 came into force
and effectively banned exclusivity clauses on ZHCs.
2It is questionable however, whether all ZHC roles afford workers this ability in practice (Wakeling, 2014).
3Workers are still afforded a number of core employment rights, unlike for example, those gig economy
workers who are officially self-employed and thus are not covered.
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4.2.2 Zero Hours-Like Contracts: the International Setting
As stated above there is no legal definition in the UK for ZHCs, and thus international
comparisons rely on assessing qualitative similarities. This can often be problematic due
to the differences in terminology, legal status and governance. Similar atypical working
arrangements however do exist and there is varied diffusion across Europe and other
developed economies, though they often operate under different names, and levels of
regulation. Caution should nonetheless be taken when drawing parallels as the welfare
implications of such arrangements will also rely on factors such as union coverage and
domestic economic performance.
Probably the largest proportion of such atypical contracts exists in Australia, where
“casual employment” contracts are a legal classification and approximately 25 percent of
employees are on such contracts. Around half of workers on these contracts receive vari-
able earnings from one period to the next, and around a third would like more hours (Gil-
fillan, 2018). Australia is however an outlier in this case, since most developed economies
where zero hours-like contracts are used generally have usage rates in the same region
as the UK. In Canada 3.2 percent of employment is in “casual employment” and in the
US approximately 2.6 percent is “on-call”. In Europe, Finland reported 4 percent of em-
ployees on ZHCs and Norway 0.8 percent; in Netherlands 6.4 percent are “on-call”, and
the Irish Quarterly National Household Survey reports that approximately 5.3 percent of
Irish employees have constant variation in their working hours.4 Given the varied defi-
nition and sometimes lack of a legal classification, equivalent statistics do not necessarily
exist for all countries where there is diffusion.
The attention these types of contracts have received in the media and political sphere
are not unique to the UK. Following union pressure, New Zealand passed regulation in
2016 which stipulated that firms needed to outline a minimum number of guaranteed
hours each week and employee refusal of hours beyond that should not result in any
detriment to the worker. Furthermore, it introduced the requirement of compensation
to the worker if shifts were cancelled at short notice. In Finland, a citizen’s initiative
gathered 50,000 supporters to ban ZHCs, and though it was rejected by the parliament,
a number of proposals have been made in order to regulate such employment relation-
ships. The most recent looks to ensure that employers present a valid reason (relating
to demand fluctuations) as to why they require to use a ZHC. Extensive regulation was
introduced in 2012 and 2013 to “on-call” work in Italy and has severely restricted the use
of zero hours-like contracts to only older and younger age groups, and in 2014 further
regulation was introduced in both the Netherlands and France.
Table 4.2 presents a comparative set of descriptions and associated regulations for
zero hours-like contracts in Western Europe (where they are present) and for the US.
Western Europe generally experiences significant regulation of zero hours-like contracts.
4Figures for the Netherlands are from 2016; for Finland, Ireland and the US from 2015, and for Norway
from 2010.
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For example, while proliferation in the EU is largest in the Netherlands, workers there
enjoy regulations that ensure a minimum number of hours of work whenever they are
called to work, as well as agreed hour adjustments based on the previous three months
of work. Conversely, unlike the UK, employees must work when called upon. Such
idiosyncrasies exemplify how outwardly similar contractual agreements may have very
different implications when in action. What is evident, however, is that the UK, Sweden
and the US (aside from some specific cities) appear to have the least regulation of zero
hours-like contracts. Union density in Sweden is high (around 70 percent), but in both the
UK and the US rates are much lower (23.2 percent and 10.7 percent respectively). Thus,
proliferation of zero hours (-like) contracts in the UK and the US, where workers’ real
wage growth has been weak, are likely to have the most significant welfare implications.
4.3 Related Literature
4.3.1 Atypical Work Arrangements
Employment relationships such as ZHCs, diverging from the standard full-time, perma-
nent, regular and single employer set-up have been characterized as “atypical” (Euro-
fund, 2017) and such working arrangements have seen a large amount of growth in the
past two decades in a number of developed economies (Eichhorst and Tobsch, 2013; Gie-
len and Schils, 2014; LSE Growth Commission, 2017; Katz and Krueger, 2019a). The con-
cept of “atypical” work arrangements has always been somewhat nebulous, but spans a
variety of working practices including part-time, agency, contract, fixed-term, contingent
and independent contracting. Studies have demonstrated the large heterogeneity across
these types of employment relationships, though part time and temporary work fare rel-
atively badly in terms of wages when compared to their standard counterpart (Kalleberg,
2000).
ZHCs most closely match the definition for contingent work, and early literature sug-
gested that atypical working arrangements, especially in the form of temporary or con-
tingent work, offered workers lower wages, fewer benefits, less security and little scope
for human capital development (Rodgers and Rodgers, 1989; Beard and Edwards, 1995;
Nollen, 1996; Kalleberg, 2000).5 Conversely, however, more recent (albeit weak) evidence
has suggested that atypical work may serve as a stepping stone to more stable employ-
ment in the long run, when faced between an option of continued job search and atypical
employment (Addison and Surfield, 2008).
The past few years have seen a growth in the interest in atypical or “alternative”
work arrangements with a small portion of the literature presenting descriptive evidence
as well as trying to understand the mechanisms driving the shift to such types of work.
5Contingent work is defined as “any job in which an individual does not have an explicit or implicit con-
tract for long-term employment or one in which the minimum hours worked can vary in a non-systematic
manner” (Polivka and Nardone, 1989).
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Factors that have been suggested to be contributors include weak demand conditions,
worker’s preferences and technological change; where the latter may work by reducing
transaction costs. Since transaction costs – such as search, monitoring and enforcement
costs – are, according to Coase (1937), factors that lead to the creation of the firm, it is
likely that technological change would lead to a blurring of the boundaries of the firm.
Katz and Krueger (2019b) found that, over the ten year period between 2005 and
2015, the proportion of workers engaged in some form of alternative work arrangement
grew by 10-20 percent in the United States, while analysis of the UK labor market has
shown a growth in both the prevalence of ZHCs as well as individuals described as “self-
employed with no employees” (LSE Growth Commission, 2017).
Katz and Krueger (2017) report US findings that individuals who suffer periods of
unemployment are 7-17 percent more likely to be employed in alternative work arrange-
ments 1 to 2.5 years later than their observational counterparts who did not experience
such unemployment. These results suggest that at least one factor that could be driving
the supply side of the atypical labor market is a weakening of market power for workers.
Additionally, Mas and Pallais (2017) use a discrete choice experiment to elicit willingness
to pay for alternative work arrangements for call center workers and find that the av-
erage worker is willing to give up a fifth of their wages to avoid an employer dictated
work schedule. This gives further evidence that low paid workers finding themselves
in contingent work arrangements are likely to be engaged in such work out of necessity
rather than choice.
To our knowledge there is little recent research concerning the factors driving labor
demand for contingent work arrangements. There are obvious benefits to employers, in
particular the ability to reduce wage liabilities and cope with seasonal and weekly fluc-
tuating demand conditions. Dube et al. (forthcoming) present evidence demonstrating
significant monopsony power on an online labor market platform, though it should be
noted such self-employed “HIT” work does have some key differences to more tradi-
tional sectors, which generally offer more on-going work.
4.3.2 Minimum Wages
Over its long existence as a key research area in labor economics, the minimum wage lit-
erature has evolved along three main lines of research. The primary and most traditional
focus has been on the employment and unemployment effects of minimum wages, which
have proven elusive to detect in many cases. Early studies based mostly on US time-
series work found negative employment effects among teenagers (Brown, Gilroy, and
Kohen, 1982). However, apart from those, the vast majority of quasi-experimental micro-
based work that started in the early 1990s in the US and the UK (Card and Levine, 1994;
Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Giupponi and Machin, 2018), and of
more recent analyses based on spatial identification in the US find hardly any evidence of
Chapter 4. Zero Hours Contracts and Labor Market Policy 227
disemployment effects of minimum wages (Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; Baskaya and
Rubinstein, 2015; Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2016; Clemens and Wither, 2019).6
Partly in response to this fairly widespread inability to find evidence of disemploy-
ment effects, a second strand of research has investigated other margins through which
firms can adjust to the wage cost shock induced by the minimum wage increase. Exam-
ples of such margins of adjustment are prices (Aaronson, 2001; MaCurdy, 2015; Harasz-
tosi and Lindner, forthcoming), profits (Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen, 2011), firm value
(Bell and Machin, 2018) and the quality of services provided (Giupponi and Machin,
2018). A third body of the literature has looked at the impact on wage inequality at the
bottom of the distribution, and at wage spillover effects up the wage distribution and
onto legally unaffected workers (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999; Autor
et al., 2016; Giupponi and Machin, 2018).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper examining the impact of a mini-
mum wage change on contractual arrangements. We thus contribute to the existing lit-
erature by assessing the impact of minimum wages on workers’ employment conditions
(other than pay) and on the utilization of flexible contractual forms by firms that can act
as buffers against the wage cost shock. We do this by exploiting the introduction of the
National Living Wage (NLW) in the UK in April 2016. The NLW is the mandated mini-
mum wage rate for workers aged 25 and over; it was set at £7.20 an hour from April 2016
to March 2017, then uprated to £7.50 in April 2017.7 As demonstrated by Figure 4.A1 in
Appendix 4.A, while the UK has had various national minimum wages (NMW) in place
since 1999, the NLW introduction represented a substantial (7.5 percent) increase in the
wage floor for those aged 25 and over.
4.4 Survey Evidence of Zero Hours Contracts
4.4.1 ZHCs in the Labour Force Survey
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly cross-sectional survey of the UK labor mar-
ket. Each quarter contains data on approximately 35,000 employees, some of whom could
be on a ZHC. Questions relating to flexible work arrangements are asked only in quarters
April-June and October-December therefore in each year it is only these two quarters that
are analyzed.
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for both all employees and ZHC employees for
2017. Of all workers in 2017, around 2.7 percent are recorded as being on ZHCs. ZHC
workers are on average more likely to be younger, female, and still in full time education,
though still a large proportion (over 80 percent) have completed their full-time education.
6In a rather different context of union bargained minima, Kreiner, Reck, and Skov (2017) study the effect
of a change in the youth minimum wage in Denmark and find an employment elasticity to the wage rate of
-0.8.
7Further details on UK minimum wage policies and the National Living Wage will be provided in Section
4.5.
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It is unsurprising that female workers experience a higher incidence of ZHCs given they
are more prevalent amongst part-time employees. Typically, ZHC workers have lower
tenure, though it is unclear whether this is due to higher ZHC worker turnover rates or
if longer tenured ZHC workers are more likely to be placed on more secure contracts.
The mean hourly wage for ZHC workers is around £5 lower than the equivalent for all
workers, and they work on average 10 hours less per week than the average employee.
Interestingly, the median hourly wage for ZHC workers is very close to the 2017 NLW of
£7.50 per hour, within approximately 5 percent.
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.4 exemplify the importance of the NLW for ZHC workers. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows there to be a very sizable spike in the wage distribution for ZHC workers
at the 2017 NLW of £7.50 an hour. Table 4.4 shows that, while the NLW is important for
a significant proportion of all employees, with around 6 percent paid exactly the NLW
and 20 percent likely to be affected by the subsequent minimum wage uprating, the 2016
and 2017 upratings affected a lot more – around half – of all ZHC workers. This latter
figure could increase when one considers the possibility of wage spillover effects up the
distribution.8 While the NLW is age specific and mandatory only for those aged 25 and
over, there is strong evidence that there are spillovers for workers aged under 25 (Giup-
poni and Machin, 2018). Indeed, one can see that the proportion paid exactly the NLW is
identical for all employees and for those aged 25 and over. This identity is lost, but only
marginally, when considering ZHC workers.
The LFS also has a panel version of the survey, albeit with a much smaller sample size.
We use this to produce transition Tables 4.5 and 4.6, which detail flows into/out of ZHC
positions from/to different types of economic activity. As can be seen by the diagonals
in both tables, ZHCs have the lowest persistence of all working arrangements presented.
Over the period analyzed (2015-2018) just over a third of ZHC workers remained in ZHC
positions after five quarters and, of ZHC workers, only a quarter were ZHC workers five
quarters before. ZHC workers are most likely to transition from and to other forms of
part time employment, full time employment and inactivity.
These patterns of work dynamics act to confirm the somewhat precarious nature of
ZHCs as a form of employment. One issue that emerges is whether workers who move
from ZHCs into more secure working arrangements (part-time and full-time employ-
ment) do so by changing employer, or if after a period of time their employer offers a
more secure contract. Equally, there is the question of whether those in “regular” work
get reclassified by employers onto ZHCs. Sample size issues preclude any systematic
and robust probing of this question with the data we have available, but when we in-
vestigated the interaction between job changes and changes in ZHC status for non-job
changers, we found there to be a roughly half and half mixture of job moves and reclas-
sifications. Clearly both are happening, but this remains suggestive as reaching a firmer
8 For evidence on the existence (or lack thereof) of spillover effects in the UK see Stewart (2012), Low Pay
Commission (2009) and Butcher, Dickens, and Manning (2012).
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conclusion would require more detailed and larger sample size longitudinal data than
we are currently able to study.
4.4.2 ZHCs in the LSE-CEP Survey of Alternative Work Arrangements
In order to better understand the role of alternative work arrangements in the UK, be-
tween February 5th and March 2nd 2018, we ran the “LSE-CEP Survey of Alternative
Work Arrangements” using an online platform. While the survey was designed to be
representative of the UK population aged 18-65, its main goal was to collect information
on both the types of jobs and characteristics of workers involved in alternative work ar-
rangements. The survey questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 4.C. The survey ques-
tioned approximately 20,000 individuals, of which just fewer than 19,000 remained in the
cleaned sample.9
Table 4.B1 in Appendix 4.B presents descriptive statistics for the sample of respon-
dents of the LSE-CEP survey. The survey is equally represented across sex and the age
distribution, with a slightly lower participation rate for the ends (18-24 and 55-65) of the
surveyed age distribution. Additionally, there is a healthy mixture of qualification attain-
ment as well as regional representativeness across the UK. Around half of our sample are
employed by a private company, a further quarter are employed by either a non-profit or
government and the remainder are split between some form of self-employment or not
working. Sample attrition during cleaning does not appear to fundamentally change any
of these statistics.
Table 4.7 presents descriptive statistics for ZHC workers, for the cleaned sample.
ZHCs are spread roughly equally across the sexes of respondents, which is marginally
different to the LFS proportion shown earlier in Table 4.3. ZHC workers in our survey
are on average younger than the average worker, though surprisingly share a similar
distribution of educational qualifications as all workers in the survey. One may have as-
sumed that workers experiencing more insecure employment contracts would be those
with lower skill sets and thus market power, however these summary statistics suggest
otherwise. On the whole, a region’s share of ZHC workers is roughly the same as their
share of workers overall. However, London appears to be anomalous in that its share of
ZHC workers is about four fifths higher than its share of workers. Interestingly, a large
proportion of ZHC workers (42 percent in the cleaned sample) hold multiple jobs, and
around a third hold a job with a more secure contract. This is suggestive that ZHC jobs
may act as a form of “top up” income for some workers, and additionally some ZHC
workers may hold multiple ZHC jobs as a form of insurance due to the possibility of lack
of hours.
Hourly wages for ZHC workers in our survey are paid an average of £11.63 per hour;
this is slightly higher than the same figure produced by the LFS for ZHC workers (£9.77).
9Respondents were excluded from the cleaned sample if they responded with gibberish to any open
questions and/or did not answer the attention questions correctly.
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Figure 4.2 presents the hourly wage distribution for ZHC workers in our survey. It can
be seen that the modal hourly rate is £8 and that there is a large proportion of individuals
paid around the region of the NLW rate of £7.50. Thus, it is likely to be the thicker right
tail that is driving up the mean wage in the CEP survey compared to the LFS, rather than
the entire distribution being centered higher.
The average number of hours worked is low (around 19 per week) and similar to
the figure found in the LFS. This further concretes the fact that many ZHC workers are
working less than full time. Figure 4.3 presents the weekly hours distribution. There is
a large spread of the hours performed, with almost 10 percent of workers not doing any
hours the previous week, which may well be reflective of the insecurity related to some
ZHC jobs. There does appear to be a selection of workers performing full-time (or above
full-time) hours, whether these hours are regular is however unclear.
What is striking is that around one third of ZHC workers do unpaid work each week,
averaging at 7 hours per week. This would imply the average worker is losing out on
approximately £80 per week. Such losses may be particularly important for social care
workers (who we study in more detail below). As discussed in Rubery, Grimshaw, and
Hebson (2014) domiciliary carers for example only get paid for face to face time, and time
spent driving between clients may result in what they call a “fragmented time contract”.
Almost two thirds of ZHC workers have been working for over five years. Conversely,
over half of those sampled have less than one year experience on a ZHC, suggesting that
an abundance of those on ZHCs have previously held non-ZHC working arrangements.
There are a few industries which stand out as having a large share of workers on
ZHCs. In particular, retail, education, accommodation and food services, and health
and social work. For retail and accommodation and food services this is unsurprising, as
these professions are characterized by having a larger proportion of workers on part-time
contracts and may be subject to seasonal fluctuations. The health and social work sector
has the highest proportion of ZHC workers (15 percent). The social care sector, which
falls under this heading, has not only a large number of low paid staff, but also faces an
informal price cap for its output good, as a large proportion of those receiving social care
are council funded. It is thus a perfect sector to analyze to assess whether firms facing
growing wage bills due to the NLW are likely to use ZHCs to reduce their wage liability.
4.4.3 LSE-CEP Survey Representativeness
Table 4.B2 in Appendix 4.B presents demographic variables (similar to those in Table 4.7
and Table 4.B1 in Appendix 4.B) for both all respondents and ZHC workers from the
LFS, and can be used to check the representativeness of the CEP survey. In terms of
overall representativeness, our survey fairs well with respect to age, qualifications and
regional distribution. Our survey does however under sample those who did not have a
job last week. Furthermore, the survey’s representativeness of ZHC workers is generally
good, however one can see that the mean hourly wage is just under £2 per hour higher
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in our survey. The median wages however are more similar (the gap reduces to £0.64),
which suggests that the LSE-CEP survey has a slightly fatter right-hand tail of the wage
distribution as discussed in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.4 LSE-CEP Survey Results
In this subsection, we report a second set of results that emerged from the survey of
employees on ZHCs, with a focus on workers preferences and employment conditions.
An important question is whether workers choose to be on ZHCs for the flexibility
that they offer, or would instead like a job with a minimum number of guaranteed hours
but could only find employment as ZHC workers. Our survey results suggest an almost
even split between workers who are satisfied with their number of hours (40 percent) and
workers who would rather work more hours (44 percent), while a remaining 16 percent
would like to work fewer hours (Figure 4.4). Of those wanting to work more hours, when
asked about the reason why there are unable to work more hours, 74 percent point to the
lack of available work, followed by another 15 percent who are instead constrained by
domestic commitments (Figure 4.5). As reported in Figure 4.6, domestic commitments
are also the main reason brought about by people who would like to work fewer hours
(38 percent), followed by the desire to spend more time on leisure and other unpaid
activities (26 percent) or other types of work (14 percent), impediments due to illness or
disability (10 percent) and study commitments (7 percent). In addition to the number of
hours worked, the pattern of those hours may also be a relevant dimension of workers’
satisfaction with their jobs. As with the desired number of hours, there appears to be an
almost even split between respondents who would like to have a more regular pattern
of hours (45 percent) and those who are satisfied with their current pattern of hours (43
percent), with the remaining 12 percent wanting a less regular schedule (Figure 4.7).
The survey responses regarding desired hours and work time patterns are suggestive
of an almost even dichotomy between workers who are happy with the amount of work
that they do, and workers who would like to work more but are unable to. We further
investigate this issue by asking ZHC workers what are the reasons for their being on a
ZHC (Figure 4.8). In line with our previous findings, the two main reasons that stand
out are the inability to find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours
(28 percent) and the flexibility to perform other activities (28 percent). Less prominent
reasons are – in order of relevance – better remuneration than other available jobs (20
percent), complementing pay from other jobs (14 percent) and earning while studying (7
percent). Overall, 51 percent of respondents state that they are either satisfied or very
satisfied with their ZHC job, 28 percent are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and the
remaining 21 percent are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (Figure 4.9).
Finally, we are interested in whether ZHC workers receive training and what type of
training they would find most useful. According to our survey results, 55 percent of ZHC
workers had received some form of training in the past year. As illustrated in column (1)
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of Table 4.8, the most common types of training are – in order of importance – safety
training (56 percent), skills training (54 percent), quality training (30 percent), and pro-
fessional and legal training (22 percent). Training was paid for by employers, contractors,
customers or someone else in 72 percent of cases, by the respondent in 16 percent of cases
and free for the remainder 12 percent (Table 4.9). We also asked all ZHC respondents
what type of training they would find useful for their future job prospects (column (2)
of Table 4.8): skills training stands out as 50 percent of respondents indicate is as useful,
followed by safety training (27 percent) and other types of training (all deemed useful by
approximately 23 percent of respondents). It therefore seems that, when offered, training
meets individual requirements.
4.5 Zero Hours Contracts and Minimum Wages
4.5.1 Conceptual Framework
As documented in the previous sections, a large fraction of workers on ZHCs are paid the
minimum wage. An interesting question that is relevant for policy is to assess whether
labor market policies such as minimum wage upratings are responsible for the increased
diffusion of ZHCs, or – conversely – the latter are a consequence of factors that have little
to do with labor market institutions. In the first case we should see that a raise of the
minimum wage increases the utilization of ZHCs. In second case, we should see no effect
of the minimum wage on ZHC usage. The rationale for a causal effect of minimum wage
policies on ZHC utilization is that ZHCs can help firms buffer the wage cost shock due
to the minimum wage increase by allowing them not to commit to a minimum number
of hours. At the same time, though, the burden of insecurity would be transferred from
firms onto risk-averse employees, potentially worsening the employment conditions of
individual workers.
In this section, we exploit a large minimum wage increase recently implemented in
the UK – the National Living Wage introduction – to shed light on the causal effect of
minimum wage policies on the incidence of ZHCs. We do so in the context of the En-
glish adult social care sector, which previous research has demonstrated to be highly
vulnerable to minimum wage increases (Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2003; Machin
and Wilson, 2004; Giupponi and Machin, 2018) and which can therefore provide a good
testing ground for the effects of minimum wage policies.
Whilst there is a sample selection issue of studying care workers, and associated ques-
tions of generalizability to the UK workforce more widely, looking at the adult social care
sector allows us to have good quality data on hourly wages and contractual arrangements
(which are necessary to answer well the question that we ask). Also, the fact that flexible
work arrangements are already largely in use in this sector means that – if the NLW has
an impact on ZHC utilization – this is a sector in which we can see it. Moreover, the
estimates are relevant for other low-pay, ZHC-intense sectors, like hospitality and retail,
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which are those we care about the most when studying the economic effects of minimum
wage floors.
4.5.2 The Introduction of the National Living Wage
The first UK national minimum wage policy dates back to April 1999, when the National
Minimum Wage (NMW) was first introduced. At that time, a minimum hourly wage of
£3.60 for workers aged 22 and over, and a lower rate of £3.00 for workers aged between
18 and 21 were established. Additional rates have been introduced in subsequent years,
so that as of October 2015 the NMW rates were as follows: an adult minimum rate of
£6.70 for workers aged 21 and over, a youth development rate of £5.30 for those aged
18-20, a youth minimum of £3.87 for 16-17 year olds and an apprentice rate of £3.30.
On July 8th 2015, the newly elected Conservative Party government called an emer-
gency budget, in which the Chancellor George Osborne announced the introduction of
the National Living Wage (NLW). This unexpected intervention changed the structure of
minimum wages by introducing a new minimum wage rate of £7.20 an hour for workers
aged 25 or above starting from April 1st 2016, while leaving the minimum wage rates
for younger workers unchanged.10 Five minimum wage rates are now in operation in
the UK: the NLW for workers aged 25 and over, the NMW for 21-24 year olds, the youth
development rate for 18-20 year olds, the young worker rate for 16 and 17 year old, and
the apprentice minimum wage.11
The NLW introduction was an unexpected and radical policy intervention. Firstly,
it came from a political party that had traditionally been hostile to minimum wages,
especially at the time of the NMW introduction in April 1999. Secondly, the NLW intro-
duction generated a wage change much larger than recent uprates, namely an increase
of 10.8 percent at the time of announcement in July 2015 and of 7.5 percent at the time
of implementation on April 1st 2016. Most importantly for our analysis, the unexpected
and sizable wage shock generated by the NLW introduction provides a unique “experi-
ment” to study the consequences of the minimum wage increase and the wage cost shock
it induced on employers’ use of ZHCs.
4.5.3 The Adult Social Care Sector
The impact of the NLW introduction on ZHC utilization is studied in the context of work-
ers and firms in the English adult social care sector. Specifically, we will consider adult
social care providers operating in the residential care home industry and the domiciliary
care industry. Residential care refers to the provision of accommodation and personal
10Additionally, the NLW was set to achieve 60 percent of median earnings by 2020, which – at the time of
the announcement – was forecasted to be £9.00 by the UK Office for Budget Responsibility.
11See Giupponi and Machin (2018) for a comprehensive discussion of minimum wages in the UK and for
an empirical analysis of the wage and employment consequences of this significant change in the structure
of minimum wages.
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care to adults in a communal residential center, which may or may not provide nursing
facilities. Members of staff in residential care homes are predominantly care assistants,
who provide 24 hour supervision, meals and help with personal care needs. Domiciliary
care – also referred to as home care – is a social care service provided to people who live
in their own houses and require assistance with personal care routines, household tasks
such as cleaning and cooking, or any other activities they may need to live independently.
Domiciliary care assistants typically work individually, and are often contracted on flexi-
ble working hours or ZHCs since domiciliary care work tends to be organized into short
and fragmented home visits.
The choice of focusing on the adult social care sector is motivated by various rea-
sons. Firstly, the sector is highly vulnerable to minimum wages changes, as it has many
low-paid workers. Of these, the vast majority are older than 25, making the setting espe-
cially suited to analyzing the NLW introduction. Secondly, the sector is close to what can
be considered a competitive labor market, as it consists of a large number of relatively
small firms providing a rather homogeneous service, and it is very labor intensive and
not unionized. Thirdly, residents’ fees are regulated and paid for by local authorities,
making it difficult for firms to pass higher costs onto prices. For all these reasons, a min-
imum wage change is likely to have a substantial impact on total costs and on economic
outcomes of workers and firms in this sector, which therefore provides a useful testing
ground for analyzing the impact of minimum wage policies. In other words, the high
vulnerability to the minimum wage increases the likelihood of finding large effects from
wage shocks. Finally, the incidence of ZHCs is high – particularly in the domiciliary care
industry – making this setting especially suited to studying the impact of the NLW on
ZHCs.
4.5.4 Data Sources
The main data source that is used to analyze the effect of the NLW introduction on ZHC
utilization is the National Minimum Dataset for Social Care (NMDS-SC).12 This is an
online system administered by Skills for Care and funded by the UK Department of
Health that collects information on the adult social care workforce in England. Social
care providers can use NMDS-SC to record and manage information about their workers,
such as payroll data, training and development, job roles, qualifications and basic demo-
graphics. By having an account and regularly updating it, providers are given access
to a set of tools to visualize and analyze their data, submit applications for training and
development funds, compare their employment and pay structure with those of other
providers locally, regionally or nationally, access publications about the social care sec-
tor and other e-learning resources for free, and directly share their data and returns with
authorities such as the Care Quality Commission and the NHS. No fee is charged to use
12NMDS-SC (2013); NMDS-SC (2014).
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NMDS-SC. However, in order to benefit of certain facilities, providers must update their
account at least once per year.
The dataset is a panel of matched employer-employee data. For each provider, we
have information on the industry and main service provided, service capacity and uti-
lization, number of staff employed, geographic location and system update dates. For
workers, we have information on demographics (gender, age and nationality), job char-
acteristics (job role, contract type and qualifications), contracted weekly hours, hourly
pay and update date of the hourly pay rate. We have access to the snapshot of the NMDS-
SC online system at monthly frequency from March 2015 to March 2017, each snapshot
including all providers in the system at that date.
A second data source is the Care Quality Commission (CQC) registry.13 The reg-
istry contains a complete record of all active English care providers regulated by CQC at
monthly frequency. It provides information on the activity status of providers and there-
fore allows us to identify when homes shut down and when new homes enter into the
market.
4.5.5 Sample Design
Around 22,000 providers are registered with NMDS-SC as of March 2016. Of these, ap-
proximately 10,000 are residential care homes with or without nursing, and 3,800 are
domiciliary care agencies. We match the sample of residential care homes and domicil-
iary care agencies with the CQC registry of active locations from March 2015 to March
2017, from which we can obtain information on whether a firm is active or closed in a
given month. Our sample comprises care homes that meet the following three criteria: (i)
being active from March 2015 through to March 2017 according to the CQC registry, (ii)
having a record on NMDS-SC for all those months and (iii) having updated their NMDS-
SC account at least once after March 2016.14 This selection leaves us with a balanced
panel of 4,680 firms that are active in March 2016 and remain open until March 2017.15
13The CQC is the independent regulator of health and adult social care in England. It is responsible for
setting standards of care and for monitoring, inspecting and rating adult social care providers, to make sure
that they meet fundamental standards of quality and safety.
14In order to avoid introducing sample selection driven by unobservable worker and firm characteristics
correlated with the timing and frequency of updating, we do not condition our sample on a specific up-
date date and only require that a firm update its records once in the twelve months after April 1st 2016.
Approximately 90 percent of NMDS-SC users update within a year.
15 In our sample we have a total of 3,599 care homes and 1,081 domiciliary care agencies. According to
the 2017 report on the care home market of the Competition and Markets Authority (2017), there are ap-
proximately 9,500 care homes in England. This implies that our sample represents approximately 38 percent
of the market for care homes. According to a 2016 report of the United Kingdom Home Care Association
(2016), the total number of registered locations providing domiciliary care in England was 8,500 in March
2016. This implies that our sample represents approximately 13 percent of the market of domiciliary care
agencies.
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4.5.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.10 reports descriptive statistics for all firms in the balanced sample, and for care
homes and domiciliary care agencies separately, as of March 2016. The adult social care
sector is characterized by relatively low hourly pay (£7.57 per hour on average) and a
large fraction of workers are aged 25 and over (88 percent on average), which are in-
dicative of a high vulnerability to minimum wage increases in general and to the NLW
introduction in particular.
The statistics reported in Table 4.10 also show that the care home sector is charac-
terized by medium-sized establishments employing on average 45 employees. Domi-
ciliary care agencies have a larger pool of employees as compared to care homes (66 vs
39 employees on average), and a remarkably higher proportion of ZHC workers (38 vs
5 percent) that translates into lower average weekly hours (16 vs 29 hours). Moreover,
the proportion of workers on other flexible work arrangements such as temporary, bank
or agency contracts, is almost twice as large in the domiciliary care sector (14 vs 8 per-
cent). These differences most likely stem from the very nature of domiciliary care work,
which tends to be organized into short and fragmented home visits to customers, so that
domiciliary care assistants are often contracted on flexible working hours.
Apart from substantial differences in the types of working arrangements, the two sec-
tors have an almost identical gender and age composition and similar wage rates. The
main occupation in both sectors is care assistant and only a very small share of the work-
force holds a nursing qualification. All these characteristics confirm that the adult social
care sector is a pertinent context to the studying of the effects of the NLW introduction
on wages and contractual arrangements.
4.5.7 NMDS-SC Representativeness
We check the representativeness of the NMDS-SC data using data from the Labour Force
Survey (LFS). Table 4.B3 in Appendix 4.B reports the mean and standard deviation for a
set of individual-level characteristics for care workers in the LFS.16 The table also reports
the same characteristics for care workers at the firm level in NMDS-SC. Demographic
variables relating to gender, age and region line up very closely. The hourly wage rate
and number of weekly hours worked are slightly higher in the LFS data, while the pro-
portion of workers on ZHC is slightly lower. The discrepancy in average weekly hours in
LFS and NMDS-SC is most likely due to the fact that the variable in LFS refers to actual
hours worked, while in NMDS-SC to contractual hours, which – for ZHC workers – are
equal to zero and therefore pull down the mean. The larger fraction of workers on ZHCs
in NMDS-SC may be due to the fact that, in this dataset, we cannot account for multiple
job holders, which tend to be more frequent in ZHC jobs. All in all, the statistics appear
to line up quite satisfactorily, mostly showing a consistent pattern across sources.
16We select employees with standard occupation classification (SOC2010) marked as “care workers” in the
LFS. LFS data refer to 2015Q4 and 2016Q1. NMDS-SC data refer to March 2016.
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4.5.8 Empirical Strategy
This section explores whether the minimum wage increase due to the NLW introduction
had an impact on the share of workers on ZHCs. By tilting the composition of the work-
force towards contracts without a guaranteed number of hours, employers can easily
adjust employment at the intensive margin, either on top of or in substitution to ad-
justments along the extensive margin. Consistent with previous work (Giupponi and
Machin, 2018), we will show that the NLW did not have a significant impact on employ-
ment, suggesting that any substitution toward contracts with flexible working arrange-
ments is to be interpreted as an adjustment at the intensive margin.
The empirical strategy is based on a difference-in-differences methodology in which
we exploit between-firm variation in the pre-NLW proportion of workers that would be
affected by the minimum wage increase, in order to identify the effect of the minimum
wage hike on ZHC utilization. The regression specification reads as follows:
∆qYj,t = α1,t + β1,t ·MINj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ1,t + ξ j,t (4.1)
where ∆qYj,t is the quarter-on-quarter change in the proportion of workers on a ZHC in
firm j between quarter t and quarter t − 1; MINj,Mar2016 is the proportion of low-paid
workers in firm j as of March 2016; X is a vector of pre-NLW firm-level characteristics
measured in March 2016, including the proportion of female workers, the average age,
the proportion working as care assistants, the proportion with nursing qualification, the
occupancy rate and a set of local authority districts fixed effects; ξ is a disturbance term.17,
18 The subscript t indicates the quarter relative to March 2016, which is normalized to take
value t = 0. The variable MINj,Mar2016 is constructed as the proportion of workers that in
March 2016 were paid below the age-specific minimum wage rate that would be in place
as of April 2016. In other words, the variable provides a measure of the NLW bite at firm
level.
The coefficients β1,t for t = −4, . . . , 0 are treatment leads and provide an easy way
to test whether there is any correlation between ZHC utilization and the proportion of
low-paid workers prior to the NLW introduction. In other words, the leads allow to test
whether there were divergent trends in ZHC utilization between firms more and less
exposed to the minimum wage increase before the policy change. This is equivalent to
testing for the parallel trends assumption in a traditional difference-in-differences setting.
To document the evolution of the relationship between the low-paid proportion and
ZHC growth in the post-reform quarters, we measure the outcome variable ∆qYj,t as the
17Data on the gender and age composition, and on the occupancy rate is missing for some firms. Such
missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
18There is a total of 325 local authority districts in our sample and of 326 local authority districts in Eng-
land. They split England into 326 areas of local governance.
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long difference between March 2016 and, respectively, June 2016, September 2016, De-
cember 2016 and March 2017. This is equivalent to estimating the cumulative effect of
the reform over post-reform quarters, i.e. the sum ∑kt=1 β1,t for k = 1, . . . , 4.
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that firms with the highest potential
to be affected by the NLW introduction were indeed those that experienced larger wage
growth in the quarters following the policy change, as a consequence of the NLW intro-
duction. Firstly, we provide evidence that this is indeed the case. Secondly, we show that
the between-firm correlation between the proportion of pre-NLW low-paid workers and
wage growth is entirely due to the minimum wage change. To this end, we estimate a
regression specification similar to model 4.1, using quarter-on-quarter wage growth as
outcome variable. The regression specification reads as follows:
∆q ln Wj,t = α2,t + β2,t ·MINj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ2,t + ηj,t (4.2)
where ∆q ln Wj,t is the quarter-on-quarter change in the logarithm of the average hourly
wage in firm j between quarter t and quarter t − 1; MINj,Mar2016 is the proportion of
low-paid workers in firm j in March 2016; X is the set of above listed covariates and η a
disturbance term. Analogously to what discussed for model 4.1, the coefficients β2,t for
t = −4, . . . , 0 are treatment leads that allow to test the exogeneity of the minimum wage
increase. For post-NLW quarters, we measure hourly wage growth (∆q ln Wj,t) between
March 2016 and, respectively, June 2016, September 2016, December 2016 and March
2017.
4.5.9 Main Results
Figure 4.10 reports the coefficients β2,t for t = −4, . . . , 0 and the cumulated sum ∑kt=1 β2,t
for k = 1, . . . , 4, from estimating model 4.2 on the balanced panel of firms that are active
throughout all months between March 2015 and March 2017. The dots indicate the es-
timated coefficients and the capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors. The specification allows for heterogeneity in the β2,t
coefficients between care homes (hollow circles) and domiciliary care agencies (black cir-
cles) and includes the full set of controls. The results provide compelling evidence of the
causal effect of the minimum wage change on hourly wage growth: whilst no systematic
correlation between the low-paid proportion and quarter-on-quarter wage growth can
be detected prior to the NLW introduction, a statistically significant correlation emerges
from the first quarter following the minimum wage increase.
In order to ease the interpretation of the results, Table 4.11 reports the estimates of
the cumulated sum ∑kt=1 β2,t for k = 4. This is equivalent to estimating the following
specification:
∆ ln Wj,t = α3 + β3 ·MINj,Mar2016 + X′j,Mar2016 · γ3 + νj,t (4.3)
Chapter 4. Zero Hours Contracts and Labor Market Policy 239
where ∆ ln Wj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of the average hourly wage in firm
j between March 2016 and March 2017; all other variables are defined as above and ν is a
disturbance term. The parameter β3 captures the relationship between the proportion of
low-paid workers and the average hourly wage growth in the 12 months after the NLW
introduction.
The specifications in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.11 report the estimated coefficient
β3 for the pooled sample of care homes and domiciliary care agencies, while those in
columns (2) and (4) allow β3 to vary across the two sectors. The regression models in
columns (3) and (4) include the above-listed firm-level controls. In all cases there is sig-
nificant evidence of larger wage increases in firms with more low-wage workers in the
pre-NLW period, as measured by the March 2016 proportion of low-wage workers. Ac-
cording to the estimate in column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the proportion
of low-paid workers (corresponding to a 34 percentage point change as reported in Ta-
ble 4.10) implies a 1.9 percentage-point faster wage growth on a baseline of 4 percent,
indicating a strong and significant relationship between our measure of the NLW bite
(MINj,Mar2016) and wage growth after the policy change. According to the estimates in
columns (2) and (4), there is no differential relationship between the initial proportion of
low-paid workers and wage growth in the domiciliary care and care home sector.
We now consider whether the wage cost shock induced by the NLW introduction had
consequences on ZHC utilization by firms. Figure 4.11 probes the relationship between
the low-paid proportion in March 2016 and growth in ZHC utilization by reporting the
coefficients β1,t for t = −4, . . . , 0 and the cumulated sum ∑kt=1 β1,t for k = 1, . . . , 4, from
estimating model 4.1 on the balanced panel of firms that are active throughout all months
between March 2015 and March 2017. Similar to Figure 4.10, the dots indicate the esti-
mated coefficients and the capped vertical bars report 95 percent confidence intervals
based on robust standard errors. The specification allows for heterogeneity in the β1,t
coefficients between care homes (hollow circles) and domiciliary care agencies (black cir-
cles) and includes the full set of controls. The graph shows no differential growth in ZHC
utilization prior to the introduction of the NLW across firms more or less exposed to the
minimum wage increase. After the policy change, a positive relationship between our
measure of the NLW bite and ZHC utilization emerges in both sectors, with a larger ef-
fect size in the domiciliary care one. Starting from the second quarter after March 2016
coefficients are statistically significant and persistent over time. The overall dynamic of
the effect gives strength to a causal interpretation of the impact of the minimum wage
hike on ZHC utilization.
Table 4.12 reports the regression coefficient β3 from estimating model 4.3 using the
change in the share of ZHC workers between March 2016 and March 2017 (∆Yj,t) as out-
come variable. Estimates in columns (1) and (3) refer to the pooled sample of care homes
and domiciliary care agencies, while those in columns (2) and (4) allow β3 to vary across
the two sectors. The regression models in columns (3) and (4) include firm-level controls.
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The coefficient estimate reported in column (3) indicates that a one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of low-paid workers is associated with a statistically signifi-
cant 0.5 percentage-point faster growth in ZHC utilization. When β3 is allowed to vary
across care home and domiciliary care sectors (columns (2) and (4)), the effect increases
by a factor of more than three in the domiciliary care sector. According to the results in
column (4), a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of workers paid below
the minimum is associated with a 0.4 percentage point larger increase in ZHC utilization
from a baseline of 0.6 in the care home sector, and a 1.5 percentage point larger increase in
ZHC utilization from a baseline of 6 percentage points in the domiciliary care sector. We
take this evidence as suggestive of an increase in the share of contracts with no minimum
guaranteed hours in response to the minimum wage increase, more so in a context – such
as that of domiciliary care agencies – in which work tends to be organized into short and
fragmented tasks.19
An interesting question to ask is whether the increased share of ZHCs is due to the
conversion of previously non-ZHC positions into ZHC ones, the creation of new ZHC
jobs or the displacement of workers on non-ZHC positions. For the first option to be
true, we would need to observe no employment effects of the NLW introduction, for the
second positive employment effects and for the third negative employment effects. We
investigate this mechanism in Table 4.B4 in Appendix 4.B, where we report estimates of
the coefficient β3 of model 4.3, using the change in the logarithm of employment head-
count between March 2016 and March 2017 as outcome variable. Our results do not point
to significant employment effects twelve months after the NLW introduction, thus sug-
gesting that new ZHC jobs replaced non-ZHC positions.
We also investigate whether the NLW introduction had an impact on the utilization of
other flexible contractual arrangements: temporary contracts, bank work and temporary
agency contracts.20 Regression estimates of model 4.3 are reported in columns (1) to (4)
of the various panels of Table 4.B5 in Appendix 4.B. For temporary contracts of all types,
estimates are of limited magnitude and statistically insignificant.
4.5.10 Estimating the Effect of Wages on ZHC Utilization
The analysis illustrated in the previous subsection provides reduced-form evidence of
the causal effect on the NLW introduction on the increased utilization of ZHCs. In this
section, we are interested in estimating the effect of the wage cost shock induced by the
19It is worth noting that, relative to the baseline, the effect size is larger for more exposed care homes,
though this is due entirely to the slower baseline growth rate.
20We report here the formal definitions of these three contractual arrangements, as defined by NMDS-SC.
Temporary contract: the worker is employed for a limited duration, normally either on a fixed term contract
or for a fixed task, or on a spell of casual or seasonal employment as a “temp”. Bank worker: the worker is
retained by the organisation as a whole, but deployed on a casual or short term basis. Temporary agency work:
the worker is supplied by an outside employment agency/bureau; this category includes staff employed by
NHS professionals, and workers supplied on contract e.g. by outside catering and cleaning companies.
Chapter 4. Zero Hours Contracts and Labor Market Policy 241
NLW introduction on ZHC utilization, i.e. a parameter that can potentially be general-
ized to other policy-relevant settings.
The empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the following structural-form
model:
∆Yj,t = α4 + β4 · ∆ ln Wj,t + X′j,Mar2016 · γ4 + θj,t (4.4)
where ∆Yj,t is the change in the share of workers employed with a zero hours contract
between March 2016 and March 2017; ∆ ln Wj,t is the change in the natural logarithm of
the average wage in firm j between March 2016 and March 2017; X is a vector of above-
listed pre-NLW firm-level characteristics and local authority districts fixed effects; θ is a
disturbance term. The parameter β4 measures the semi-elasticity of ZHC utilization to
the wage rate.
Due to the potential endogeneity of ∆ ln Wj,t, we estimate equation 4.4 via a two-stage
least squares approach and instrument the change in the logarithm of the average wage
∆ ln Wj,t with MINj,Mar2016. Model 4.3 can therefore be considered as the first stage of the
instrumental variable model. The estimates reported in Table 4.11 prove the relevance
of MINj,Mar2016 as instrument for ∆ ln Wj,t. Moreover, the patterns illustrated in Figures
4.10 and 4.11 combined provide compelling evidence in favour of the exogeneity of the
instrument and of the exclusion restriction.
Estimates of the coefficient β4 are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.12, where
column (5) is based on the pooled sample, while column (6) allows the coefficient β4
to vary between care homes and domiciliary care agencies. The estimate in column (5)
points to a positive and significant wage semi-elasticity of 0.26, whereby a 4.1 percent
increase in hourly wages (the average in the sample) leads to a 1.1 percentage point faster
growth in ZHC utilization on a baseline of 1.9 percentage points. Once we allow the
parameter to vary across the two industries, the effect becomes significantly larger in the
domiciliary care sector, and smaller for the care home sector. According to the estimates
in column (6), a 4.1 percent increase in wages (the average in the sample) leads to a 3.3
percentage point faster growth on a baseline of 6.1 percentage points in the domiciliary
care sector. In the care home sector, a similar wage increase leads to a 0.9 percentage
point faster growth in ZHC utilization, on a baseline of 0.6 percentage points.21 Thus, it
seems that one consequence of care sector employers paying higher wages to their staff
is a raised likelihood of also placing them on a zero hours contract. This is especially true
of domiciliary care employers.
4.5.11 Using LFS to Further Probe the Results for Low Paid Workers
Finally, we test whether a change in the proportion of ZHC utilization for care workers,
and workers in other low paying industries, following the introduction of the NLW is also
visible in the national statistics data. Figure 4.12 presents the evolution of the proportion
21Estimates of model 4.4 using the share of other forms of flexible contractual arrangements as outcome
variable are reported in the various panels of Table 4.B5 in Appendix 4.B.
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of care workers on ZHCs around the introduction of the NLW using data from the LFS,
for the period from 2014 to 2017. As can be seen, in the quarter following the introduction
there is an increase in the proportion of ZHCs. The first two columns of Table 4.13 present
an empirical counterpart to the graph from the following estimating equation:
ZHCi,t = α5 + β5 · PostNLWt + X′i,t · γ5 + ui,t (4.5)
where ZHC is a binary indicator of ZHC status for worker i in period t; PostNLW is
a dummy taking value one after March 2016; X is a vector of individual-level controls
including age, education, and dummies for gender, white ethnicity, British nationality,
working in the public sector and regional location; u is a disturbance term.22
The results shown in the first two columns of Table 4.13 demonstrate that, following
the NLW introduction, the proportion of workers employed on ZHCs in the social care
sector increased. In the column (2) specification including controls, it rose by 1 percent-
age point, or a sizable 24 percent of the pre-NLW mean.23 Furthermore, this positive
association appears generalizable to other lowing paying industries. Columns (3) and (4)
of Table 4.13 present results for estimates of equation 4.5 using a sample of all workers
employed in low paying industries.24 As can be seen, the results are almost identical to
those for the social care industry. Table 4.B6 in Appendix 4.B breaks down the results
into all 13 low paying industries and as can be seen all industries (aside from security)
have a positive β5 coefficient (albeit with varying magnitudes and degrees of signifi-
cance). Given the evidence outlined earlier in this section using the NMDS-SC data, we
feel there is substantive evidence to suggest that the increase in ZHC utilization in the
social care industry and in low paying industries in general in the national statistics is
due to the NLW introduction.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper offers new evidence on the rise and nature of alternative work arrangements,
with a specific focus on ZHCs in the context of the UK labor market. Combining both
secondary and newly collected survey data, we provide a comprehensive assessment of
the nature of ZHCs, which had been so far only very limitedly studied. The survey data
allow us to empirically document the characteristics of workers engaged in ZHCs and to
better understand the trade-off between flexibility and insecure, low pay that is inherent
in this type of work arrangement.
22Twelve region dummies were included in total.
23A regression using only care workers (i.e. based on occupation rather than industry) yields a similar
result, with a coefficient of 0.018 and a standard error of 0.007, representing a 17 percent increase on the
pre-NLW mean.
24The low paying industries used are those in the UK’s Low Pay Commission list, which can be found in
Low Pay Comission (2017), and are listed in Table 4.B6 in Appendix 4.B.
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Furthermore, we investigate whether minimum wage policies have a role in the in-
creased utilization of ZHCs by firms. We do so by leveraging a novel matched employer
employee dataset of English adult social care providers and credible identifying variation
stemming from the NLW introduction in the UK labor market.
The analysis finds that many workers on ZHCs are relatively low paid, with a large
proportion being paid at or slightly above the minimum wage. Such relatively low pay,
coupled with limited and fragmented hours, implies high levels of earnings insecurity
for workers whose only option is to work on this type of arrangement. Indeed, a stark
dichotomy emerges between workers who value the flexibility provided by ZHC jobs,
and workers who would rather work more and more regular hours and therefore appear
to be engaged in ZHCs out of necessity rather than choice.
The analysis reveals that minimum wage policies appear to have had some bearing
on the increased utilization of ZHCs. Specifically, in the context of the English adult so-
cial care sector, we find that the NLW introduction led to a larger incidence of ZHCs. The
increase is more highly pronounced in the domiciliary care sector, a sector in which work
has traditionally been organized around fragmented hours. This suggests that firms ex-
ploit the flexibility of ZHCs in order to buffer the wage cost shock induced by the min-
imum wage increase. It remains to be understood whether these effects will stabilize or
grow larger in the longer run – an issue we intend to study in due course. Similarly,
the issue of whether there should be a higher minimum wage for ZHC workers (as sug-
gested in the 2017 Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices) is a research question
that needs economic evidence to better inform its viability as a future option for labor
market policy.25 In particular, our evidence suggests that a domiciliary worker paid the
NMW experienced both an increase of 7.5 percent in their wages and 6.1 percent in their
probability of being on a ZHC as a result of the NLW introduction, and such a trade-off
may have important welfare implications for workers, both in their current employment
and for their future career trajectories.
25Taylor (2017).
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4.7 Figures
FIGURE 4.1: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL WORKERS AND
WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graphs show the distribution of hourly wages for all workers and workers who declare to be on
a ZHC. The distribution is censored at £5 and £20.00. The data are binned into £0.20 bins. NLW denotes the
level of the National Living Wage.
Source: LFS.
Chapter 4. Zero Hours Contracts and Labor Market Policy 245
FIGURE 4.2: HOURLY WAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of hourly wages for respondents who declare to be on a ZHC. The
distribution is censored at £5.00 and £20.00. The data are binned into £0.20 bins.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
FIGURE 4.3: WEEKLY HOURS DISTRIBUTION FOR WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of weekly hours of work for respondents who declare to be on a
ZHC. The distribution is trimmed at the 95th percentile.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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FIGURE 4.4: DESIRED HOURS FOR WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Would you have preferred to work
more or fewer hours last week in your zero hours contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or were you
satisfied with the number of hours you worked?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
FIGURE 4.5: REASON FOR NOT WORKING MORE HOURS (WORKERS ON
ZHC)
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Why were you NOT able to work
more last week?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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FIGURE 4.6: REASON FOR NOT WORKING FEWER HOURS (WORKERS ON
ZHC)
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Why would you want to work fewer
hours?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
FIGURE 4.7: DESIRED PATTERN OF HOURS FOR WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Would you have preferred to work
a pattern of more regular hours last week on your zero hours contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or
were you satisfied with the pattern of hours you worked?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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FIGURE 4.8: MAIN REASON FOR BEING ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “Which is the most important reason
why you work on a zero hours contract or on-call job?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
FIGURE 4.9: JOB SATISFACTION OF WORKERS ON ZHC
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Notes: The graph shows the distribution of responses to the question “How satisfied are you with working
on a zero hours contract or on-call job?”.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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FIGURE 4.10: EFFECT OF INITIAL LOW-PAID PROPORTION ON WAGE
GROWTH BY SECTOR
NLW Introduction
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Domiciliary Care Homes
Notes: For the quarters before the NLW introduction, the graph reports the estimated coefficients βˆ2,t from
model 4.2 for care homes and domiciliary care agencies. After the NLW introduction, the graph reports the
estimated sum ∑kt=1 ˆβ2,t for k = 1, . . . , 4. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care providers active
between March 2015 and March 2017. The vertical bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on
robust standard errors. Control variables included in the underlying regression are the initial proportion
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occu-
pancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing
information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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FIGURE 4.11: EFFECT OF INITIAL LOW-PAID PROPORTION ON PROPOR-
TION OF EMPLOYEES ON ZHC BY SECTOR
NLW Introduction
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Domiciliary Care Homes
Notes: For the quarters before the NLW introduction, the graph reports the estimated coefficients βˆ1,t from
model 4.1 for care homes and domiciliary care agencies. After the NLW introduction, the graph reports the
estimated sum ∑kt=1 ˆβ1,t for k = 1, . . . , 4. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care providers active
between March 2015 and March 2017. The vertical bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on
robust standard errors. Control variables included in the underlying regression are the initial proportion
female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occu-
pancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing
information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
Source: NMDS-SC.
FIGURE 4.12: PROPORTION OF CARE WORKERS ON ZHC (LFS)
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Notes: The graph presents the evolution of the proportion of care workers on ZHCs from April 2014 to April
2017. The dashed line marks the introduction of the NLW at the start of 2nd quarter in 2016.
Source: LFS.
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4.8 Tables
TABLE 4.1: FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE UK
Permanent employ-
ment
Zero hours contract Self-employment
National Insurance con-
tributions
Employers pay NI
contributions on their
employee’s earnings
and benefits, above
the threshold of £162
a week, at a rate of
13.8%. Employees pay
NI on their earnings
and benefits above the
threshold of £162 a
week at a rate of 12%.
Above the earnings
threshold of £892 a
week this drops to 2%
Employers pay NI
contributions on their
employee’s earnings
and benefits, above
the threshold of £162
a week, at a rate of
13.8%. Employees pay
NI on their earnings
and benefits above the
threshold of £162 a
week at a rate of 12%.
Above the earnings
threshold of £892 a
week this drops to 2%
Contributions are only
made by the worker.
Above the yearly profit
threshold of £6,205
there is a flat rate
of £2.95 per week.
Between £8,424 and
£46,350 there is a rate of
9% and above £46,350
the rate drops to 2%
Minimum wage Covered Covered Not covered
Holiday pay Full-time employees
are entitled to 28 days
paid holiday leave per
year, and part time
employees the pro-rata
equivalent
Entitled to the same de-
gree of holiday pay as
permanent employees.
Due to the nature of
ZHC work, many firms
include holiday pay
in the workers hourly
wage rate
Not entitled to holiday
pay
Sick pay Entitled to statutory
sick pay, only if they
earn at least £116 per
week
Entitled to statutory
sick pay, only if they
earn at least £116 on
average from one
employer
Not entitled sick pay
Unfair dismissal protec-
tion, Minimum notice
periods and Statutory
redundancy pay
Protected against unfair
dismissal, covered by
statutory minimum no-
tice periods, and enti-
tled to statutory redun-
dancy pay
Employer could offer
zero hours in perpetu-
ity, thus effectively no
protection against un-
fair dismissal, no mini-
mum notice period, no
redundancy pay
Not covered by un-
fair dismissal protec-
tion, minimum notice
periods or statutory re-
dundancy pay
Notes: National Insurance contributions build up your state pension, whilst also helping to pay for the NHS
and other welfare services. Reports from the UK’s Citizens Advice Bureau suggests some employers attempt
to avoid paying out sick pay to ZHC workers, and stop hours for those workers who do try to claim. Some
instances of case law in the UK have tried to establish that ZHC workers who work regular hours may be
eligible for aspects of dismissal protection.
Source: UK Government Website.
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TABLE 4.2: ZERO HOUR-LIKE CONTRACTS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES
Country Contract
type
Description and/or regulation
France N/A ZHCs are outlawed in most cases. All part-time contracts must include
the number and distribution of hours. Collective bargaining agreements
require a minimum of 24 hours per week but can be reduced at the request
of the employee. Exceptions for youth in education and temporary agency
workers
Germany On-call
work
Generally, contracts must specify weekly and daily working hours. If
agreed by the employer and employee (or employee representative) a
contract could avoid specifying weekly working hours, in which case 10
weekly working hours are deemed to be agreed. If the daily working hours
are not specified, the employer is bound to call the employee for at least 3
consecutive hours per day
Italy On-call
work
Contracts exist but are heavily regulated. Contracts must be justified by
reference to production cycles and organization needs, and companies
who use them must notify the ministry of labour. Banned from public
administration, weekend work and bank holiday work. Only workers un-
der 25 and over 55 can be placed on them. Limits to 400 working days over
3 years and then automatic conversion into full-time permanent contract
Sweden On-call
work
These contracts give no fixed hours and the employer can vary the work-
ing hours. No known regulation
Norway Zero hours
contract
Until recently such contracts made up around 0.8% of the workforce. Case
law from 2005 and 2017 has deemed the use of permanent contracts where
employees were to work only on-call as illegal and evading temporary
employment law (which has strict usage and limitations). New regulation
has been proposed by government to explicitly prohibit ZHCs
Netherlands Zero hours
contract
Unlike the UK, there is an obligation on behalf of the employee to work
when called upon. Each time an employee is called to worker, they must
be paid a minimum of 3 hours wages (even if there is less than 3 hours
work for them). Following 3 months of continuous employment on a ZHC,
the agreed number of hours adjusts to the average number of hours during
the previous 3 months
Min-max
contract
Employees are given a guaranteed number of hours – weekly, monthly or
annually. These are always paid even if the employer is unable to provide
work. If the guaranteed number of hours per week is 15 hours or less,
then similar regulation to the ZHCs is enforceable. During periods of high
demand, employers and employees can agree upon extra hours
United
States
On-call/
“Just-
in-time”
schedules
Diffusion of on-call working arrangements have increased from 1.6% in
1995 to 2.6% in 2015 (Katz and Krueger, 2019a). There is no federal regula-
tion, however eight states operate “show-up pay” laws, where employers
are required to pay workers for a minimum number of hours (no matter
how long they work), if they have been called to work. Coverage however
varies across these eight states, and a number of exemptions exist. A few
cities (e.g. San Francisco, Seattle, New York) operate fair scheduling or-
dinances. For example, San Francisco requires new employees to receive
a written estimate of their expected days and hours of shifts. Schedules
must be posted at least two weeks in advance, changes with less than a
week notice results in compensation entitlement for the employee, and
employees required to be on call but not working are also entitled to some
compensation. If employers have available hours, these must be offered to
current part-time employees before hiring additional part-time workers
Source: Eurofund, 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2015; McCrate, 2018.
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TABLE 4.3: LFS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
All Employees ZHC Employees
2017 2017
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Age 43.43 13.39 38.22 16.67
Prop. female 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.49
Prop. in full-time education 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.38
Age when completed full-time education 18.63 3.10 18.32 3.05
Median tenure 5-10 yrs 1-2 yrs
Prop. part-time 0.29 0.45 0.67 0.47
Prop. aged under 25 0.09 0.29 0.31 0.46
Hourly wage 14.73 11.78 9.77 7.46
Hourly wage (aged 25+) 15.42 12.13 10.76 7.96
Hourly wage (aged under 25) 8.24 3.63 7.47 5.50
Hourly wage (median) 11.50 7.90
Weekly hours 31.40 17.38 21.33 16.98
Prop. wanting more hours 0.08 0.27 0.25 0.43
Observations 71,604 1,907
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of individual character-
istics for the employees from the LFS, for both all employees and ZHC workers, in 2017.
The ZHC indicator only appears in April-June and October-December quarters of the LFS.
Thus the above statistics use only those two quarters for each year. Wage data only appears
in two waves of the survey, thus wage stats are based off approximately one third of the
number of observations.
Source: LFS.
TABLE 4.4: THE BITE OF THE NATIONAL LIVING WAGE
All Employees ZHC Employees
2016 2017 2016 2017
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Prop. paid below next NLW 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.50
Prop. paid below next NLW (25+) 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49
Prop. paid at NLW 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
Prop. paid at NLW (25+) 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42
Observations 20,638 21,102 606 554
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of proportions of employees impacted by the NLW,
for both all employees and ZHC workers, for the years 2016 and 2017.
Source: LFS.
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TABLE 4.5: TRANSITIONS OUT OF ZHC WORK (BETWEEN QUARTER T
AND T+5)
Status
in T
Status in T+5
Inactive Unempl Emp FT Emp PT Self FT Self PT ZHC Total
Inactive 84.89 3.79 2.23 5.68 0.38 1.82 1.21 100.00
[2,641]
Unempl 21.20 36.71 19.94 15.19 0.63 1.90 4.43 100.00
[316]
Emp FT 2.47 1.13 88.91 4.41 1.79 0.49 0.81 100.00
[4,697]
Emp PT 7.20 1.55 9.50 76.22 0.75 1.55 3.22 100.00
[1,737]
Self FT 2.58 0.49 8.11 0.86 79.85 6.88 1.23 100.00
[814]
Self PT 11.50 1.47 2.95 6.19 10.03 66.08 1.77 100.00
[339]
ZHC 15.17 4.83 16.55 20.00 4.14 2.76 36.55 100.00
[145]
Total 24.62 2.92 42.69 16.71 7.47 3.63 1.96 100.00
[2,632] [312] [4,563] [1,786] [799] [388] [209] [10,689]
Notes: For each type of economic activity today, the table reports the percentage of respondents by working
arrangement in 5 quarters time. The data is pooled from the LFS panel survey, from January 2015 to March
2018. For all those in some form of employment, their primary job is reported. Sample sizes reported in
square brackets.
Source: LFS.
TABLE 4.6: TRANSITIONS INTO ZHC WORK (BETWEEN QUARTER T AND
T+5)
Status
in T
Status in T+5
Inactive Unempl Emp FT Emp PT Self FT Self PT ZHC Total
Inactive 85.18 32.05 1.29 8.40 1.25 12.37 15.31 24.71
[2,641]
Unempl 2.55 37.18 1.38 2.69 0.25 1.55 6.70 2.96
[316]
Emp FT 4.41 16.99 91.52 11.59 10.51 5.93 18.18 43.94
[4,697]
Emp PT 4.75 8.65 3.62 74.13 1.63 6.96 26.79 16.25
[1,737]
Self FT 0.80 1.28 1.45 0.39 81.35 14.43 4.78 7.62
[814]
Self PT 1.48 1.60 0.22 1.18 4.26 57.73 2.87 3.17
[339]
ZHC 0.84 2.24 0.53 1.62 0.75 1.03 25.36 1.36
[145]
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
[2,632] [312] [4,563] [1,786] [799] [388] [209] [10,689]
Notes: For each type of economic activity today, the table reports the percentage of respondents by working
arrangement 5 quarters before. The data is pooled from the LFS panel survey, from January 2015 to March
2018. For all those in some form of employment, their primary job is reported. Sample sizes reported in
square brackets.
Source: LFS.
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TABLE 4.7: SAMPLE OF ZHC WORKERS IN LSE-CEP SURVEY
Mean S.D.
Female 0.53 0.50
Age 36.28 13.21
Age 18-24 0.26 0.44
Age 25-34 0.25 0.43
Age 35-44 0.19 0.39
Age 45-54 0.18 0.38
Age 55-65 0.13 0.33
No qualifications 0.02 0.13
Some GCSE/O levels 0.10 0.30
5 or more GCSE/O levels 0.13 0.34
Trade/technical/vocational training 0.11 0.31
A levels 0.23 0.42
Bachelor’s degree 0.27 0.45
Master’s degree 0.11 0.31
Doctorate degree 0.03 0.16
North East 0.05 0.22
North West 0.12 0.32
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.06 0.23
East Midlands 0.08 0.27
West Midlands 0.09 0.29
Eastern England 0.08 0.26
London 0.19 0.40
South East 0.12 0.33
South West 0.08 0.27
Wales 0.04 0.20
Scotland 0.07 0.26
Northern Ireland 0.02 0.15
Married/Cohabiting 0.44 0.50
Widow/Separated/Divorced 0.10 0.30
Never married 0.45 0.50
Children 0.55 0.50
White 0.84 0.37
Mixed/Multiple ethnic group 0.04 0.20
Asian/Asian British 0.06 0.23
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 0.06 0.23
Arab 0.00 0.06
Observations 1,167
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TABLE 4.7 CONTINUED: SAMPLE OF ZHC WORKERS IN LSE-CEP SURVEY
Mean S.D.
Multiple employers (ZHC jobs) 0.42 0.49
Non-ZHC job holder 0.34 0.47
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.01 0.08
Mining and quarrying 0.01 0.08
Manufacturing 0.07 0.25
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.02 0.15
Water supply, sewerage, waste management 0.01 0.10
Construction 0.06 0.24
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles 0.09 0.29
Transportation and storage 0.06 0.24
Accommodation and food service activities 0.11 0.32
Information and communication 0.05 0.22
Financial and insurance activities 0.03 0.18
Real estate activities 0.01 0.07
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.03 0.16
Administrative and support service activities 0.05 0.23
Public administration and defense 0.01 0.10
Education 0.09 0.29
Human health and social work activities 0.15 0.36
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.06 0.24
Other service activities 0.06 0.23
Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 0.01 0.12
Activities of extraterritorial organizations 0.00 0.07
Other 0.01 0.07
Hourly wage 11.63 8.16
Hourly Wage (median) 8.64
Hours worked in previous week 18.62 13.67
Different days worked per week 4.06 1.71
Proportion doing unpaid hours 0.32 0.47
Average weekly unpaid hours 7.08 9.02
Less than one year of working experience 0.05 0.23
1-3 years of working experience 0.17 0.38
3-5 years of working experience 0.15 0.36
More than 5 years of experience 0.62 0.48
Less than one year of working experience in ZHC 0.52 0.50
1-3 years of working experience in ZHC 0.21 0.41
3-5 years of working experience in ZHC 0.14 0.35
More than 5 years of experience in ZHC 0.13 0.34
Received work-related training in the last year 0.55 0.50
Observations 1,167
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of individual charac-
teristics for the sample of respondents who declared to be on a ZHC in the week prior to
taking the survey.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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TABLE 4.8: TRAINING OF WORKERS ON ZHC
Received last year Most useful
(1) (2)
Technical or technology training 0.18 0.23
Quality training 0.30 0.24
Skills training 0.54 0.50
Continuing education 0.13 0.20
Professional training and legal training 0.22 0.24
Managerial training 0.15 0.23
Safety training 0.56 0.27
Other 0.01 0.02
Observations 644 1,167
Notes: The table reports answers to the question “What type of training [did you re-
ceive last year]?” in column (1) and to the question “What type of training would you
find most useful to improve your job prospects?” in column (2). The table reports the
proportion of respondents who ticked each of the preset options.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
TABLE 4.9: WHO PAYS FOR THE TRAINING OF WORKERS ON ZHC
Who pays
Me or a family member 0.16
A contractor or customer 0.11
My employer 0.59
Someone else 0.02
No one, it was free 0.12
Observations 644
Notes: The table reports answers to the ques-
tion “Who paid for the cost of the training?”.
The table reports the proportion of respon-
dents who ticked each of the preset options.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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TABLE 4.10: NMDS-SC SUMMARY STATISTICS
All firms Care homes Domiciliary care
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Number of employees 45.22 46.26 38.99 31.16 65.97 74.00
Proportion under 25 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.09
Hourly wage 7.57 1.09 7.53 1.11 7.67 1.01
Weekly hours 25.61 8.90 28.56 5.17 15.75 11.31
Weekly earnings 189.42 79.01 212.80 54.35 111.59 96.54
Hourly wage carer 7.10 0.93 7.01 0.97 7.43 0.68
Weekly hours carer 24.49 10.30 27.98 6.25 12.41 12.25
Prop. on ZHC 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.38 0.33
Prop. on permanent contract 0.88 0.17 0.90 0.11 0.82 0.27
Prop. on temporary contract 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.15
Prop. on bank contract 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.13
Prop. on agency contract 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.16
Female 0.85 0.13 0.84 0.13 0.87 0.11
Age 42.60 4.63 42.71 4.53 42.21 4.92
Prop. carer 0.61 0.19 0.56 0.16 0.75 0.23
Prop. with nursing qualification 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.01
Occupancy rate 0.77 0.33 0.92 0.14 0.27 0.30
Proportion paid below NLW 0.48 0.34 0.52 0.32 0.34 0.36
Observations 4,680 3,599 1,081
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set of firm-level variables for the
balanced sample of firms used in the analysis. The statistics refer to March 2016, and are shown
for the full sample, and for the sample of care homes and domiciliary care agencies separately.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 4.11: WAGE EQUATIONS
Change in log average hourly wage
March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Initial low-paid proportion x Domiciliary -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes
F-stat 519.52 280.43 410.41 203.22
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms 0.041
Care homes 0.043
Domiciliary care 0.036
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficient βˆ3 from model 4.3. The sample is a balanced
panel of adult social care providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables
are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care as-
sistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and local authority district dummies. When
data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing information is controlled for via a set of
dummy variables.
Source: NMDS-SC.
Chapter 4. Zero Hours Contracts and Labor Market Policy 260
TABLE 4.12: ZERO HOURS CONTRACTS EQUATIONS
Change in proportion of employees on ZHCs
March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop 0.001 0.006* 0.014** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Initial low-paid prop x Domic 0.039** 0.033*
(0.019) (0.019)
Change in log avg wage 0.257** 0.219**
(0.126) (0.101)
Change in log avg wage x Domic 0.596*
(0.350)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms 0.019
Care homes 0.006
Domiciliary care 0.061
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient βˆ3 from model 4.3 in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient βˆ4 from model 4.4 in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of
workers on ZHC as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care providers
active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-
value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with
nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and local
authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing information is
controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
Source: NMDS-SC.
TABLE 4.13: ZERO HOURS CONTRACTS EQUATIONS (LFS SAMPLE)
Probability of being on a ZHC
Social care Low-pay industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post NLW 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 25,191 25,191 91,362 91,362
Controls No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var. 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.041
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient βˆ5 from model 4.5.
The sample for the first two columns is workers employed in the social care indus-
try, and for the second pair of columns is workers employed in low-pay industries
(defined in Low Pay Comission, 2017). The samples contain 4 pre-NLW quarters
(2014-2015 quarter 2 and quarter 4) and 3 post-NLW quarters (2016 quarter 2 and
quarter 4, and 2017 quarter 2). Controls include age, education, gender, a dummy
for white ethnicity, a dummy for British nationality, a dummy for working in the
public sector and twelve regional dummies. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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4.A Appendix Figures
FIGURE 4.A1: MINIMUM WAGE RATES IN THE UK BETWEEN 1999 AND
2018
Notes: The graph reports the various minimum wage rates in the UK between 1999 and 2018. The apprentice
rate applies to apprentices. The 16-17 year-old rate to workers aged 16 and 17. The youth development rate
to workers aged 18-20. The adult rate applied to workers aged 21 and over until March 2016. From April
2016, the adult rate applies to workers aged 21-24 and the NLW to those aged 25 and over.
Source: Low Pay Commission.
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4.B Appendix Tables
TABLE 4.B1: SAMPLE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS OF LSE-CEP SURVEY
Mean S.D.
Female 0.53 0.50
Age 40.93 13.04
Age 18-24 0.14 0.35
Age 25-34 0.21 0.41
Age 35-44 0.22 0.41
Age 45-54 0.25 0.43
Age 55-65 0.19 0.39
No qualifications 0.04 0.19
Some GCSE/O levels 0.12 0.32
5 or more GCSE/O levels 0.13 0.34
Trade/technical/vocational training 0.12 0.33
A levels 0.22 0.41
Bachelor’s degree 0.26 0.44
Master’s degree 0.09 0.28
Doctorate degree 0.02 0.12
North East 0.05 0.22
North West 0.11 0.32
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.09 0.29
East Midlands 0.08 0.27
West Midlands 0.09 0.29
Eastern England 0.07 0.26
London 0.12 0.33
South East 0.15 0.35
South West 0.08 0.27
Wales 0.05 0.22
Scotland 0.08 0.27
Northern Ireland 0.02 0.14
Employed by government 0.17 0.38
Employed by private company 0.49 0.50
Employed by non-profit organization 0.07 0.26
Self-employed, with or without employees 0.11 0.32
Working in the family business 0.01 0.11
Only work last week was filling out surveys 0.03 0.17
Did not have a job last week 0.12 0.32
Observations 18,831
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of a set
of individual characteristics for the full sample of respondents to
the LSE-CEP Survey of Self-Employment and Alternative Work
Arrangements.
Source: LSE-CEP survey.
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TABLE 4.B2: CEP-LSE SURVEY REPRESENTATIVENESS BASED ON LFS
2017
All individuals ZHC workers
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.49
Age 42.78 13.34 37.85 14.91
Age 18-24 0.11 0.32 0.28 0.45
Age 25-34 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.39
Age 35-44 0.22 0.41 0.16 0.37
Age 45-54 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38
Age 55-65 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39
No Qualifications 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.24
GCSE/O levels 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
Trade/Technical/Other 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30
A Levels 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
Bachelor’s Degree 0.30 0.46 0.23 0.42
Master’s Degree 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17
Doctorate Degree 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06
North East 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
North West 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29
Yorkshire The Humber 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28
East Midlands 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
West Midlands 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.26
East of England 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
London 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32
South East 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35
South West 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32
Wales 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.11
Scotland 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Northern Ireland 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23
Employed by Public Sector 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36
Employed by Private Sector 0.58 0.49 0.84 0.37
Self-employed, with or without employees 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29
Does not have a job 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00
Hourly Wage 14.82 11.42 9.70 7.12
Hourly Wage (median) 11.55 8.0
Observations 108,983 1,686
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of individual level characteristics for all work-
ing age respondents and ZHC workers. Wage data only appears in two waves of the LFS,
thus wage statistics are based off approximately one third of the number of observations.
Source: LFS.
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TABLE 4.B3: NMDS-SC SURVEY REPRESENTATIVENESS (CARE WORK-
ERS)
LFS NMDS-SC
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prop. female 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.13
Age 42.62 13.58 42.60 4.63
Hourly rate 7.91 1.50 7.10 0.93
Weekly hours 28.38 16.14 24.49 10.30
Proportion on ZHC 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.23
North East 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23
North West 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.31
East Midlands 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28
West Midlands 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33
East England 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34
London 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
South East 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
South West 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
Observations 2,025 4,680
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation for a set of
individual-level characteristics for care workers in the LFS (columns
(1) and (2)). The table also reports the mean and standard devia-
tion for the same set of characteristics at the firm level in NMDS-SC
(columns (3) and (4)). The LFS data refer to 2015Q4 and 2016Q1, and
the NMDS-SC data to March 2016. The ZHC indicator only appears in
April-June and October-December quarters of the LFS. Thus the pro-
portion of ZHC reported in column (1) is based on 2015Q4 data only.
Wage data only appears in two waves of the LFS, thus wage statis-
tics in columns (1) and (2) are based off approximately one fifth of the
number of observations.
Source: LFS and NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 4.B4: EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS
Change in log number of employees
March 2016 to March 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial low-paid proportion -0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Initial low-paid proportion x Domiciliary 0.036 0.024
(0.032) (0.033)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes
F-stat 519.52 280.43 410.41 203.22
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms 0.013
Care homes 0.013
Domiciliary care 0.012
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient βˆ3 from model 4.3, using
the change in log headcount employment as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced
panel of adult social care providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Con-
trol variables are the initial proportion female, proportion with nursing qualification, pro-
portion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occupancy rate and local authority
district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such missing information
is controlled for via a set of dummy variables.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 4.B5: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT EQUATIONS
Change in proportion of employees by contract type between March 2016
and March 2017
Panel A - Temporary contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Initial low-paid prop x Domic -0.003 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
Change in log avg wage -0.038 -0.008
(0.060) (0.046)
Change in log avg wage x Domic -0.129
(0.167)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms -0.002
Care homes -0.001
Domiciliary care -0.005
Panel B - Bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Initial low-paid prop x Domic 0.008 0.011
(0.006) (0.007)
Change in log avg wage 0.037 -0.024
(0.056) (0.063)
Change in log avg wage x Domic 0.193
(0.118)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms -0.004
Care homes -0.004
Domiciliary care -0.005
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TABLE 4.B5 CONTINUED: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT EQUATIONS
Panel C - Agency contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial low-paid prop 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial low-paid prop x Domic 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.008)
Change in log avg wage 0.017 0.001
(0.040) (0.027)
Change in log avg wage x Domic 0.023
(0.137)
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var.:
All firms -0.002
Care homes -0.000
Domiciliary care -0.009
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient βˆ3 from model 4.3 in columns (1)-(4),
and the estimated IV coefficient βˆ4 from model 4.4 in columns (5)-(6), using the change in the share of
workers on a given contract as outcome variable. The sample is a balanced panel of adult social care
providers active between March 2015 and March 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Control variables are the initial proportion female,
proportion with nursing qualification, proportion of care assistants, average age (all workers), occu-
pancy rate and local authority district dummies. When data on firm-level covariates is missing, such
missing information is controlled for via a set of dummy variables. Temporary contract: the worker is
employed for a limited duration, normally either on a fixed term contract or for a fixed task, or on a
spell of casual or seasonal employment as a “temp”. Bank worker: the worker is retained by the organ-
isation as a whole, but deployed on a casual or short term basis. Temporary agency work: the worker
is supplied by an outside employment agency/bureau; this category includes staff employed by NHS
professionals, and workers supplied on contract e.g. by outside catering and cleaning companies.
Source: NMDS-SC.
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TABLE 4.B6: ZERO HOUR CONTRACTS EQUATION, LOW PAY INDUSTRIES
(LFS SAMPLE)
Probability of being on a ZHC
Retail Hospitality Social care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post NLW 0.001 0.002 0.0118** 0.014** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 27,058 27,058 12,446 12,446 25,191 25,191
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.: 0.017 0.017 0.102 0.102 0.042 0.042
Employment Cleaning and Leisure,
agency maintenance travel and sport
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Post NLW 0.013 0.013 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.024** 0.025**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 1,701 1,701 5,729 5,729 3,541 3,541
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.: 0.072 0.072 0.019 0.019 0.099 0.099
Food Wholesale Childcare
processing of food
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Post NLW 0.011* 0.013** 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 2,885 2,885 1,915 1,915 3,246 3,246
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.: 0.025 0.025 0.010 0.010 0.031 0.031
Agriculture Security Textiles
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Post NLW 0.001 0.001 -0.024 -0.019 0.018** 0.019**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 3,084 3,084 1,057 1,057 996 996
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.: 0.010 0.010 0.115 0.115 0.009 0.009
Hairdressing Pooled
(25) (26) (27) (28)
Post NLW 0.010* 0.010** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,513 2,513 91,362 91,362
Controls No Yes No Yes
Pre-NLW mean of dep. var.: 0.013 0.013 0.041 0.041
Notes: The table reports the estimated reduced-form coefficient βˆ5 from model 4.5, using different Low
Paying Industry samples, as defined in Low Pay Comission (2017). The samples contain 4 pre-NLW quarters
(2014-2015 quarter 2 and quarter 4) and 3 post-NLW quarters (2016 quarter 2 and quarter 4, and 2017 quarter
2). Controls include age, education, gender, a dummy for white ethnicity, a dummy for British nationality, a
dummy for working in the public sector and twelve regional dummies. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. P-value: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: LFS.
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4.C LSE-CEP Survey of Self-employment and Alternative Work
Arrangements: Survey Questionnaire
R1 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ No qualifications
◦ Some GCSE/O levels.
◦ 5 or more GCSE/O levels
◦ Trade/technical/vocational training
◦ A levels
◦ Bachelor’s degree
◦ Master’s degree
◦ Doctorate degree
R2 Are you?
◦ Male
◦ Female
R3 What is your age? [ALLOW INTEGER NUMBERS BETWEEN 15 AND 99]
R4 Which region do you usually live in?
◦ North East
◦ North West
◦ Yorkshire and Humberside
◦ East Midlands
◦ West Midlands
◦ Eastern England
◦ London
◦ South East
◦ South West
◦ Wales
◦ Scotland
◦ Northern Ireland
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S1 On your main job last week, were you employed by government, by a private com-
pany, a nonprofit organization, or were you self-employed or working in the family busi-
ness? Or were you not working at all last week?
◦ Employed by government GO TO S2
◦ Employed by private for-profit company GO TO S2
◦ Employed by nonprofit organization including tax exempt and charitable organi-
zations GO TO S2
◦ Self-employed, with or without employees GO TO S3
◦ Working in the family business GO TO S3
◦ Only work last week was filling out surveys SCREENS OUT
◦ Did not have a job last week SCREENS OUT
S2 Many people work in self-employment, on either a part-time or full-time basis, doing
things such as working on construction jobs, selling goods or services in their businesses,
or working through a digital platform or intermediary, such as Uber, Upwork, Deliveroo
or Avon. Last week, were you working or self-employed as an independent contractor, an
independent consultant, or freelance worker? That is, someone who obtains customers
on their own to provide a product or service.
◦ Yes
◦ No
S3 Last week, were you on a zero hours contract? Zero hours contracts are also known as
casual contracts or “on call” work. Under such contracts, people agree to be available for
work as and when required, but have no guaranteed hours or times of work.
◦ Yes GO TO QUESTION Q1
◦ No GO TO QUESTION D1
Q1 In your employment as a zero hours contract or on-call worker last week, did you
have more than one employer or contract? Please consider only jobs on zero hours con-
tracts or on-call jobs when answering this question.
◦ Yes
◦ No
Q2 Last week, did you do any paid work as self-employed or on employment contracts
other than zero hours contracts or on-call jobs?
◦ Yes
◦ No
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Q3 In your zero hours contract or on-call job, how many hours did you work last week?
Please, consider only hours you are paid for.
Please enter: hours last week
Q4 In your zero hours contract or on-call job, how many hours do you work on average
in a week? Please, consider only hours you are paid for.
Please enter: hours on average in a week
Q5 On how many (different) days per week do you usually work?
Please enter: days per week
Q6 How much did you earn per hour in your zero hours contract or on-call job last week?
Please, consider only hours you are paid for.
Please enter earnings: £ per hour
Q7 Did you do any hours of unpaid work in your zero hours contract or on-call job last
week? E.g. travel time from one customer to another.
◦ Yes
◦ No
IF Q7 = Yes
Q7a How many hours of unpaid work did you do in your zero hours contract or on-call
job last week?
Please enter: hours of unpaid work last week
Q8 Would you have preferred to work more or fewer hours last week in your zero hours
contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or were you satisfied with the number of hours
you worked?
◦ More hours last week
◦ Fewer hours last week
◦ Satisfied with number of hours
IF Q8 = More hours last week
Q8a Why were you not able to work more last week?
◦ I am not qualified for the available work
◦ There isn’t enough available work
◦ I have domestic commitments that prevent me from working more
◦ I am ill or disabled
◦ Other
IF Q8 = Fewer hours last week
Q8b Why would you want to work fewer hours?
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◦ I am a student
◦ I am ill or disabled and do not feel I can take on more hours
◦ I have domestic commitments that prevent me from working more
◦ I want to spend more time on leisure or other unpaid activities
◦ I want to do other types of work
◦ Other
Q9 Would you have preferred to work a pattern of more regular hours last week on your
zero hours contract or on-call job at that wage rate? Or were you satisfied with the pattern
of hours you worked?
◦ More regular hours last week
◦ Less regular hours last week
◦ Satisfied with pattern of hours
Q10 How satisfied are you with working on a zero hours contract or on-call job?
◦ Very satisfied
◦ Satisfied
◦ Neither satisfied not dissatisfied
◦ Dissatisfied
◦ Very dissatisfied
Q11 Which of the following are reasons why you work on a zero hours contract or on-call
job? Tick all that apply.
 Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours
 Pay is better than other available jobs
 To complement pay from other jobs
 To earn money while going to school
 Gives me flexibility to perform other activities
 Other
Q11a Which is the most important reason why you work on a zero hours contract or
on-call job?
◦ Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours
◦ Pay is better than other available jobs
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◦ To complement pay from other jobs
◦ To earn money while going to school
◦ Gives me flexibility to perform other activities
◦ Other
IF Q11a = Could not find employment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours
Q11b Please indicate which of the following reasons contributed to you not finding em-
ployment in a job with a guaranteed number of hours:
◦ Lack of jobs near where I live
◦ I faced discrimination
◦ I am overqualified for the available jobs
◦ I am underqualified for the available jobs
◦ Other
Q12 For how long have you been working on a zero hours contract or on-call job?
◦ Less than one month
◦ 1 – 6 months
◦ 7 – 12 months
◦ 1 – 2 years
◦ 3 – 4 years
◦ 5 years or more
Q13 How much longer do you expect to remain in your zero hours contract or on-call
job?
◦ Less than one month
◦ 1 – 6 months
◦ 7 – 12 months
◦ One year or more
Q14 Have you received any work-related training in the last year?
◦ Yes SKIP TO Q14a
◦ No SKIP TO Q14c
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Q14a What type of training? (Mark all that apply) [LIST IN RANDOM ORDER, BUT
OTHER IS LAST]
 Technical or technology training
 Quality training
 Skills training
 Continuing education
 Professional training and legal training
 Managerial training
 Safety training
 Other (please specify: )
Q14b Who paid for the cost of the training?
◦ Me or a family member
◦ A contractor or customer
◦ My employer
◦ Someone else
◦ No one, it was free
Q14c What type of training would you find most useful to improve your job prospects?
(Mark all that apply) [LIST IN RANDOM ORDER, BUT OTHER IS LAST]
 Technical or technology training
 Quality training
 Skills training
 Continuing education
 Professional training and legal training
 Managerial training
 Safety training
 Other (please specify: )
Q15 In your job on a zero hours contract or on-call job, what kind of work do you do, that
is, what is your occupation? (For example: plumber, typist, farmer)
Please enter your occupation:
Q15a What are your usual activities or duties at this job? (For example: typing, keeping
account books, filing, selling cars, operating printing press, laying brick)
Please enter your usual activities or duties:
Q15b What kind of business or industry are you in at this job?
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◦ (A) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
◦ (B) Mining and Quarrying
◦ (C) Manufacturing
◦ (D) Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply
◦ (E) Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities
◦ (F) Construction
◦ (G) Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
◦ (H) Transportation and Storage
◦ (I) Accommodation and Food Service Activities
◦ (J) Information and Communication
◦ (K) Financial and Insurance Activities
◦ (L) Real Estate Activities
◦ (M) Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities
◦ (N) Administrative and Support Service Activities
◦ (O) Public Administration and Defense, Compulsory Social Security
◦ (P) Education
◦ (Q) Human Health and Social Work Activities
◦ (R) Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
◦ (S) Other Service Activities
◦ (T) Activities of Households as Employers of Domestic Personnel, Undifferentiated
Goods and Services Producing Activities of Households for Own Use
◦ (U) Activities of Extraterritorial Organizations and Bodies
◦ Other (please specify: )
Q15c In your zero hours contract or on-call job, what is the main company you work for?
Please specify name:
D1 Which country were you born in?
Please specify:
D2 What is your nationality?
Please specify:
D3 Which category or categories below best describe your ethnic group? (Mark all that
apply)
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 White
 Mixed / Multiple ethnic group
 Asian / Asian British
 Black / African / Caribbean / Black British
 Chinese
 Arab
 Other (please specify: )
D4 How many years of working experience have you got?
◦ Less than one year
◦ 1 – 3 years
◦ 3 – 5 years
◦ 5 years or more
D5 Are you now married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married?
◦ Married
◦ Widowed
◦ Divorced
◦ Separated
◦ Never Married
◦ Other (please specify: )
D6 How many children do you have?
◦ 0
◦ 1
◦ 2
◦ 3 or more
D7 Which category represents your total individual income (before taxes) during the past
12 months? This should include money from all jobs, net income from a business or farm,
and any rent, pensions, dividends, interest, social security payments or other money
income you received.
◦ Less than £5,000
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◦ £5,000 to 9,999
◦ £10,000 to 19,999
◦ £20,000 to 39,999
◦ £40,000 to 69,999
◦ £70,000 or more
D8 Which category represents total income (before taxes) of your household during the
past 12 months? This should include money from all jobs, net income from a business
or farm, and any rent, pensions, dividends, interest, social security payments or other
money income that all members of your household received, including you.
◦ Less than £5,000
◦ £5,000 to 9,999
◦ £10,000 to 19,999
◦ £20,000 to 39,999
◦ £40,000 to 69,999
◦ £70,000 or more
D9 Do you use services such as Uber, TaskRabbit, Airbnb or Deliveroo?
◦ Yes
◦ No
D10 Could you tell us how interesting or uninteresting you found the questions in this
survey?
◦ Very interesting
◦ Interesting
◦ Neither interesting nor uninteresting
◦ Uninteresting
◦ Very uninteresting
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